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 1 Abstract 
The project topic is the evaluation of the implementation of Performance-
based Design (PBD) in Melbourne, Australia, working with the sponsor, the 
Metropolitan Fire Brigade.  The evaluation came from a series of case studies 
performed on buildings in Melbourne, as well as interviews of engineers, building 
owners, and others involved in the building process.  From this data, the make 
recommendations for further research and changes to Melbourne’s implementation of 
PBD to improve safety and communication.  
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7 Nomenclature 
 
ABCB – Australian Building Code Board – Creates and maintains the Building Code 
of Australia (BCA)  
 
Alternate Methods and Materials – An allowance for a version of Performance-based 
Design mentioned in some prescriptive codes   
 
Alternative Designs – Another term, usually used in prescriptive codes, for a variation 
on Performance-based Design   
 
BCA – Building Code of Australia – Standard PBD-based building code used in all 
states and territories in Australia.  Needs regulatory approval from each state to be 
enforced 
 
Break Glass Alarm – This is the equivalent to the United States Pull Station. It is the 
manual mode of setting off the fire alarm to alert people in a building that there is a 
fire  
 
Building Code – Requirements that a building must meet at construction in order to be 
deemed safe to occupy 
 
Building Inspector – The Official who examines a building for fire code violations   
 
Building Regulations – Laws passed by each state that describe the enforcement and 
specific implementation of the BCA in each Australian state   
 
Building Certifier – General term for the person who performs regulatory evaluations 
and certifies a building with approval for occupancy; In Victoria, this is the Building 
Surveyor    
 
Building Surveyor – Victorian official, who may be private or acting on behalf of the 
city council, who performs regulatory evaluations and certifies a building with 
approval for occupancy 
 
Deemed-to-Satisfy – (DtS) Provisions in PBD standards that give a series of designs 
known to be effective derived directly from previously existing prescriptive codes.  
 
Design Fire – The fire characteristics used by FSEs to analysis whether the building 
meets sufficient safety standards 
 
Deterministic Analysis – a.k.a. Hazard-based Assessment; Uses one canonical fire to 
determine the effectiveness of the whole fire solution 
 
Essential Safety Measures – A Victorian regulatory term used to describe the safety 
systems in a building.  This primarily refers to purely fire safety systems, such as fire 
appliances, but can include specific usage requirements as well.  These systems are 
subject to brigade inspection   
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Fire Appliances – Fire Safety-specific hardware in buildings, such as sprinkler 
systems, smoke alarms, and hose reels 
 
Fire Brigade – An organized body of fire fighters 
 
Fire Code – Fire safety requirements for a building that apply after construction is 
complete 
 
Fire Department – Local government body that prevents and puts out fires 
 
Fire Scenario – A hypothetical fire that could occur in a building, used in the analysis 
of buildings during design and to form the design fire   
 
FPE – Fire Protection Engineer – In the US: engineers that focus on general fire 
safety throughout many aspects of a building.  In Australia: engineers that focus on 
the design of fire appliances 
 
FSE – Australian equivalent of a US FPE 
 
FRL - Fire Resistance Level – A lab measurement of a building material’s resistance 
to fire, measured in time until the material is compromised   
 
Fuel – Material in a building that is combustible 
 
Hazard Analysis – See Deterministic Analysis 
 
KPI – Key Performance Indicator - Quantifiable measurements of critical success 
factors used in the fire modeling process 
 
MFB – Metropolitan Fire Brigade – Umbrella organization for fire departments in 
Melbourne.  Also involved in the building evaluation process 
 
MFB Comments – Non-legally-binding suggestions for a building to improve its 
safety during the PBD process 
 
MFB Recommendations – Legally binding requirements a building must meet to gain 
MFB approval before it can be constructed 
 
MBS – Municipal Building Surveyor – Employed by the city council, responsible for 
ensuring both the structural and fire safety of people within buildings in the city 
 
NFPA – National Fire Protection Association – US fire protection standards 
organization  
 
Performance-based Design – Building code paradigm that gives building designers 
broad safety objectives and requires an engineer to evaluate the building individually   
 
Prescriptive Codes – Building codes that precisely define requirements a building 
must meet to pass inspection.  These requirements are detailed, and frequently 
quantitative   
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Probabilistic Analysis – a.k.a. Risk Analysis – The Analysis technique that uses 
probabilities of different fire events to determine which ones are most important   
 
Risk Analysis – See Probabilistic Analysis 
 
SFS – Society for Fire Safety, an Australian professional body for Fire Safety 
Engineers 
 
WorkSafe – Government agency responsible for occupational health and safety 
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8 Executive Summary 
Building fires present a significant hazard in cities, and regulatory officials 
work to prevent and mitigate these hazards though the use of building codes.  In 
recent years, building codes in Australia and many cities around the world have 
moved to more flexible Performance-based Design (PBD) techniques to allow for 
more innovation in building design.  This transition poses some risks, however, as 
PBD requires a Fire Safety Engineer (FSE) to design alternative fire safety solutions 
and then analyze these systems to determine if they at least meet the minimum 
expectations of the Building Code of Australia (BCA), which may be less 
conservative than the Deemed-to-Satisfy (DtS) requirements.  These fire safety 
solutions frequently rely on the implementation of policies by building managers to 
maintain their efficacy.  The goal of this project was to determine, based on real-
world examples, whether buildings using PBD have successfully implemented 
policies that ensure the design assumptions made by the FSE hold true during 
occupancy.  The result is a set of recommendations for further research based on the 
information gathered during this project.   
 
The effective implementation of these policies depends on the communication 
between the parties involved in the building process, and can be broken into two 
sections:  
1. Downstream Communication – the flow of fire safety information from FSEs 
through to building owners/managers in order to determine what policies to 
implement and the role they play in keeping their building safe. 
2. Upstream Communication – the flow of usage information from building 
owners/managers/maintenance to the designing FSEs in order to determine 
what assumptions can be made about building usage within design models.    
 
The methods for evaluating this communication were broken into the two 
main research objectives for the project:  
1. Determining whether usage assumptions underlying the fire engineering 
models were correct in the building during occupancy. 
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2. Determining whether building managers/owners were aware of the effect 
usage changes can have on the fire safety systems and how to avoid these 
changes.   
 
Performing this research consisted of two parts: a series of detailed case 
studies conducted on buildings in Melbourne, and interviews of FSEs, Fire Services 
Personnel, Building Surveyors, and Building Managers/Owners.  The case studies 
provided concrete examples of PBD implementations and the interviews allowed an 
evaluation of the communication between stakeholders.  The building 
managers/owners from each case study building were questioned specifically about 
policies concerning the PBD fire safety systems, and these answers were compared to 
the results of the site visits of the buildings themselves.  The remaining interviews 
were performed to provide an account of the experiences of various stakeholders 
involved with the design process.  The groups were compared against each other to 
determine the effectiveness of the communication in the building process. 
 
During the course of the project, the team visited six buildings for use as case 
studies with three residential apartment buildings and three commercial warehouses.  
In these samples, the level of compliance with usage specifications from the fire 
engineering reports varied from buildings with significant usage deviations that could 
catastrophically affect fire safety to buildings that were rigorously managed and able 
to detect and compensate for changes quickly.  It should be noted that that there were 
not enough case studies to be able to generalize the distribution of flawed buildings 
over Victorian buildings.   
 
From these case studies and interviews, it was determined that there are issues 
with the implementation of PBD in Melbourne.  Although the sample size was small, 
the problems found in these buildings combined with experiences of interview 
subjects indicates that there are a substantial number of buildings that are not being 
used and maintained as specified by the FSE during the fire analysis.  Additionally, 
the team found that: 
• There is no mechanism in place for detecting subtle changes in a building’s 
use that don’t necessarily change its classification. 
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• Many issues found were not necessarily a result of PBD, but the severity of 
the issues was often compounded as a result of the alternative solution 
removing redundant systems. 
• FSEs have little to no involvement with the project after the fire engineering 
analysis is complete. 
• There are not enough enforcement officials to be able to effectively police all 
the buildings in Melbourne.  Instead, regulatory bodies are focus on high risk 
buildings and rely on complaints to catch issues elsewhere. 
• Building managers rarely have any technical knowledge of the fire safety 
requirements, including those whose buildings are well run and compliant. 
• Most building managers are dependent on outside contractors to perform 
maintenance on fire safety systems. 
• Some owners and managers see no financial benefit to performing 
maintenance as the fines for getting caught are less than the maintenance 
costs. 
 
Based on these findings the team made several recommendations, both for 
further research and to improve the implementation of PBD.  As the sample size for 
this study was too small to make any generalizations on the extent of implementation 
issues, it is recommended that further studies be performed on a larger sample of 
buildings.  Of particular interest should be buildings which have experienced change 
in ownership, as this was indicated by virtually all the interview subjects as a scenario 
when information can be lost and usage can change.  Additionally, older buildings 
should be examined since the only PBD buildings available at the time of this project 
were relatively new.  The goal of these studies should be to determine the level of 
compliance and to determine what, if any, usage assumptions tend to not be 
implemented.  Research should also be done to determine how well fire safety system 
maintenance companies perform their duties. 
  
Additional recommendations include the following: 
• Evaluating maintenance contractors could show a positive response. Building 
owners and managers can use this information to hire the best maintenance 
contractors to ensure the compliance of the building’s safety systems.   
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• Fines for failing to properly maintain should be increased to make it in the 
managers’ financial interest to meet the requirements. 
• Efforts should be made to educate owners, managers and insurance companies 
about fire safety and how to keep a building safe.  The insurance companies, 
in particular, if it is shown to be in their best interest, can be used to enforce 
fire safety regulations. 
• Fire safety requirements need to be communicated more clearly and 
understandably to building managers.  This can be done either through a more 
standardized format for the occupancy permit or through a separate set of 
operating manuals detailing how the building needs to be managed. 
• Companies should look into more self-policing policies.  
• FSEs should be more involved in the actual construction and commissioning 
of a building.  One way to do this would be to require the signature of the FSE 
on the occupancy permit for buildings using the alternative solutions he 
designed. 
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9 Introduction 
 
Fires present a significant hazard in large cities, as large buildings with many 
occupants make dealing with fires more complicated.  Fires are destructive not only 
through loss of life, but also through significant property damage and economic 
consequences due to a lost business, lost records and replacement of damaged goods.  
In the US, in 2005, there were 511,000 structure fires, with over 3,000 civilian deaths, 
over 15,000 injuries, and US$9.2 billion in property damage (National Fire Protection 
Association [NFPA], 2006).  In New South Wales, Australia, there were 7259 
building fires from 1997-1998 which caused 531 injuries and 27 deaths, as well as 
more than AU$241 million in damage (New South Wales Fire Brigade [NSWFB], 
1998).  The public as a whole feels the cost of severe fires, as insurance rates must 
take into account the cost of rebuilding the damaged or destroyed buildings.   
 
1Fire Safety Engineers  (FSE) work to prevent deadly fires by determining the 
best ways to construct and maintain buildings with performance during a fire in mind.  
Australia has implemented a Performance-based building code, in which designers are 
given broad performance requirements that a building must meet in order to 
accomplish certain objectives.  In the construction of large buildings, such as schools, 
offices, and apartment complexes, designers may consult with FSEs to ensure the fire 
safety systems in the building will meet these performance requirements.  With 
Performance-based Design (PBD), designers have increased flexibility to use 
alternative designs to accommodate unique circumstances or the use of innovative 
materials and methods (Australian Building Codes Board [ABCB], 2004).  While 
PBD allows for greater flexibility of design, it relies on assumptions made by the 
engineer during the design process.  Small changes made by the occupants of the 
building can dramatically change the validity of these assumptions, often without the 
occupants even realizing it.  This can result in discrepancies between the models 
designers use to predict fire performance and the actual usage of the building 
(Marchant, 2003).   
                                                 
1 The terminology for this position differs between the US and Australia; in the US an engineer that 
focuses on general building safety in a fire is a Fire Protection Engineer (FPE), while this same 
position in Australia is a Fire Safety Engineer.  Because this paper focuses on Australian fire safety, the 
convention will be to use FSE in all cases.    
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 At the core of the discrepancies between a building in use and its PBD models 
is knowledge transfer amongst the key parties involved with the building.  In order to 
ensure the assumptions made by the designers are valid and continue to be valid 
throughout the building’s lifetime, communication between key stakeholders, 
specifically the designers and occupants, must be maintained.  Those who actually 
live in, work in, own and maintain a building must know how to ensure the building 
continues to meet the fire performance specifications of the designer.  In the 
information passing from the users through to the FSEs, the building designers should 
know whether usage assumptions made at design-time are accurate based on the real-
world usage of the building.  By maintaining the transfer of knowledge amongst all 
involved parties, the discrepancies between the designer’s fire performance models 
and the building in use can be reduced to improve safety.   
 
The implementation of PBD evaluated in this project was the Melbourne 
implementation covered by the Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB).  The MFB statutory 
authority is throughout Melbourne, which limited the sample size of the study to a 
pool of buildings in Melbourne.  However, the area covered by the MFB is large, with 
over 1,000 square kilometers, $200 billion in assets, and over 3 million people 
(“Corporate action plan”).  The findings of this research could have wide-reaching 
implications, as modifications to building codes and the laws that authorize their 
enforcement affect a very large number of buildings.  Furthermore, the data from this 
project could be passed on to national agencies that deal with building codes as well, 
which means that results of this project could have an effect on the implementation of 
building codes across a much larger region than that which the MFB oversees.  The 
results could be applicable anywhere PBD is currently implemented or where there 
are plans to implement PBD. 
 
The background research consisted of an examination of the performance-
based building process as implemented in buildings from design through to final use 
of the building years after completion.  This required an understanding of fire safety 
engineering as applied to the design of buildings and an understanding of the 
occupant usage data designers use to create engineering models.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, it was important to understand what occupants, owners and 
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maintenance staff of buildings should know about fire safety.  In order to understand 
the sources of discrepancies between a building’s use and its design, the project 
required analysis of the competing needs in the development of a building, such as 
economic concerns or long-term usefulness.  This gave sufficient background on each 
node in the knowledge transfer chain to start on the project itself.   
 
There were two main research objectives in evaluating the implementation of 
PBD in Melbourne: determine the existence of changes in building use that have 
invalidated the FSEs’ fire model for the building, and determine the level of 
awareness of these changes among the people who own, maintain and occupy the 
building.  With the data from these research objectives, common areas of discrepancy 
were found and recommendations were produced to improve the implementation of 
PBD in Melbourne.  The primary source of research for this project consisted of a 
series of case studies performed on a pool of buildings in Melbourne.  MFB selected 
these buildings as ones that make use of PBD, and all buildings were assumed to have 
met code at the time of construction. 
 
The case studies themselves accomplished the first research objective: finding 
discrepancies between the buildings, if any existed, and their documented 
performance specifications.  This consisted of building visits with inspectors from 
MFB to determine how well buildings continued to meet the fire performance 
specifications documented during the design and construction of the building.  This 
provided a direct test as to how much buildings in the case studies diverged from their 
original planned use.  The second research objective, finding the level of knowledge 
among those who own, maintain and occupy the building, was accomplished by 
interviewing these people to find out how aware they are of how their actions can 
change these assumptions, invalidating the design models and possibly making the 
building less safe.  
 
After a suitable number of case studies were completed, the data was analyzed 
to determine common areas of discrepancy and their sources.  Due to the small 
sample size of the buildings examined during this project, it was not possible to do a 
full statistical analysis and generate trends.  Even with this limitation, the sample size 
was sufficient to find several common areas to improve.  The most important part of 
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the project was creating a list of recommendations for improvements to be made in 
the existing system and areas for more research.  These recommendations included 
things such as simple changes to building codes or procedures, or even legislative 
changes.  In any case, there exists room for this project to have a significant effect on 
the implementation of PBD in Melbourne and in many other cities.   
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10 Background 
The manner in which building and fire codes are applied is a complicated 
process, involving a number of different parties and constraints.  This section seeks to 
give a background on design techniques used in the development of buildings, 
particularly those concerning regulatory influence.  There are two essential paradigms 
used in building codes aimed at fire safety: prescriptive codes and Performance-based 
codes.  Prescriptive codes give a very precise, methodical list of (frequently 
quantitative) requirements for a building design to follow, whereas Performance-
based Design (PBD) give broader safety objectives to meet with the requirement that 
a Fire Safety Engineer (FSE)2 analyze the building.   
 
Prescriptive codes have been around much longer, but in recent years many 
jurisdictions have moved over to PBD because of the potential advantages in cost 
savings and enhanced flexibility.  This transition is still a recent event and there are 
many aspects of the implementation of PBD that need to be evaluated.  One of the 
major issues is the effect of subtle usage changes to the design fire’s underlying 
assumptions, which are unlikely to be perceived as significant, that can have an effect 
on the effectiveness of the building’s fire safety systems.  This can be due to issues 
with the assumptions used during design of the buildings, or building occupiers not 
knowing what is necessary after construction to keep the building safe.   
 
The purpose of this research project is to evaluate the Melbourne 
implementation of PBD by determining if those buildings constructed under PBD 
have any of the subtle flaws that might undermine their safety and whether those 
people who own, occupy and maintain the buildings know how to avoid these subtle 
flaws.  Subtle flaws are the focus of this project due to the fact that more substantial 
changes will require building recertification and thus, design reevaluation.   
 
                                                 
2 The terminology for this position differs between the US and Australia; in the US an engineer that 
focuses on general building safety in a fire is a Fire Protection Engineer (FPE), while this same 
position in Australia is a Fire Safety Engineer.  Because this paper focuses on Australian fire safety, the 
convention will be to use FSE in all cases.   
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Performing this evaluation requires background knowledge of how building 
codes work, starting with prescriptive codes and the transition into PBD.  Because the 
focus of this project is on the implementation in Melbourne, knowledge of some of 
the legislative and regulatory influences on the use of building codes is necessary.  To 
see how Melbourne’s implementation compares to the rest of the world, the building 
code implementations from several other areas in Australia and other countries are 
included.   
 
10.1 Prescriptive Design 
Prescriptive design is the predecessor to PBD in the world of fire safety. 
Gaining an understanding for the older prescriptive codes can provide a better outlook 
on PBDs. Supplying the advantages and the disadvantages of the prescriptive codes 
will help explain why Performance-based codes are being adopted by many countries.   
10.1.1 Prescriptive Codes 
A prescriptive code specifies “certain construction characteristics, limiting 
dimensions, or protection systems without referring to how these requirements 
achieve a desired fire safety goal” (SFPE 9).  An example of a prescriptive code from 
the Florida Building Code concerning automatic sprinklers states for a certain 
classification of building, based on the building’s intended use, an automatic sprinkler 
system must be provided if:  
• The fire area exceeds 12,000 square feet (1115 m 2).  
• The fire area has an occupant load of 300 or more.  
• The fire area is located on a floor other than the level of exit discharge.  
• The fire area contains a multi-theater complex (Florida State Legislature) 
This code is very representative of the typical prescriptive code.  It gives a very clear 
description of exactly how to satisfy the requirement.  If the building meets any of the 
criteria it must have a sprinkler system, otherwise it is not necessary.  The reasoning 
behind the requirement is not made clear, nor is the goal of the code. 
10.1.2 Building Process 
The building process can be broken down into a series of phases for a building 
engineered for fire safety.  The following is a generalized description of how the 
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building process should proceed based on the Fire Safety Engineering Manual of 
Practice (Ramsay, et al., 0.2-3).   This is an idealized version of the building process 
and the areas in which flaws arise will be covered in Section 10.2.4.  This description 
is not specific to any particular locality, and should only be considered to be a 
benchmark for comparisons.   
 
In the initial design phases, implementing fire safety solutions is easiest.  As 
there is a great deal of flexibility at this stage, multiple methods of developing the 
building for fire safety can be evaluated to determine which are both effective at 
preventing severe fire and cost effective.  The designers have the choice of using 
either the ‘Deemed-to-Satisfy’ designs, or finding an alternative design through a 
PBD process.  ‘Deemed-to-Satisfy’ designs are prescriptive requirements listed in the 
building code known to provide an acceptable level of safety by meeting the 
performance objectives.  These provide precise design parameters that can be directly 
implemented.  If there is another safety solution that can provide a comparable level 
of safety, then it can be implemented with PBD.  The PBD process, described in 
greater detail in Section 10.2.1, but for the purposes of this section, both prescriptive 
and PBD solutions are available to implement. These alternatives could use non-
standard materials, equipment, or other design techniques that could provide an 
equivalent level of safety at reduced cost.  The use of Performance-based alternatives 
will be detailed in Section 10.2 (Ramsay et al. 38).   
 
The next phase is regulatory approval, where a reviewing FSE must approve 
the design or be sent back for changes.  Upon granting initial regulatory approval, the 
construction phase begins.  The construction phase still requires the input of an FSE 
to ensure any changes to the design do not impair the effectiveness of the fire safety 
systems (Ramsay et al. 38).   
 
After construction, the building goes through a commissioning process in 
which a building certifier must test the final building for code compliance before 
occupancy.  This process can include actual tests of the fire safety systems 
implemented in the building, and these tests should also include integrated testing to 
determine how well multiple systems function together.  In the case of a Performance-
based alternative design, an FSE will need to set the necessary performance 
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requirements used to measure the specific system in the building.  Once the tests are 
complete, the building receives an occupancy permit certifying it is ready for use.  
During the occupancy of the building, the information used in the fire planning must 
reach the owners and occupants of the building, so usage, fuel load, and fire safety 
system assumptions made by FSEs to model likely fire scenarios are not invalidated 
inadvertently.  Even something like rearranging furniture could have an adverse effect 
on the fire performance of a building because the fuel load could change or 
evacuation routes could be impaired, resulting in a fire the FSEs had not anticipated.  
The building managers should receive a series of guidelines that explain how to 
properly maintain the building.  Further in the life of the building, should the use of 
the building change, or alterations be made to the building, managers should consult 
an FSE to ensure the building remains well-protected from fires (Ramsay, et al., 0.2-5 
– 0.2-6). 
 
Because there is more to the building than the fire safety systems, it is helpful 
to understand some of the parties and processes involved with the construction of a 
building.  The party that usually starts the building process is the developer, which 
usually finances the building, assembles the design team, oversees the building 
through construction, and in many cases, sells the building.  This is the party that is 
most directly connected to the design process, although eventual owners of a building 
are frequently included in order to ensure it meets their needs.  After construction, the 
developer hands the building over to the owner, which may be a single person or 
small business or a large corporate entity that owns many buildings.  The management 
of the actual building may not be involved in the design process, and will depend on 
the exact use of the building (Edwards).   
 
10.1.3 Advantages of Prescriptive Codes 
Prescriptive codes have been enforced for generations; only in the last decade 
or so has the PBD approach been implemented. Prescriptive codes still work as a 
safety measure in many places, including the United States of America where the 
transition to PBD has been slow. There are several advantages to prescriptive codes 
that also explain their continued use.  If a building has certain occupancy and a certain 
square footage, then that building automatically falls under a particular set of codes 
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and standards requiring the building include certain fire safety features. This is an 
advantage when the construction of a building is underway because there is no 
analysis to conduct, the designers merely have to categorize the building appropriately 
and follow the applicable codes (Babrauskas).   
 
Another advantage to prescriptive codes is they provide a high level of fire 
safety in buildings following common ‘standard’ design patterns. Prescriptive codes 
stipulate specifically what to do in each case with a minimum of interpretation. 
Prescriptive codes are also easy to enforce as there is no inherent analysis that must 
occur in order to apply them; code enforcement officials can simply check certain 
measurements and specifications off on a list (Barnett).  This makes it easy to 
determine if a prescriptive code has been met or not.  The codes are not perfect, 
however, which explains the continuing trend toward the newer PBD (Babrauskas). 
 
10.1.4 Disadvantages of Prescriptive Codes 
The primary disadvantage of prescriptive codes is the lack of flexibility.  The 
inflexibility of prescriptive codes is largely due the very specific quantitative 
requirements often prescribed in the codes.  The inflexibility of prescriptive codes 
leads to a range of problems.  One problem is that the designs produced are not 
always the most cost-effective, as prescriptive codes may not allow the use of 
possibly cheaper alternate design solutions.  While specific requirements can make 
the design of more ‘standard’ buildings easier, buildings that fall outside of the 
common design patterns are made more difficult.  Some more unique buildings, such 
as skyscrapers or large stadiums, simply cannot be built easily under prescriptive 
codes because the codes simply do not cover such buildings.  Because of their size, 
the emergency planning for these special case buildings needs to take into account 
complexities that are covered in prescriptive codes.  These problems make the use of 
prescriptive codes more difficult or impossible in some situations (Hadjisophocleous 
and Bénichou 127-142). 
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10.2 Performance-Based Design 
The movement towards PBD began in the 1970s with the development of the 
concept.  In the 1980’s, individual nations began implementing a Performance-based 
building code, with Great Britain and Japan being among the first to attempt to 
incorporate elements of PBD into their respective building codes (Barnett; The 
Evolution of Performance-Based Codes 4).  Performance-based codes were 
implemented to address some of the main disadvantages of prescriptive codes.  This 
section will define PBD and outline the design process as well as some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of PBD. 
 
10.2.1 Performance-Based Design Description 
Performance-based codes can be defined as codes or standards that 
specifically state their goals and reference acceptable methods to demonstrate 
compliance with their requirements (SFPE 8).  In contrast with prescriptive codes, 
Performance-based codes identify objectives to meet and define possible methods of 
satisfying the objective without limiting the designer to any specific solution.  Any 
method that satisfies the performance requirements outlined by code is available for 
use (About the Building Code).  
 
 
Figure 8-10-1: Hierarchy of the BCA (“About the Building Code”) 
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Figure 8-10-1 shows the performance hierarchy of the Building Code of 
Australia (BCA).  Moving down the pyramid it is easy to see how performance-based 
codes are written and implemented in a general sense.  At the top of the hierarchy are 
the objectives, which are general statements of what the designers must accomplish.  
These are stated in very broad terms, leaving the details of achieving this goal to 
lower levels in the hierarchy.  Table 8-1 shows specific examples of the top three 
levels of the pyramid.  A typical objective might state that occupants should be kept 
safe in the event of a fire.  The functional statement then gives a general statement of 
how to meet the objective.  A possible functional statement for the previous example 
would be that a building must be constructed to prevent the spread of fire long enough 
for occupants to safely evacuate.  The next level of the pyramid specifies the 
performance level the building must satisfy.  The performance requirement is 
mandatory and must be satisfied either through the use of the Deemed-to-Satisfy 
provisions or alternative solutions (About the Building Code). 
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Objective Functional Statement Performance 
Requirements 
Protect the occupants not 
intimate with the initial 
fire development from loss 
of life 
A building is to be 
provided with safeguards 
to prevent fire spread so 
occupants have time to 
evacuate to a safe place 
without being overcome 
by the effects of fire 
A material and assembly 
must resist the spread of 
fire to limit the generation 
of smoke and heat, and any 
toxic gases likely to be 
produced, to a degree 
appropriate to the travel 
distance, the number and 
mobility of occupants, the 
building use and the active 
fire safety systems 
installed in the building 
Table 8-1: Example of Objective, Functional Statement and Performance Requirement (Custer 
and Meacham 72-73) 
  
Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions are written similarly to prescriptive codes.  
They outline a specific requirement the building can meet in order to satisfy the 
performance requirement.  The building designer can choose to meet this provision or 
use an alternative method so long as it can be proven to satisfy the performance 
requirement through one of the assessment methods (About the Building Code). 
  
 The goals of Performance-based codes, specifically with regard to fire, are 
relatively simple and straightforward.  The most important goal is widely considered 
to be the protection of the lives of the occupants.  This means people must be alerted 
to the danger and must be allowed enough time to evacuate safely to a safe location.  
Performance-based codes must also include provisions to prevent the spread of the 
fire.  In Australia, this goal only applies to the spread of fire to other buildings.  There 
are no provisions in the BCA to protect the building in which the fire originated 
except for the purpose of suppressing the fire in order to allow the occupants enough 
time to escape.  Any concern for the building itself is limited to protecting the 
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occupants and nearby buildings.  The owner of the building might specify additional 
performance requirements to limit damage but these are separate from the BCA 
requirements and not subject to enforcement from the government.  Lastly, it is the 
goal of Performance-based codes to protect firefighters while they do their job.  This 
includes ensuring the structural integrity of the building so it can withstand the fire 
long enough for firefighters to perform search and rescue operations (Barnett; 
Bukowski 81). 
 
10.2.2 Fire Analysis 
In order to perform evaluations of PBD implementations, it is necessary to 
understand some of the underlying technical components of producing a PBD.  While 
this project will not focus on the technical details concerning fire models and the 
scientific background material, it is useful to understand many of the basic 
components of fire safety.   
 
10.2.2.1 Risk vs. Hazard 
In order to effectively evaluate a specific PBD, some attention needs to be 
paid to exactly how engineers assess safety in a building.  Because reducing a 
building to a mathematical model is a very complicated process, there are several 
ways of approaching the problem. There are two basic paradigms in assessing a 
building design’s effectiveness; however a combination of both often provides the 
best analysis.    
 
One method of analyzing a building is a deterministic approach, which relies 
on scientifically derived mathematical models that can describe the progression of a 
fire.  There is a wide variety of different models that can be applied to buildings and 
particular conditions, so it is easy to tailor models to a particular building.  One 
advantage of this approach is the outcome of the models is determined completely by 
its parameters, so the results of a simulation will always be the same if the parameters 
are the same.  The abundance of models is the reason deterministic assessments are 
more frequently used (Metropolitan Fire Brigade).   
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Deterministic assessments are also known as hazard-based assessments, where 
the analysis focuses around a single canonical fire to determine the performance of 
the whole solution.  The biggest flaw with a pure hazard-based assessment is it 
centers on a specific fire, which may not fully test the other aspects of the design 
necessary for a more thorough performance analysis (Bukowski and Babrauskas 173-
191).   
 
Another method of analysis is a probabilistic assessment, which centers on 
calculating the risk associated with design elements and determining the probabilities 
of certain events occurring over time.  The advantage with probabilistic approaches is 
the method also gives the probabilities of fire contingencies.  The difficulty with this 
approach, however, is the data necessary to make probabilistic comparisons are very 
difficult to acquire in sufficient detail to be effective, which is why probabilistic 
assessments are not used as frequently (Metropolitan Fire Brigade).   
 
The probabilistic assessment is also known as a ‘Risk-based’ assessment, 
named because one must attempt to find and sort all the possible risks that could 
occur in a particular building, and then rank them.  This ranking allows the engineer 
to determine the acceptable ‘cost’ in the case of a fire.  This is a particularly difficult 
area of this form of fire assessment, because there are costs which cannot be easily 
compared, such as property damage vs. human life.  There are other difficulties here 
as well, as determining the list of all events that could occur (even very unlikely or 
unusual ones) is very hard (Bukowski and Babrauskas 173-191). 
 
  In order to manage the problems of both approaches, it is necessary to use a 
mixed approach that examines multiple fire scenarios to ensure all the various parts of 
the design solution are examined.  Risk-based analysis should be used to determine 
what fire scenarios are the most likely.  This provides a way of managing the benefits 
of both assessment strategies while mitigating the negative effects (Bukowski and 
Babrauskas 173-191).   
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10.2.2.2 Fire Scenarios and Design Fires 
A key part of the fire safety design process is the creation of the fire scenario 
and design fire.  A fire scenario is a description of a specific fire including specific 
building features and the damage the fire is expected to cause (Custer and Meacham 
43).  A design fire is a “set of conditions that defines or describes the critical factors 
for determining outcomes of trial designs” (SFPE 7).  Fire scenarios are defined first 
in the design process, and then used to create design fire scenarios, which are in turn 
used to evaluate possible designs.  This relationship is shown in Figure 10-2.  This 
section will describe in more detail this process and the decisions that must be made 
regarding key assumptions about the fire, building, and occupants. 
 
Figure 10-2: Design Process 
 The development of fire scenarios is the first step in determining how to 
satisfy the performance criteria outlined in the building code.  In order to determine 
possible fire scenarios, the pre-fire conditions of the structure must be determined.  
These conditions fall into several categories.  One is building characteristics.  This 
includes factors such as the size of the rooms, the amount of ventilation through 
doors, windows and other openings, the height of the building and the proximity of 
the building to other fire hazards such as neighboring buildings.  The fire protection 
systems such as sprinklers and smoke detectors must be taken into account as well as 
the amount of fuel (combustible materials) in the building, the response of the fire 
department and the environmental factors such as temperature and humidity.  These 
are just some of the building characteristics to consider in the fire scenario.  In many 
cases, these factors are not explicitly known and assumptions must be made (Custer 
and Meacham 44; National Fire Protection Association 25; SFPE 42-55). 
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 The fire scenario must also take into account the occupants.  The response of 
the occupants to the fire is important and is generally dependent on the ability to sense 
physical cues, such as smoke or a fire alarm, the ability to interpret these cues and 
react appropriately, the mobility of the occupants, and their susceptibility to the heat 
and toxins produced by fires.  These characteristics might include the occupants’ 
familiarity with the building, which affects their ability to react appropriately, the 
alertness of the occupants, such as whether they are asleep or awake, and how 
committed the occupants are to their pre-fire activities, which could affect their 
willingness to leave the building.  Group dynamics also play a role; such as whether a 
person will lead or follow and a whether a person will respond as a member of a 
group or as an individual.  The fire scenario must also take into account evacuation 
times and other psychological factors such as fear and panic (Custer and Meacham 
46; National Fire Protection Association 24; SFPE 55-57) 
  
 Finally, designers must consider the characteristics of the fire.  One such 
consideration is the source of ignition.  The initial fuel is also an important factor.  
The state of fuel, which affects how easily it is ignited, what that fuel is made out of, 
the quantity of fuel, and the arrangement of the fuel in the room are critical to the 
development of the fire.  The ability of the fire to spread beyond the area in which it 
starts is important as well as the location of key features, such as critical documents 
that must be protected, specified by the client with relation to the initial fire location.  
These are all factors that must be considered in the creation of fire scenarios (Custer 
and Meacham 44-46; Ramsay et al. 2.2 3-4; SFPE 57-62). 
  
 These characteristics are used to determine possible fire scenarios using 
several methods.  One such method is called Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA).  This involves studying the possible failure modes of individual components 
and the cause and effect of each possible failure mode.  Failure analysis is another 
method, which involves identifying possible causes of unacceptable losses as defined 
by the stakeholders in the building process.  These losses might include death, injury 
or other possible outcomes of a fire.  Fire scenarios can also be identified through 
simple “what if” analysis by determining the outcome of a certain failure or event.  
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Using these methods and others, possible fire scenarios can be determined (Custer and 
Meacham 123-127) 
  
 With the possible fire scenarios identified, it is then necessary to narrow these 
down into a manageable number of design fire scenarios.  There are two general 
methods for determining design fire scenarios.  The first is the probabilistic approach.  
This method uses statistics to determine the likelihood of a fire occurring and the 
likely outcome of the fire.  This allows fire scenarios which are either very unlikely or 
have an acceptable outcome to be eliminated.  The other approach is the deterministic 
one.  This method uses analytical models to determine whether a fire scenario will 
exceed the performance criteria.  Using this method, enough design fire scenarios are 
selected to provide a sufficient representation of all possible fire scenarios (Ramsay et 
al. 2.3-2; SFPE 47-51).   
  
 With the design fire scenarios identified, a design fire curve is determined.  
Without going into too much detail on the fire engineering involved, a design fire 
curve is a representation of the development of fire over time.  This development is 
characterized by ignition of the fire, then growth up to the flashover point after which 
the fire burns at a steady state until decay.  The design fire scenarios are then used to 
evaluate possible designs.  This involves determining for each of the design fire 
scenarios whether a design will meet the performance criteria.  From the designs that 
meet the criteria, the final design is chosen (Custer and Meacham 47-63; SFPE 57-65) 
 
10.2.3 Advantages of Performance-based Design 
 There are several important advantages Performance-based codes have over 
prescriptive codes.  One such advantage at the heart of PBD is the establishment of a 
clear design goal.  A well-defined objective provides the designers with a better 
understanding of what the design needs to accomplish.  This allows them to more 
easily determine an alternative to the solution detailed in the code.  PBDs are also able 
to more easily incorporate the latest advances in technology and, of particular interest 
for this project, fire engineering.  Prescriptive codes have to be edited and updated at 
a fervent pace in order to be able to incorporate the latest materials and methods.  
Prescriptive codes do allow the use of new technology if it can be shown to be as safe 
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as proven technology, but the details of this process are not as clear with prescriptive 
codes as it is with Performance-based codes (Barnett).  Because Performance-based 
codes allow designers to determine the best method of achieving the provided goal, 
they can put new technologies into practice without excessive alterations to the code 
itself (National Fire Protection Association 8-10; About the Building Code). 
 
 PBD also allows the building to employ a comprehensive fire protection 
system.  Because the code leaves the method used to satisfy the objective up to the 
designer, the fire systems can be made to work together to achieve that goal as 
opposed to each having to meet individual prescriptive requirements.  This allows for 
more efficient design and can lead to safer buildings when the fire engineering 
systems work properly.  This efficiency can also allow the same or greater level of 
safety to be achieved while still decreasing the costs.  When the fire safety systems 
are designed as one entity to meet certain objectives, this allows the designers to 
eliminate redundancies and therefore save money (Custer and Meacham 19).   
 
10.2.4 Disadvantages of Performance-based Design 
The disadvantages of PBD are primarily associated with the design fire 
scenarios.  As described previously, the creation of fire scenarios requires the 
engineer to consider many characteristics of the building and its occupants.  Often it is 
necessary for the engineer to make assumptions about these characteristics as well as 
other inputs in the fire model.  These assumptions have inherent uncertainties that can 
affect the validity of the design fire.  Communication between stakeholders can affect 
the reliability of the design.  It is important for the occupants of the building to have 
an understanding of the assumptions made about the use of the building.  It is equally 
important for the designers to understand the occupants’ needs and make accurate 
assumptions based on these needs.  Otherwise, an inadvertent change can drastically 
alter the performance of the building.  A good example of this might be propping 
open fire doors.  This is something that can easily be done out of convenience without 
any consideration of fire safety.  This can have a serious impact on 
compartmentalization, allowing smoke and flame to spread more quickly through a 
building.  Conflicts of interest between pleasing the client by decreasing costs and 
ensuring the building is safe can also affect the quality of the fire protection systems.  
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Finally, enforcement of PBD can be an issue to due the subjective nature of the codes.  
The specific requirements will be different for each building and will often require 
thorough analysis by individuals with more training than the typical building certifier.  
These disadvantages will be discussed further throughout this section. 
 
10.2.4.1 Uncertainties in Performance Based Design 
The engineering aspect of PBD can often be better defined by using more 
accurate assumptions. The design of the building should ensure the safety and 
protection of the building’s occupants.  The only way the engineers can make better 
assumptions is through feedback from the occupants of the building. This way the 
engineer can see if there are problems occurring with his assumptions and if there are 
problems, the engineer can fix them to provide better assumptions.  
 
Meacham uses the term “acceptable risk” to provide a skeptical term that must 
be evaluated (“Assessment” 27).  It is important that firefighters can get into the 
building, get the occupants out of the building and safely get out of the building as 
well.  PBDs have to accommodate for all aspects of fire safety and this should include 
all people.  The engineering of Performance-based fire protection is also to “predict 
the outcome of possible situations and also use different tools to evaluate these 
situations” (“Assessment” 28).  The engineers can then scientifically determine 
solutions and ways to change the designs to work properly. If the PBDs are working 
to their predicted performance or better, then the engineers can ensure people will be 
safe. 
 
The human aspect is a more difficult topic to evaluate than others.  People are 
spontaneous and hard to predict which makes it very difficult for the engineers to 
predict how they will react or respond to a fire.  In some cases people may not 
respond to a fire alarm initially or just may not even hear it. In this case, Meacham 
shows how people are not always quick to respond to a fire.  The FSEs sometimes 
assume occupants move to an exit immediately when they hear a fire alarm, but: 
 
In current performance-based fire protection designs, the time assigned 
by an engineer to the time interval required for people to begin 
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evacuation can be zero (people are assumed to begin travel once the 
alarm sounds), point values as low as 20 or 25 seconds, or a 
multiplicative factor of the estimated travel time. (“Assessment”, 30) 
 
This may not always be true, particularly if someone is hearing impaired or otherwise 
prevented from being able to quickly identify an alarm.  
 
10.2.4.2 Risk Communication 
It is important in PBD for the final occupants of the building to understand 
what they need to do to prevent fire as well as what they need to do in the event of a 
fire.  Without this knowledge, fire can render even the best fire safety solution 
ineffective.  This is particularly true of the assumptions made during the fire analysis, 
which human behavior can often invalidate.  It is important for the FSE to make clear 
how to maintain the assumptions but this is not always done.  An example of this is 
the Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas.  In the fire analysis, the engineer assumed the size of 
the fire would be limited to a certain heat release rate primarily based on the 
assumption that most of the decorations and furnishings on the unsprinklered casino 
floor would be non-combustible (Brannigan and Smidts 415).  The documentation did 
not specify, however, any enforcement mechanism for this assumption.  This risk 
communication issue is illustrated further by an MFB study which found most fire 
victims were unprepared to deal with the fire and did not feel confident during the 
ordeal (Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board 21).   
 
10.2.4.3 Sensitivity of Fire Models to Variation in Inputs 
 Despite the sophistication of the fire models in use today, they still require the 
engineer to determine and input the values of variables used in the model.  Because 
there is always going to be uncertainty in these values it is impossible to be certain the 
outcome predicted by the model will match reality.  There are methods to combat this 
uncertainty, which include factors of safety based off sensitivity analysis performed 
by the engineer during the design process. Sensitivity analysis is a method of 
determining how changes in model parameters affect the results generated by the 
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model (Peacock et al. 110).  Using this, an engineer can determine a factor of safety 
that accounts for the uncertainty in the inputs. 
 
Experience, or lack thereof, of the engineer using a computer model can affect 
the accuracy of a design fire utilizing its results.  The use of a computer fire model 
requires the engineer to have an understanding of the model used by the computer and 
proper modeling techniques.  This understanding comes with training and experience, 
something which many fire safety engineers may not have.  Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI) can be used to aid in the modeling process.  KPIs are quantifiable 
measurements of critical success factors defined by an organization.  Using these one 
can determine how well a model is being used.  This provides the engineer with 
guidance and allows the engineer to have a better understanding of how to 
appropriately use the computer model.  Although KPIs are very useful, they require 
extra time, money and training in order to define and use properly (Kuhn et al. 4-7). 
 
 This analysis works well for variables such as material properties and initial 
conditions such as temperature and pressure.  Human behavior however, is much 
more difficult to quantify and plays a major role in the fire scenarios. Data on human 
behavior is limited and is complicated by the changing nature of human behavior over 
time.  Simple things such as tenant modifications, renovations, maintenance and 
repair can have a significant impact on the amount of fuel and increase the severity of 
a fire (Bukowski).  This uncertainty affects the overall reliability of the design in 
several ways.  First is the accuracy of the design fire scenario.  Many assumptions are 
made about the actions of the occupants both before and during a fire and these have a 
large impact on the outcome of the fire scenario.  Human behavior also makes it 
difficult to guarantee the conditions used in the design fire scenario, which were 
relevant at the time the building was constructed, will stay the same.  It is very 
difficult to use past data to predict the future with regards to human behavior in the 
same way this is done with events which occur more regularly over long periods of 
time, such as hurricanes or earthquakes.  This makes planning for the future in the 
design extremely difficult.  These uncertainties mean the actual safety level of 
buildings in use might not be the same as the safety level predicted by the design and 
could fall below the performance requirements specified by the codes (Brannigan and 
Smidts 344-345). 
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 10.3 Melbourne Implementation 
Because this project centers on the implementation of PBD in Melbourne, it is 
necessary to discuss some of the elements specific to Melbourne.  The role of the 
MFB and the legislative structure and regulations that allow the MFB to influence the 
building process is an important aspect of studying Melbourne’s implementation of 
PBD.   
 
The powers afforded to statutory bodies such as the Metropolitan Fire Brigade 
derive from a series of legislation passed at the state level.  The BCA is adopted as the 
standard for use in Victoria in the Building Regulations statutes.  The Building 
Regulations 2006, adopted by the legislature of Victoria, detail how the building code 
is applied, both during the construction of the building and after, as well as the powers 
of all of the various agencies.  All of the technical details of the building code 
implementation are deferred to the BCA (Edwards; Building Regulations 2006).   
 
During construction, the MFB has authority over certain sections of the design 
of a building when it requires an engineering analysis due to PBD.  These sections 
limit MFB powers to a list of specific fire safety appliances (Barnett; Edwards).  The 
areas where the MFB chief officer has authority, from the Building Regulations 2006, 
Section 309, are:  
(a) fire hydrants;  
(b) fire hose reels;  
(c) fire control centers or fire control rooms;  
(d) fire precautions during construction;  
(e) fire mains;  
(f) control valves;  
(g) booster assemblies;  
(h) emergency vehicle access;  
(i) fire indicator panels;  
(j) proscenium curtain drencher systems;  
(k) fire services controls in passenger lift cars. 
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The chief officer of the MFB must approve any variations from BCA Deemed-to-
Satisfy provisions concerning the systems listed in the building regulations, although 
this decision may be appealed before the Building Appeals Board (Edwards; Building 
Regulations 2006).   
 
While MFB does have some authority for buildings using PBD, they do not 
have enforcement power outside of this area. The person with legal authority to 
certify a building’s safety is not actually the MFB or a team of engineers; it is the 
building surveyor3.  The building surveyor is sometimes connected to the city council, 
but in most cases is actually from private industry.  The surveyor assembles all of the 
documents for a building, and must deliver any PBD reports to the town council.  A 
building inspector must have a graduate certificate on PBD in order to evaluate the 
fire engineered portions of the design, but is not likely a fully trained engineer 
(Edwards; Barnett; Building Regulations 2006).   
 
MFB is involved in the PBD process in either of two situations: when a 
building is designed with Performance-based alternative design, or when the 
designers of the building request that the MFB examine the PBD document.  During 
the design of a building, MFB has the power to make “recommendations” about the 
design, and these recommendations are legally binding on the designer and builder.  
MFB can also make “comments” concerning less important issues or issues outside 
their jurisdiction, but the designers are not legally obliged to act on them 
(Metropolitan Fire Brigade). 
 
After the building has been constructed, MFB lacks significant power to force 
changes in the event a building no longer meets code specifications properly.  Due to 
some political difficulties, some of the MFB’s powers to inspect buildings were 
legislated away.  Currently, MFB has the power to call for an inspection of a 
building’s fire appliances (hose reels, sprinklers, etc).  They cannot call for an 
inspection or shut down a building to deal with other issues affecting fire safety, such 
as drastically changed fuel loads. (Barnett).   
 
                                                 
3 In all cases in this paper building surveyor can be used interchangeably with building certifier, 
although building surveyor is the term used in Victorian regulations.   
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The primary regulatory body after the construction of a building is the 
Municipal Building Surveyor (MBS).  The MBS is employed by the city council and 
is responsible for ensuring the safety of people within buildings in Melbourne.  
Towards this end, the MBS has the power to inspect buildings and force changes be 
made.  Ultimately, the MBS can prosecute those who fail to satisfy the regulation but 
this power is rarely used, instead the focus is on negotiation4.  Another regulatory 
body, primarily responsible for construction sites, is WorkSafe.  This is a government 
agency responsible for occupational health and safety.  WorkSafe has the power to 
inspect work sites and penalize those who do not meet the regulations.  Additionally, 
WorkSafe engages in activities to educate workers and their employers. 
 
10.4 Other Building Code Implementations 
In order to find ways to improve the Melbourne implementation of PBD, 
looking at implementations used in other areas can be useful.  In these sections, the 
variations from the policies used in Melbourne are covered, as well as the 
enforcement powers afforded by the different building regulations.   
 
10.4.1 Queensland 
The code for Queensland derives from the BCA, as all the building codes in 
Australia do, with small implementation changes.  The Queensland Fire and Rescue 
Service (QFRS) functions as an agency that reviews Performance-based alternative 
designs for compliance with building regulations, but the building certifier is the 
person wielding the power to sign off on the building’s safety.  The building certifier 
performs essentially the same role as the building surveyor in Victoria.  Some other 
points of interest in the Queensland code implementation are the inclusion of arson in 
the list of fire scenarios to evaluate, the possibility of having a building storing 
dangerous materials built using PBD, and the forceful recommendation to use 
sprinkler systems (Queensland Fire and Rescue Service).   
 
                                                 
4 This information comes from interviews with the MBSs in Melbourne, and more detail can be found 
in Appendix D.4, which covers the relevant interview.  Details on the citations of interviews for the 
purposes of this paper can be found in Section 12, and Section 12.2.1.   
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10.4.2 Australian Capital Territories 
The code for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) derives from BCA 
requirements, but there are several elements of interest to this project.  The ACT Fire 
Brigade (ACTFB) uses the Performance-based framework established by the BCA, 
but does detail some exceptions, such as falling back to prescriptive codes for 
buildings containing dangerous chemicals or explosives.  There are other 
clarifications to the requirements and recommendations of the BCA, such as 
recommending the use of sprinkler systems, or that designs not rely on fire brigade 
intervention to ease performance requirements.  There are also some interesting 
requirements as to the relation between the FSEs, the designers, and the occupants of 
the building.  The fire engineering report, created during the design and evaluation of 
a PBD solution, needs to be “delivered [to] and understood” (Australia Capital 
Territory Fire Brigade) by the owners, occupiers and maintenance staff of the 
building.  The regulations require building management and maintenance follow the 
requirements of the fire engineering report throughout the life of the building 
(Australia Capital Territory Fire Brigade).  This is an important aspect of how the 
ACT building regulations work, as the documentation transfer from the FSEs to the 
occupants is required to occur, but this does not necessarily mean the owners actually 
understand the documents.   
 
10.4.3 Australian Department of Defense 
The Australian Department of Defense has its own set of building regulations 
which are used by all of the armed forces in Australia.  These building regulations 
reference the BCA, but only as a minimum set of requirements which are 
supplemented by far more strict regulations specified in the Manual of Fire Protection 
Engineering (MFPE) distributed by the Department of Defense.  These strict 
regulations are the primary difference between the military’s regulations and civilian 
building regulations.  This is due to both the extra protection required for the 
military’s critical assets as well as the extra resources the military is able to bring to 
bear on the issue of fire safety.  There are several regulations which are of interest in 
relation to this project.  One is the post-construction mandatory maintenance and 
inspection schedule the regulations specify to ensure fire safety systems continue to 
function throughout the life of the building.  Another interesting feature of the MFPE 
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is specific to PBD, which requires the display of a sign similar to Figure 10-3  in the 
building.  This sign lets the occupants know the building’s fire safety system relies on 
certain assumptions which must be maintained (Australian Government Department 
of Defense). 
 
CAUTION 
 
The fire safety systems in this building have been certified on the basis of 
complying alternative solutions, current building use, and design fuel loads and 
limitations. 
 
Any changes in building use, elements of building structure, or building services 
can affect building compliance and may require recertification by an accredited 
Building Surveyor 
Figure 10-3: MFPE Alternative Solution Signage 
10.4.4 Massachusetts 
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the US, the building codes are not 
based on PBD, but rather on prescriptive codes.  While the codes themselves may 
differ significantly, there are some elements of the way the codes are enforced 
relevant for comparison.  In Boston, Massachusetts, the fire department has the right 
to enter any premise for the purposes of inspection to determine if a “material or 
condition” (“Boston Fire Prevention Code”) exists that could lead to a fire or 
explosion, or be dangerous in the case of a fire.  The inspector also has the ability to 
order a problem fixed, either by the owner or by the fire department at the owner’s 
expense (“Boston Fire Prevention Code”).  This is significantly different from the 
enforcement abilities the MFB has in Melbourne.   
 
10.4.5 UK 
Great Britain was one of the first nations to develop a Performance-based 
building code.  The primary motivation for this change was that the prescriptive 
building codes had grown too cumbersome from hundreds of years of modifications 
and additions.  In 1985, the building code, titled Building Regulations, was revised to 
utilize Performance-based design which reduced the document from 307 pages to 23 
(The Evolution of Performance-Based Codes 12).  The new building code contained 
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very few details on alternate designs and approval methods, making many engineers 
reluctant to try new methods.  Additionally, the reluctance of insurance companies to 
insure buildings not designed to meet the old prescriptive codes made it difficult to 
encourage the use of PBD.  In 1991, the Building Regulations were revised again to 
include some of these details and a code of practice was developed to govern fire 
safety engineering practices in building design in an effort to encourage the use of 
alternative methods (Barnett; International Activities 56; The Evolution of 
Performance-Based Codes 12-17). 
 
10.4.6 New Zealand 
New Zealand started developing Performance-based codes in the early 1990s. 
FSEs of New Zealand developed a five level pyramid model, listed from the top 
down: Objectives; Functional Requirements; Performance Criteria; Verification 
Methods; and Examples of Acceptable Solutions.  This pyramidal structure of the 
building code standard is very similar to the BCA code pyramid used in Australia 
(Babrauskas).   
   
In 1992 New Zealand had some Performance-based solutions, but they used 
the prescriptive requirements as “acceptable solutions” and rewrote the prescriptive 
requirements so they would meet the performance objectives.  New Zealand also 
made the controversial decision that “the protection of property at the regulated 
occupancy is not a matter for the code but is rather between the owner and his 
insurance company” (Bukowski 25-27).  The code now only includes the provisions 
to protect the third parties, meaning the insurance companies. The property that 
belongs to the third party is protected. This gives more work to the insurance 
companies because they must now develop and enforce their own regulations, in 
addition to the regulations stated in the code (Bukowski 25-27; Barnett). 
 
10.5 Background Summary 
The background research on this project is especially important due to the 
technical nature of many of its aspects.  This literature review covers the background 
behind PBD, many of the details of its implementation, and several areas for 
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examination concerning design considerations and important details in practice.  In 
order to put this information in context, this section covered prescriptive design, as 
well as the general building process.  The main findings of the research were while 
the Performance-based codes are relatively simple in their statement; there are many 
subtle areas that need to be understood in order to implement them properly.  In every 
aspect of the use of PBD, there exist tradeoffs between safety and feasibility and cost, 
as a number of other constraints to optimize in the construction of a building.   
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11 Methodology 
In order to evaluate the implementation of Performance-based Design (PBD) 
in Melbourne, there were two primary research objectives: looking for the existence 
of changes in a building’s usage that affect the validity of the fire safety solution’s 
underlying assumptions, and determining the level of awareness among building 
owners and managers of how and where these changes can occur.  The primary 
research technique to address these objectives was a series of case studies on 
buildings throughout Melbourne.  In each of these case studies, the building was 
visited to look for any discrepancies from its usage as assumed by the fire safety 
solution, which fulfilled the first research objective.  The second objective, 
determining the level of awareness of building owners and managers of fire safety 
specifications relied on a series of interviews of the people involved.  In order to gain 
a wider breadth of experience on the implementation of PBD, interviews of private 
Fire Safety Engineers (FSEs), fire services personnel and building surveyors were 
crucial to be able to generalize conclusions.   
11.1 Research Objectives 
These objectives concerned how the way in which people sometimes live in or 
use a building can conflict with assumptions made in fire safety solutions.  The 
understanding that the fire safety solution does not change is a key aspect of these 
objectives.  Once the fire safety solution is created for a specific building, it remains 
constant as the basis for the design of the fire safety systems.  The only changes that 
occur are the ways in which people use the building.  Some changes may cause 
conflicts with the fire safety solution assumptions, which can result in a lower level of 
safety in the building.  The building owners and managers may not know the effects 
of these changes.  This project identified some situations where these discrepancies 
are occurring and how knowledgeable building owners and managers are of the 
effects of these discrepancies.  Using this information, recommendations were made 
to improve the implementation of PBD in Melbourne.   
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11.1.1 Existence of Subtle Usage Changes that Undermine the 
Design Fire 
The design fire is something that will not change throughout the lifetime of the 
building.  When the engineer designs the building, the design of the fire safety 
systems is based on the impact of the design fire.  The engineer makes assumptions 
about the building occupants and the use of the building.  The assumptions that the 
engineer made may not match the way the building is used.  Sometimes changes to 
the building occur that the engineers did not expect.  The people that use and maintain 
the building can undermine the fire safety solution by making changes, even small 
ones, to the building.  For example, the people living in a building may change the use 
of a room, which could be as simple as adding or just rearranging fuel in the room, 
completely transforming the needs for fire safety in the room and changing the 
performance of that original design.  Prior to the completion of this research project, 
the existence and extent of these potentially life-threatening changes was unknown.  
The visits to the buildings in the case studies identified many of these issues. 
11.1.2 Knowledge of Subtle Usage Changes that Undermine 
the Design Fire 
The second research objective was to determine whether those who run the 
building are aware of how the building could be made unsafe by changing its use.  
The knowledge of the effects of these changes is important for the safety of people in 
and around the building.  If the impact of these changes can be communicated from 
the designers to the managers and owners, then the managers and owners will be less 
likely to accidentally make a change that results in unsafe conditions.  The existence 
of trends of similar issues throughout multiple buildings indicated that there might be 
some miscommunication occurring during design, which results in the assumptions 
not reflecting the actual use of the building.  The team conducted a series of 
interviews of building managers and owners, as well as others involved in the 
building process; to determine the level of knowledge they have of the policies 
necessary for the building to remain safe.   
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11.1.3 Onsite Scheduling 
Organizing the case studies and the interviews were the main limiting factors 
in scheduling for the project, as both involved coordination with several other parties.  
The schedule for the project is shown in Table 11-1.  During early phases of the 
project, much of the time was spent completing research as well as reviewing the 
design documentation for each of the case study buildings.  This early phase was 
important, as the areas targeted during the visits and the building-specific interview 
questions were dependent on key design features identified from this documentation.  
After this review was completed, the building visits were carried out.  The actual 
process of visiting a building was relatively short; allowing the team to complete the 
actual visit quickly provided the necessary MFB personnel were available.  The initial 
target for the number of case studies was 10 different buildings. However, the size of 
the sample that the team actually visited and analyzed was 6 buildings, 3 residential 
and 3 commercial.  After the information was collected from both building-specific 
interviews and building visits, it was analyzed to determine if any general patterns 
existed.   
 
Also during this time, individuals were contacted to arrange in-person and 
other types of interviews, which were important to gain more depth to the information 
gathered.  
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Week 1 Week 2  Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 
Background               
Continue Literature Review         Secondary Task     
Prepare and Present Proposal 
Presentation                
Case Studies               
Analyze PBD documentation for 
Case Studies                      
Write building-specific interview 
questions                     
Visit Buildings                    
Perform interviews (Building 
Owners)                     
Interviews               
Write general interview 
questions                   
Find contacts for interviews                      
Perform Interviews                      
Final Project Completion               
Prepare Final Presentation                   
Write final report                            
Table 11-1: Project Gantt Chart 
     
11.2 Case Studies 
The primary means of accomplishing the research objectives was to perform 
case studies of individual buildings designed using Performance-based methods.  
These buildings were selected by Professor Barnett and the MFB at the start of the 
project.  Each building was visited by the team along with an inspector, or two, from 
the MFB to identify discrepancies between the current use of the building and the 
assumptions made in the design specifications outlined in the PBD documentation.  
Building owners, managers and maintenance staff were also interviewed to determine 
their knowledge of the assumptions made in the design of the building and how those 
assumptions can affect fire safety in the building. 
 
Prior to the visits it was necessary to identify the key performance criteria for 
each individual building.  In order to accomplish this, the design documentation was 
examined for each building.  Because of the nature of PBD, the fire safety 
requirements vary from building to building.  For each building, it was important to 
determine what the important elements of the building’s fire safety system were.  This 
included features such as fire doors, which automatically close to help contain a fire, 
fire detection systems, or sprinkler systems.  It was also important to determine the 
performance requirements for each of these systems.  This information gave direction 
to the visits.  The team also established what assumptions the designers made.  This 
includes assumptions on the usage of the building, assumptions about the occupants 
such as their mobility or responsiveness, and the quantity and arrangement of fuel in 
the building.  Identifying the important assumptions was necessary to determine the 
specific information needed from the building owners and managers.   
 
The fire engineering reports, and the surrounding documentation, also 
provided a view of how the actual process of the fire engineering review works.  
Because the documentation on record at the MFB also included a chronological 
history of all reports, applications and correspondence during the approval process, it 
was possible to see how a building had changed during the course of its design, and 
the approach taken by fire services, the original FSE, and the developers.  This was 
useful in seeing how communication took place, and gave an indicator as to what 
factors influenced the design.  Also of interest in determining the usage requirements 
of a building was the occupancy permit, which is a much shorter document that is 
more visible to the owners and managers than the fire engineering report.   
 
A visit was performed for each building selected for the project.  The visits 
were performed with the assistance of inspectors and engineers from the MFB.  The 
building visits themselves were relatively short, as it was only necessary to verify the 
areas of concern of the PBD solution identified during the review of the 
documentation.  One important aspect of performing the site visits was to ensure that 
the building managers did not have prior notice about the visit.  This was to ensure 
that any problems would not be fixed just before the visit, as these site visits need to 
be a snapshot of normal use, not changed to be better for the inspectors.  The focus of 
the visits was on the critical design features identified from the PBD documentation.  
It was necessary to determine whether these building features in their current form 
were compliant with the performance criteria established in the design.  The primary 
areas of concern were issues arising from either a change in building usage which 
resulted in the fire safety systems being less effective or from improper maintenance 
which led to an ineffective system.  The most important issues were those that 
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rendered the fire safety solution ineffective.  This provided the information needed to 
determine whether fire safety solution assumptions were valid at the time of the visit. 
 
The team also interviewed key building personnel such as owners, managers, 
and maintenance staff.  The primary purpose of these interviews was to determine 
how aware owners, mangers, and maintenance staff were of the PBD requirements for 
the building and what policies were in place to satisfy these requirements.  
Information on these policies not only provides a more detailed picture of the building 
at the time of the visit, it also gives some insight on the potential for future problems.  
If few discrepancies were found, the presence of these policies helped to indicate 
whether this was due to mere coincidence or actually a product of good management.  
The information from the interviews was also compared to the observations compiled 
during the visit to determine whether effective communication of fire safety 
information was occurring.  The details of these interviews will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
11.3 Interviews  
Interviews were an important facet of the research for this project because 
the team needed to look at more than just the state of the buildings examined in the 
case studies to determine how well PBD was implemented in Melbourne; it was 
necessary to understand the practical details of the implementation to be able to 
address the problem.  Talking to the people involved in the building process allowed a 
broader view of the use of buildings than what the short visits allowed.  
 
 
 
The in-person and phone interviews were semi-structured and, with the 
subject’s permission, recorded to ease the analysis and compilation of results.  The 
goal with the interviews, especially with the fire safety professionals, was to provoke 
more discussion and elaboration on experiences with PBD in buildings.  The number 
of building owners and managers interviewed was dependent on how many buildings 
were visited, although as many interviews with fire safety professionals were 
performed as possible.   
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 In order to get a more complete picture of the implementation of PBD, a 
variety of professionals involved in the building process were targeted, including 
private FSEs, building surveyors, and engineers and inspectors working with fire 
services.  Because these people were scattered across Australia, they were primarily 
subjects for telephone interviews.  These telephone interviews focused on essentially 
the same set of topics used for the face-to-face interviews, but were designed to add 
more structure to the questions in order to make these interviews quicker to complete 
and results easier to collect and analyze.  The interview questions for each targeted 
group comprise Appendix B. More questions were asked as the interview was 
performed due to some other issues that were brought up by the interviewee or past 
interviewees.   
 
The selection of general interview subjects occurred by several means.  
Initially, the team started with a series of contacts, particularly fire services personnel 
around Australia and building surveyors, supplied by the staff at the MFB.  The team 
also used publicly available lists of registered professional building practitioners 
available through the Victorian Building Commission.  This list, primarily targeting 
private FSEs, included approximately 70 engineers, and the team contacted 18 of 
these FSEs through a random selection process.  Initial contact for these interview 
subjects started with formal emails, consisting of a brief description of the project and 
a request for an interview.  Of the FSEs selected, nine either did not respond or were 
unable to help.  In the other subject categories, initial subjects from MFB-supplied 
contact information were able to provide additional possible contacts, which were 
added to the list and contacted during the course of the project.   
 
An important aspect of the design of these questions was the relationship 
between each of these groups.  By asking multiple groups how communication works 
between each (such as asking FSEs and building managers how fire safety 
information passes between them) it was possible to determine where lapses in 
communication lie.  It also allowed the team to determine whether any missed 
information was due to certain groups never being informed (i.e., engineer never 
informed of certain usage requirements) or the information was not understood (i.e., a 
building manager did not understand what policies need to be in place despite being 
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told).  When combined with the information from the case studies on the actual 
implementation of the PBD solutions, this made it possible to determine where 
communication issues caused implementation issues.   
 
11.3.1 Private Fire Safety Engineers 
Private FSEs play a significant role in the design of PBD solutions, and were a 
major target group for interviews.  Because of their role in the design process, there 
were several areas where they had useful perspective: getting details on the build 
process, finding constraints and factors that influence design, learning how fire safety 
knowledge passes from the engineers to business owners, and general experience with 
PBD.  These goals stemmed from the roles that FSEs play in the use of PBD, as not 
only are they experts in PBD, they also are among the parties that are actively 
involved in its implementation.  The specific questions and topics discussed are 
outlined in Appendix B. 
 
The most basic of the areas discussed was the general building process 
involved with PBD, including the details of who is involved and what issues arise 
during the process.  The constraints that influence design choices such as cost, speed 
of construction, maintenance difficulty or politics were of particular interest because 
these could be reflected in the existence of small deviations from the performance 
specifications.  This information allowed the team to target and prioritize areas for 
investigation more accurately.  To make sure these details fit in with the broader 
understanding of PBD, finding general observations of PBD, such as advantages, 
disadvantages and consequences was also useful.  While some of this information was 
found in background literature, the less obvious details gleaned from experience were 
useful in looking for subtle discrepancies in buildings’ use and construction.   
 
There were several communication mechanisms examined, specifically the 
passing of fire safety information from FSEs to building managers, passing more 
detailed fire analyses to fire services and building surveyors for review, and receiving 
usage information from the owners of the building.  For each of these avenues of 
communication, there were questions that targeted not only how information passes 
from group to group, but what levels of feedback exist to determine how much the 
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other group is aware of.  In particular, it was useful to understand how the engineers 
worked to inform the building managers and owners of the important assumptions 
underlying the design.  This avenue of communication can be verified for its 
effectiveness by comparing what the building managers and owners actually know to 
what the FSEs thought they should know.  This aspect of communication is 
particularly important, as non-technical building managers and owners will not be 
able to understand the complete fire analysis, and will need this information distilled 
into implementable policies.  This particularly large transformation of the fire safety 
information makes it a likely location for communication breakdown.   
 
There were a few possible concerns in interviewing FSEs for information on 
PBD implementations.  While they were experienced in PBD, it was important to 
retain some degree of objectivity when approaching the building case studies by not 
simply looking for what PBD implementation problems the engineers perceived.  
While this project may not have been statistically significant because of the small 
sample sizes of buildings, it was important to avoid approaching the case studies with 
any biases that might have resulted in missing important details.   
11.3.2 Building Owners, Managers and Maintenance 
Personnel 
One of the primary research objectives for this project was to determine the 
level of fire safety knowledge among those who own, maintain and occupy buildings, 
so an obvious source of information was to ask these people questions to determine 
their familiarity with the fire safety systems of their building.  Because this was a 
major area of research for this project, these interviews were a priority; however the 
exact execution of them varied greatly depending on the circumstances of the case 
study itself.   
 
While these were important interviews, they were among the more difficult 
ones to conduct because of the delicacy of the situation in which the case studies were 
performed.  There was an important balance to manage between getting unfiltered 
information for the interviews while ensuring that subjects did not feel alienated or 
tested.  It was also important to avoid questions that might lead the subject to a direct 
answer, focusing instead on questions that would provoke the subject to giving a more 
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comprehensive response.  An example of this shift might be asking “Are there people 
here all the time?  Even at night?” to find out what minimum staffing levels are, rather 
than asking “What is your minimum staffing number?”  These indirect questions 
relied on the manager’s urge to impress the team with safety standards, but also 
necessitated follow-up questions to target the areas of interest from the PBD 
documentation.   
 
The issue of gaining the cooperation of building managers was made even 
more difficult by unannounced visits, which could have made some building 
managers more defensive.  The solution was to maintain a level of tact in approaching 
questions, and avoid being judgmental of the subjects’ responses during the 
interviews.  The fact that the team performing the interviews is not comprised of FSE 
students was an advantage, as building managers might feel that team was in less of a 
position to judge their policies and knowledge than a professional FSE or inspector.   
 
The questions listed in Appendix B, outline a template for these interviews. 
Additional questions, specific to each case study, were necessary based on key areas 
of the PBD documentation.  These questions focused on several key areas.  Questions 
were asked concerning the amount of knowledge the building staff had of the 
assumptions made during the design process and the implications of invalidating these 
assumptions.  Questions about the design process and the amount of communication 
that occurs among various stakeholders were also asked.  Finally, the team attempted 
to determine the amount of concern which existed among the owners and managers 
about fire safety issues. In addition to the previous information, the team gathered 
information about the maintenance programs in place for the fire safety systems.  The 
information obtained from these interviews provided a clearer understanding of the 
amount of communication that existed between the building owners and the design 
team. 
 
11.3.3 Building Surveyors 
Another important group of interview subjects was the local building 
surveyors.  Because of the degree of regulatory power wielded by surveyors, they 
provided an important perspective on the implementation of the building codes in 
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Melbourne.  The target information concerned mostly the role of the Building 
Surveyor and level of understanding of PBD that building surveyors have.  The 
specific aspect to this project is whether the Building Surveyor has a sufficient 
understanding of PBD to make informed decisions when issuing permits.  Because of 
the role surveyors perform in the process, they also have several avenues of 
communication with other parties involved, so determining the effectiveness of their 
communication with private FSEs, building owners, and fire services personnel was 
important.  Building surveyors were also likely to have experience with a variety of 
buildings, so asking about past experiences was an important aspect of the interviews.   
 
 
Because understanding the ability to make informed decisions was a central 
goal of interviewing surveyors, some level of tact was necessary to avoid asking “Are 
you competent to make informed decisions when issuing permits?”  The questioning 
approach taken was to rather ask about how effective the fire engineering reports 
were; highlighting important aspects of the design.  This method both targeted quality 
of communication and gave an indirect idea of the level of understanding of PBD that 
surveyors have.  The other method of learning about the knowledge of surveyors was 
to ask about their education and certifications, specifically focusing on what courses 
were taken and the depth to which fire safety was covered.   
 
11.3.4 Fire Services Personnel 
The last major interview group was the people involved in the review and 
enforcement of PBD within the fire services.  This consisted primarily of FSEs, who 
review the fire engineering reports, and inspectors, who examine the implemented 
design after construction.  The interviews targeted the level of involvement the fire 
services have after the initial design review that occurs prior to construction.  
Particularly, the team focused on the time period after the building has been 
completed and occupancy has started.  As with all the interview groups, descriptions 
of any experiences or observations concerning the practical implementation of PBD 
were very useful in understanding the issue.   
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The questions targeting those who review fire engineering reports for 
regulatory approval primarily looked at how communication between the reviewing 
FSEs and the building stakeholders functions.  One of the main goals of these 
questions was to see where effective design feedback occurred, and how it was 
implemented.  Some of the questions examined at what point the fire engineering 
report came to the reviewing FSEs, how reviewing FSEs check the usage assumptions 
made in the fire engineering report, and how recommendations and comments made 
on a design are implemented in the final design.  
 
The questions targeting those who inspect buildings primarily examined the 
enforcement powers to force code compliance if usage changes render a building’s 
PBD solutions ineffective.  This was important for the project because feedback on 
the maintenance of a design is necessary to ensure that the PBD solution remains 
effective during occupancy. 
 
11.4 Analysis 
As case studies and interviews were completed, the group analyzed the 
information gathered looking for general patterns sufficient to warrant 
recommendations. The generalizations made were not necessarily sound enough to 
show strong conclusions by themselves, but rather, the common areas of concern can 
function as a pilot study to direct future long-term analysis. 
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12 Findings 
Due to the size of the project, both in the complexity of the interactions 
between parties and the technical aspects involved, these results and analyses are 
arranged to present as much of the information as possible.  It should be noted in the 
following sections that the data gathered in this project cannot be analyzed in a 
statistical manner due to the research methods used and the small sample sizes.  In 
lieu of statistical trends, the findings are stated in the form of common observations 
from the interviews and case studies.  Examples and specific experiences from 
interviewees are also used as support for these findings.  Buildings used in case 
studies reference the building identifiers used in Appendix C, and cited by letters.  
Interviews are cited by subject number in Appendix D, and will be cited as Subject 1, 
Subject 2, and so forth.   
 
The information targeted by the research objectives is most directly measured 
by the case studies, as examining specific buildings allowed the team to verify 
specific requirements specified in the original designs.  Section 12.1: Case Studies, 
focuses on presenting the information on common areas of concern found in the 
buildings examined in the case studies.  This is because some of the specific issues 
found in buildings may be useful in future studies of Performance-based Design.  This 
section also provides the answer to the first research objective of determining whether 
small usage changes exist in fire-engineered buildings that defeat the fire safety 
systems.   
 
Section 12.2: Owners and Manager Implementations, addresses the second 
objective by examining the management approaches taken to usage changes and 
awareness of fire engineering requirements.  This section uses a mix of results from 
case studies and interview subjects’ experience to determine the level of knowledge 
and awareness among building managers.  Because the management policies and 
implementation are a result of a complex series of interactions between developers, 
owners, fire engineers, building surveyors and fire services, this section also includes 
information on the many influences that affect management policies and their 
implementation.   
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Because a major topic of this project is to examine the communication between the 
various parties involved in the building process, Section 13.3: Communication, 
concerns the means by which communication occurs.  The specific focus is on the 
mechanisms that allow for the detection and resolution of unsafe usage changes.  
These communication processes are important to examine in order to ensure practical 
communication methods, implementable with existing resources, are able to address 
the problem.  Also of interest in examining the communication during the lifetime of 
the building is to look at the actual means by which communication occurs, 
particularly the documents that pass information between parties, such as the fire 
engineering report and the occupancy permit.    
 
12.1 Case Studies 
Case studies were performed on six buildings located in Melbourne.  These 
buildings had all been built using alternative solutions, most of which made 
assumptions about the use of the building and management policies which needed to 
be maintained, and were in some form of occupancy during the time of the site visit.  
Appendix C details these alternative solutions and the required policies as well as the 
results of the site visits for each of these.  To protect the confidentiality of those 
associated with these buildings, their names and addresses have been omitted.  Three 
of the case study buildings were residential and, while the sample size is small, they 
covered a wide spectrum of compliance.  Three commercial buildings were visited, 
with a focus on storage warehouses that deleted sprinkler systems as a part of their 
designs as well.  For each visit the team prepared a list of requirements for the fire 
safety solution to function as designed.  These lists were based on the design 
documentation for the individual buildings.  During the site visits, team determined 
the level of compliance with these requirements.  When possible, the manager of the 
building accompanied the team on its visit to answer questions.  This was the case for 
Buildings A, D, E and F.  The official visit with an MFB inspector to Building C was 
lead by the building manager, although the majority of observations made did not 
occur in the presence of the manager.  In Building B, a later interview was used to 
obtain more information.   
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The buildings were selected by MFB engineers as likely candidates for site 
visits, based largely on their previous experience during the review process.  Building 
C was added to this initial residential list, as it provided a convenient long-term case 
study because it was the team’s place of residence.  All three of the commercial 
buildings were selected from the pool of available buildings and were found to be 
complete and in use for several years since construction.   
 
Of the residential buildings, Buildings A and B were each subjected to one site 
visit, giving the team a snapshot of the conditions in each building.  Building C, 
however, was observed continuously over the course of the team’s stay in Melbourne.  
The commercial buildings, Buildings D, E, and F, were each subjected to one site 
visit, each accompanied by a building manager.  There was a seventh building, 
Building G, which was not visited as it was discovered that the building had not been 
completed at the time of project. 
 
Each site visit included at least one MFB inspector, who also looked for issues 
concerning essential safety measures that were not necessarily part of the lists 
prepared from the fire engineering reports.  In cases where significant safety 
violations existed, notices were issued to the building owner.  These notices give a 
certain period of time, usually either 30 or 60 days, to the owner to have a problem 
fixed, after which there would be another inspection.  The issuing of these notices was 
handled entirely by the accompanying inspector.   
 
12.1.1 Residential Buildings 
The buildings in the pool of residential buildings were relatively similar in 
their use and other constraints.  The buildings (A, B and C) were all apartment 
buildings built a relatively short time before the site visit.  Two of the buildings, A 
and B were approximately three years old, while building C was still under 
construction with staged occupancy that had been occurring over the previous several 
months.  Each was primarily used as apartments (Class 2), although most had other 
areas such as car parks and retail space.  The buildings ranged from 9 to 36 stories in 
height.  All were tall enough for the DtS codes to require an automatic sprinkler 
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system.  Two of the buildings (A and C) were connected with other buildings as a part 
of a complex, but were examined as individual buildings for the purposes of this 
study. Building B was a stand-alone building.  Common deviations from DtS included 
the use of a single egress stair (B and C), reduced Fire Resistance Levels (FRLs), and 
extended egress travel distances.  While it is clear that the buildings were in many 
ways similar, the actual level of adherence to fire engineering requirements varied 
greatly, showing a spectrum of compliance with an excellent building (A), a mediocre 
building (B), and a potentially disastrous building (C).   
 
 During the site visits, the team looked for evidence to determine the level of 
compliance with fire engineering requirements.  Whenever possible, a manager 
escorted the team during the visit to answer questions.  This was the case for Building 
A and for the initial visit with MFB to Building C, but in building B, the team was 
simply given access to the building as there was no manager available.   
 
Building A, detailed in Section C.1, was found to be exemplary with virtually 
no noticeable faults.  It also had the systems and policies in place which should 
prevent major issues from arising.  Not only was the current condition of the building 
very good, the staff was found to be well aware of the state of their building and quick 
to both find and fix any problems as they arose.  When the team arrived and spoke to 
the manager, he immediately told the team that a fault had occurred in the evacuation 
system from the 7th to the 13th floor.  This problem was identified during the 
building’s biannual maintenance and procedures were put into place to ensure the 
safety of the occupants and to make sure that the occupants are aware of such 
procedures while repairs were made.  This level of awareness and willingness to make 
the necessary changes quickly provides an excellent example of how building 
management should be approached.   
 
Building B was found to contain several deficiencies which, when combined, 
created a potentially dangerous situation.  The specific issues found during the site 
visit are detailed in Section C.2.  The main source of these faults seemed to come 
from improper or nonexistent maintenance.  For example, all of the portable fire 
extinguishers seen had not been serviced for at least two years, as opposed to the 
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required biannual checks. In Figure 12-1, the tag on the fire extinguisher shows that 
there has not been any maintenance on the extinguisher for about two years prior to 
the date of the visit.  In some cases the fire extinguishers were missing altogether.  
The single stair in the building was required to be sterile, but there was debris found 
in the bottom of the stairwell which presents a hazard, especially if it were to ignite.  
In another case, the maintenance logs for the sprinklers indicated that the required 
maintenance had been performed, but a fault with the sprinkler running warning light 
was found each time for the past year and never seemed to be repaired.  This fault has 
the potential for serious consequences.  If the pump motor is running unnoticed, it 
could burn out leaving the sprinklers inoperable in the event of a fire.   
 
Figure 12-1: Overdue Maintenance on Fire Extinguishers in Building B 
 
The issues found in Building C were more serious than those in B, and had the 
potential to be disastrous.  The results of the site visit are detailed in Section C.3.  A 
lack of communication seemed to be the primary source of these deficiencies.  The 
building utilized staged occupancy, which means occupancy had started while the 
construction workers were completing the building.  This practice is not necessarily 
dangerous, but it must be clear to construction workers that safety requirements for an 
occupied building are different from those for a construction site.  It is common 
practice for workers on a construction site to prop open doors to make it easier to 
move around.  This, however, affects compartmentalization in an occupied building.  
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This building in particular relied on a single stairway, pressurized to keep smoke out.  
With the doors open this system would not work properly, causing the only exit from 
the building to become unusable as it fills with smoke.  The issue of certain building 
areas changing use due to ongoing construction could also be seen with the storage of 
trash in the first floor lift lobby.  Figure 12-2:  shows bins of debris on one of the car 
park levels.  Most of the carpark levels did not have an automatic sprinkler system, 
which were deleted as part of the alternative solution for the building.  This deletion 
did not account for the kind of fuel load which was present as a result of the rubbish. 
 
 
Figure 12-2: Rubbish in First Floor Lift Lobby of Building C 
 
Because Building C was the place of residence for the team, the process of 
forcing change on the building was observed easily during the course of the project.  
The rectification process involved several participants, including MFB, the Municipal 
Building Surveyor (MBS) for Melbourne, and Worksafe.  It took approximately two 
weeks for significant improvements to be made to the building’s use.  Part of this 
delay was caused by the complexity of the situation.  There was confusion as to who 
had authority due to the dual nature of the building as both a construction site and an 
occupied residential building.  The quickest organization to get results was Worksafe, 
which was able to have a 45 kilogram Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) tank placed near 
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an open fire door to the stair, as shown in Figure 12-3, removed within 24 hours of the 
filing of a complaint.  Eventually, through the combined efforts of the MFB and the 
MBS, changes were made to the way the building was used, but these changes were 
slow in coming.  
 
 
Figure 12-3: LPG Tank in Lift Lobby Outside Open Door to Stairway in Building C 
 
12.1.2 Commercial Buildings 
The process of performing the case studies for the commercial buildings was 
generally the same as that for the residential buildings.  Using the design 
documentation, key policies required to maintain the effectiveness of the fire safety 
solution were identified.  The level of compliance with these requirements was then 
determined by visiting the building and talking to the building manager. 
 
Three commercial buildings were studied.  These were all large warehouses 
and shipping companies.  A common feature throughout these buildings was that the 
sprinklers had been deleted from the design.  Instead of automatic sprinklers, these 
buildings often relied on occupant behavior and management policies to minimize the 
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growth of a fire.  Overall, the commercial buildings were found to be more compliant 
than the residential buildings visited.  There were faults found at each, including some 
very serious issues at Building F.   
   
Building D, detailed in Section C.4, had a few minor issues.  Because of the 
lack of sprinklers in the building, there were many constraints placed on the manner 
in which paper rolls could be stored in order to justify the deletion.  One of these was 
that paper rolls could not be stacked any higher than 4.8 meters.  For the most part 
this was being held true in the building and policies were in place to maintain it, such 
as signs at the maximum height allowed.  There were a couple stacks that were as 
high as 5.2 meters, but this seemed to be an exception rather than a regular 
occurrence.  Other than this the building was largely compliant.  All the essential 
safety measures such as portable extinguishers and hose reels were being maintained.  
There were also evacuation and emergency procedures posted in the building. 
 
Building E, detailed in Section C.5, was found to be reasonably compliant and 
well managed.  The primary area of concern for the building was the distribution 
center which had been increased in floor area from 16,670 m2 to 18,730 m2, crossing 
the 18,000 m2 regulatory threshold for required automatic sprinkler systems.  The 
sprinkler system and automatic fire detection systems had been deleted in favor of 
human intervention policies.  The design specified that the means of detecting and 
reporting a fire would be done entirely by employees working in the building.  When 
the team visited, the building manager was unaware that there was no automatic fire 
detection system.  This has the potential to result in a breakdown in communication, 
where a worker might call the fire brigade and not notify management or might 
evacuate without realizing that he/she needs to notify the security gatehouse so that 
they can sound the alarm.  Because the alarm and evacuation system is manually 
activated, a breakdown in communication could result in a much more dangerous 
scenario than the design accounted for.  Other than these issues, the building was well 
managed and run in accordance with the requirements of the FSE. 
 
Building F was found to have some very significant issues, which are detailed 
in Section C.6.  There were several problem areas which could create problems in the 
event of fire.  One was obstructed egress paths.  There was one fire exit which had 
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large stacks of wooden pallets blocking it, as shown in Figure -12-4.  Additionally, 
there was a lot of paper in the printing room, making egress more difficult there.  The 
more significant issue was fuel load.  The fire engineering analysis specified that the 
storage in the warehouse be kept below four meters in height and under a certain 
volume, which was calculated to be four rows of shelving.  When the team visited the 
building it found that there were five rows of shelving.  Additionally, the team 
measured the height of the goods on the shelving to be between 5.6 and 6 meters on 
two of the rows.  These were the highest point at which the containers were stored, 
although all the shelves had goods stored higher than four meters as the top shelf itself 
was just less than four meters high and each row had goods stored on the top shelf.  
This additional fuel load could result in a fire which is much more intense than what 
the building was designed to handle.   
 
Figure -12-4: Obstructed Exit in Building F 
 
12.1.3 Types of Changes 
In examining the deviations between a building and its design requirements, 
there are a great number of subtleties necessary to understand the impact that certain 
changes can have.  These include the ways in which a building can change in usage 
and how the changes affect the requirements.  Many of these distinctions overlap, but 
still provide a way of categorizing and understanding the usage changes.  
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 49 
May 1, 2007 
Understanding these subtleties is necessary to improving communication and design 
techniques to solve existing usage deviations and prevent future ones.     
 
12.1.3.1 PBD and DtS Requirements 
The issues found in these case studies generally fell under one of two 
categories: ones breaking general requirements posed by the DtS provisions, and ones 
breaking building-specific requirements of the PBD.  Many of the issues found 
throughout the case studies fell into the former category.  These issues were not 
necessarily associated with PBD but rather were indicative of the issues involved with 
enforcing building regulations in general.  
 
Although many issues were found with buildings which could compromise the 
fire safety solution in a building, often these areas of non-compliance were associated 
with the DtS provisions.  The engineer usually makes the assumption when designing 
the alternative solution that the building will comply with the building codes, but this 
assumption is made for any building, whether it utilizes PBD or not.  This included a 
wide range of issues.  One example was the storage of goods in Building F, where the 
fuel load was much higher than anticipated at design.  This particular requirement, 
however, came from the BCA, not from the fire engineering report.  Another example 
of a DtS violation is the maintenance lapses in Building B.  These problems were not 
a direct result of issues with PBD, but the possible effects were compounded by the 
fact that the buildings used alternative solutions to eliminate some of the fire safety 
measures.  The increased fire load in Building F was made more serious by the fact 
that there were no sprinklers to help control a fire.  The same is true in Building B, 
where unresolved maintenance issues with the sprinkler system could cause it to fail 
in a fire, making it even more difficult to escape.  Because the PBD aspects require 
that the DtS aspects comply with code, the calculations that justify the PBD aspects 
may become inaccurate.   
 
The other category of issues was those that violated assumptions made by the 
engineer when designing the alternative solution.  An example of these types of issues 
was the storage of the paper rolls in Building D.  It was clearly stated in the report that 
the paper rolls needed to be stored in a certain manner, which was not always case 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 50 
May 1, 2007 
when the building was visited.  The single stair apartments have more stringent 
requirements on the stairs, where the fire doors must not be chocked open (as they 
were in Building C) and there must not be excess combustible material in the stair (as 
there was in Building B).  These types of problems are more unique to PBD buildings, 
where the requirements are unique to each building and must be maintained in 
addition to all of the DtS requirements.   
 
12.1.3.2 Situation Changes 
One way in which changes can occur is due to a new or altered situation in 
which a building is used.  These newly added or altered situations are ones that were 
not anticipated at design, and can result in defeated fire safety systems.  It is also 
possible to have the same situation, but with a change in usage, which can also result 
in an unsafe building.   
 
From the case studies, Building C provides the best example of an additional 
situation, where an apartment building had the additional situation of a staged 
occupancy, which added construction debris and resulted in building practices 
rendering the stair pressurization system ineffective.  In this instance, the FSE, 
Subject 8, was not involved with plans to have a staged occupancy at design, so 
provisions acceptable for all stakeholders for the staged occupancy were never 
created.  This change was due to the addition of a new situation, construction, to the 
previously planned residential apartments.   
 
An example of a changed situation comes from one of the fire services 
interviewees (Subject 6), of a factory that burned after its contents were changed from 
non-combustible metal car parts to a variety of flammable items, including 150,000 
liters of motor oil.  In this case, the usage situation was changed from a warehouse 
storing non-combustible materials to a warehouse storing combustible materials.  This 
was a change in usage situation was due to a change in ownership.   
 
Changes to the usage situation of a building, either by adding new situations or 
changing the existing one, can have a significant effect on the safety of a building, as 
highlighted in both of these cases.  However, the possibly harder to detect changes are 
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those that do not include a change in usage situation.  From the case studies, Building 
F was the clearest example of a building where the usage changed from the design, 
but did so in a subtle manner without an obvious change in usage.  The major problem 
with Building F is the fuel load in the storage area, where the building, when in use, 
contained far more material than the original plans called for.  However, the change 
itself is relatively small, in that the building still stores exactly the same contents, and 
only differs in the quantity and arrangement of the material stored.  The significance 
of this is that it is even harder to detect this sort of change, as it may appear to outside 
inspectors or building managers that the building is being used exactly as originally 
planned.     
12.2 Building Owners and Managers 
Communication to building owners and managers is a central focus of this 
project.  However, due to the numbers of parties involved with a building and the 
number of influences on management, communication is one of the most complicated 
areas of the project.  Communication lapses can occur in a number of different 
circumstances for different reasons.  Of particular interest to this project is the 
owners/managers’ awareness of fire safety needs, which can significantly change the 
level of compliance with fire engineering requirements.  The examples in the next 
sections will show some of the issues that the team found and how they relate to the 
owners and managers. In order to determine how management influences the 
effectiveness of fire safety in a building, the project looked at a spectrum of PBD 
implementation qualities.  This allowed the team to determine which areas of 
knowledge are necessary for effective building management. Building owners and 
managers can use buildings with well-implemented management procedures as an 
example.    
12.2.1 Interview Results 
The primary sources of information gathered to gain perspective on the roles 
of building owners and managers were the interviews performed as a part of case 
studies, as well as interviews of the various professionals involved in the building 
process.  There were two interviews performed during the residential case studies, and 
an early interview in which the team played a less active role.  This was because the 
accompanying MFB inspector had more immediate concerns due to the safety issues 
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with the building.   Outside of the case study-specific interviews, there were thirteen 
interview subjects, in a range of fields, including four private FSEs, three fire services 
personnel from other Australian states, and six building surveyors.  Due to the small 
sample sizes, it is not possible to consider statistical trends within this sample as 
statistical significance is not possible within from these interviews.  For further 
reference, the general list of questions and topics is located in Appendix B, and the 
notes from individual interviews are in Appendix D.  Due to confidentiality concerns 
among the interview subjects, citations to particular subjects are made using the 
numbering used in Appendix D.   
 
In most cases, the building manager was present when the site visits occurred 
and escorted the team through the building.  During this time, the team asked 
questions about management policies, evacuation procedures, and maintenance 
policies.  Building B was the only building which did not have a manager on site 
during the site visit.  In this case, a phone interview was performed after the actual 
site visit occurred.  Follow up interviews occurred for several of the other building 
managers.   
 
The set of interview questions and topics evolved during the course of the 
project, as the interviews were frequently rather unstructured or tailored to specific 
people.  In many cases, the team could gather more information and examples by 
encouraging subjects to elaborate on questions.  Many subjects were more 
experienced in some areas than others, which required more targeted questions.  The 
questions in Appendix B were used as a general guide for the interviews, but the 
actual questions asked depended on a number of factors.  Several subjects, 
particularly those in fire services, were quick to supply examples and experience with 
PBD, and these interviews did not require a significant degree of probing for more 
information.   
12.2.2 Management Implementations 
The case studies indicate that there is a breadth of management implementation 
techniques, with varying levels of compliance with fire engineering requirements. 
This section provides comparison between what good management looks like, and 
what can go wrong under bad management.  It should be noted that while both 
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extremes of management are present, the proportion of implementation quality in 
Victorian buildings in general cannot be determined from the case studies.   
12.2.2.1 Compliant Management 
The differences between managers can significantly influence the 
effectiveness of a building’s fire safety systems.  Because the specific management 
policies come from the fire engineering requirements, any compliant building will 
have implemented these policies correctly.  Of particular interest in the analysis of 
compliant management (determined during the site visits) is the approach taken and 
attitude towards maintenance.  Analysis of these sections will allow the team to 
determine what makes effective management work when compared to non-compliant 
management. 
 
One of the residential case studies, Building A, management was particularly 
effective in ensuring that all of the fire engineering requirements were maintained.  In 
this building, not only were almost all of the systems in place maintained properly, 
but those that were not working were fixed very quickly.  In the initial selection of 
this building, project advisors knew through previous experience living in the building 
that management would be very proactive in fixing any discovered problems.  The 
site visit and interview with the manager (Subject 7) confirmed all of these 
expectations.   
 
The interesting conclusion to be drawn from the interview with the Building A 
manager was that the manager had very little understanding of how the fire systems 
worked. He also had never seen the fire engineering report for his building and knew 
nothing of its existence. His primary source of information for the building was the 
set of building operating manuals provided by the developer, which specified in detail 
what he must do to keep the building compliant. He was informed by his body 
corporate that he must complete the safety system checks as per the requirements, 
both due to regulatory and safety concerns, but the fire safety reasons behind the 
requirements were never explained to him. For example, when the group asked him if 
he knew why the fire doors needed to be kept closed, all he knew was that he was 
keeping his building safe. There was no understanding of what a fire door actually 
does to help with safety (Subject 7).  
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 The safety and maintenance checks were outsourced to maintenance 
contractors that knew the technical aspects of the safety systems so that the owners 
and managers would not have to deal directly with these details. The manager’s 
mindset was that if he kept doing these checks then he would get to keep his job and 
keep getting paid, while keeping the building safe at the same time. The body 
corporate also performed audits to ensure maintenance was performed correctly and 
problems fixed promptly.  Another interesting observation was that cleaning, 
maintenance, and repair for all the systems was outsourced to maintenance contractors 
and therefore there were no employees under the manager. The people that do the 
cleaning and system checks report to him if they find something that is not working 
properly and he then gets the appropriate repair person to fix it.  One particularly 
notable accomplishment of the building management was the meticulously detailed 
and organized documentation of all checks and maintenance performed (Subject 7).   
 
The managers and the body corporate were very reliant on the contractors the 
company hires to take care of fire safety systems because they had little knowledge of 
the technical aspects of the systems. The communication with contractors appeared to 
be effective in this building, as management was aware of any existing problems and 
could fix them quickly.  Because the building was relatively new, the contractors 
performing the maintenance of the building were the same as those that originally 
installed the systems, so no further evaluation methods of the contractors were in 
place.  The reason behind the choice to use these contractors was based on previous 
experience and reputation (Subject 7).  
 
In the best building of the commercial sites, Building E, there was an active 
effort to keep the building clean by removing all combustible debris from the area.  
The manager escorting the team during the site visit informed the team that company 
staff performed frequent housekeeping between shifts, which helped avoid excess 
combustible materials, a requirement of the PBD documentation.  The management 
also performed evacuation drills and had had two emergency evacuations, which 
effectively tested the emergency plans.   
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The primary PBD requirements of Building D were the storage of rolls of 
paper, which could not be stored over a certain height.  Procedures were put in place 
by management to keep the rolls of paper from being stacked too high. This included 
signs posted throughout the building to inform the workers that the paper should not 
be stacked over 4.8m. These signs were located at the proper height so employees 
stacking the paper knew the highest point at which they could stack the rolls.  The 
management had also gone through the dimensions of each type of roll used and 
determined how many could be stacked within the height restriction.  There were 
some stacks of paper higher than 4.8m, but not significantly over the limit.  There 
were only a few of these exceptions, as the majority of the stacks were within the 
limit.  The managers were not aware that some of these exceptions existed, as the only 
means of quickly measuring the heights is to count rolls and compare heights.  The 
management also responded positively to this by suggesting ways to prevent this from 
occurring in the future, such as running wire at the proper height to make it physically 
difficult, or at least inconvenient, to store goods higher than allowed.   
 
12.2.2.2 Non-Compliant Management 
While there are only a small number of ways in which a building can be 
compliant, there are a large number of ways in which buildings can be badly 
managed.  This section will describe the ways in which the management in non-
compliant buildings in the case studies went wrong.  Further analysis on influences 
likely to cause problems with management implementations appears in Section 
12.2.3.  
 
Building C, the single-stair apartment building with the worst flaws, allowed for an 
extended observation of management process to resolve deviations from fire 
engineering requirements.  At the beginning of the time the team was on site, the 
management was notified of the problems with the building.  One major difference 
between this building and the others studied was the impact of active construction on 
the building.  This extra party made determining whose responsibility the fire safety 
matters were more complicated.  The building had ongoing changes in the building 
which fixed some of the previous deviations found, but new issues were found during 
the course of the team’s stay in the building.   
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 Because of their role in the usage changes in the building, the awareness of the 
builders was an important consideration. The builders, even though they were 
responsible for some of changes occurring in the building, did not understand how 
this affected the safety in the building.  The builders were unaware of the stair 
pressurization system and did not know the doors were vital to the building’s safety. 
When the individual workers were approached and the nature of the fire safety system 
was explained (In terms of the safety risk posed directly to the workers themselves), 
they were more willing to change their habits.  Unfortunately, the problems of 
propping the doors open were not solved this easily, as builders continued to find 
ways to defeat the door latching mechanisms until, after two weeks, the builders 
simply unlocked the doors.  This case highlights that even after being informed of the 
importance of a safety requirement from both legal and safety perspectives, some 
people will continue to ignore simple safety requirements.  It should be noted that 
during the entire process, every door had a sign labeling it as a fire door that must not 
be propped open.     
 
Continuing with this particular case, the building manager was notified of the 
problems in the building through the fire brigade and the municipal building surveyor, 
and the actual procedure for fixing problems was more complex than simple 
notification.  While the building manager, when notified by a brigade inspector, 
claimed that changes would be made in a timely fashion to the building by security 
staff he employed, these changes took much longer to actually come to fruition.  This 
indicates a communication problem between management and the construction 
workers, however the exact dynamics of this relationship have not been fully 
observed.  There are also indications that the problem is more significant.  Fixing one 
of the more serious flaws in the building, a 45kg LPG tank near an open door to the 
stairwell, highlighted that a combination of broken lines of communication, lack of 
awareness of the building’s condition, and the people trying to fix this problem were 
even misled. When the tank was said to be gone, it was actually moved to a different 
place in the building. The eventual solution for this problem was to involve an 
Australian workplace safety agency, WorkSafe, to force removal of the LPG tank.   
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In this example of worst case management, it is clear there are a number of 
ways in which a lack of awareness and communication resulted in an unsafe building.  
In this example, the primary aspect of awareness was of the significance of the 
changes to the design, as it was clear from signs on fire doors that propping them 
open is a fire hazard.  From the observations over the course of the project, it 
appeared that policy changes to increase compliance with fire engineering 
requirements were motivated by continued pressure from several regulatory agencies 
rather than internal impetus to improve safety.   
 
In another example the team interviewed the manager (Subject 9) of Building 
B. After this interview, performed after the inspection of Building B, it was 
interesting to hear what he knew about his building. The team had asked if he was 
aware of the fire safety systems and the necessary maintenance in his building and he 
said he was. This highlighted a discrepancy between management’s perception of the 
building and its actual condition, as the site visit found a lack of maintenance on the 
fire extinguishers and an egress path blocked by garbage bins.  This is a particularly 
worrying discrepancy, as this building had a notification of non-compliance with 
Essential Safety Measures requirements, and the notice should have been sent directly 
to this particular manager.  The manager also said that they had outside contractors 
that maintained these systems and have been since the commissioning of the building. 
This manager claimed that maintenance checks and repairs had been performed on the 
correct schedule, though there were relatively significant flaws found during regular 
maintenance checks that had remained unfixed for over a year.  While the team 
cannot verify whether the maintenance contractors had made any attempt to notify the 
manager of problems found during routine checks, the team can conclude that the 
manager is apparently unaware of the condition of the building.   
 
Building F highlighted a different communication error, specifically the 
communication of the building’s specific limitations to the managers.  The manager 
was not aware, while escorting the team through the facility, of the fuel load 
requirements for the building, particularly the height and volume requirements.  This 
requirement was specified because the storage racks shown on the initial plans 
indicated that storage volume and height would be very close to the DtS requirement 
for sprinklers.  This requirement was on the occupancy permit, but directly cited a 
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table from the BCA and required that the building be an “excessive hazard.”  It would 
not be possible to determine how to implement this requirement without finding the 
table in the BCA itself.  This is a significant lapse in communication, which can in 
part be tracked back to the building surveyor, as the building surveyor would actually 
have written the occupancy permit.  There is some uncertainty in exactly where all of 
the communication issues lie, however.  The building manager either did not read the 
occupancy permit or did not understand the requirement, which indicates that either 
the building owners or building surveyor did not communicate the meaning behind 
the requirement.  There appear to be other communication issues involved with this 
building, as the original usage assumptions on the plans as to the number of racks 
changed.  The plans tentatively showed four long storage racks, which is near the 
threshold for DtS required sprinklers, but the actual building had five racks and 
storage on the floor.  This deviation indicates that the initial usage assumptions were 
not conservative enough in estimating the storage capacity of the building.   
 
12.2.3 Influences on Management Implementations 
There are many factors which affect how building owners and managers make 
decisions regarding both the construction and the day-to-day management of their 
buildings.  These influences include things such as cost, education, and insurance 
requirements.  It is important to understand these influences and how they can cause a 
building to be managed in either a compliant or non-compliant manner.  This section 
provides analysis based on a combination of case study observations and interviews 
with fire safety professionals. 
  
12.2.3.1 The Cost of Fire Safety 
There are several areas in which cost can influence the use of PBD in 
buildings.  One issue is the tradeoff between higher initial costs to implement safety 
systems versus a very high cost in the case of a fire.  Many of the interviewees noted 
that developers are afraid of installing more complicated fire safety systems, like 
automatic sprinklers, because of the high initial cost and the cost of maintenance.  
These same developers also tended to ignore the significantly higher costs of a fire in 
a building that is not well-protected.  Even with pressure from fire services and fire 
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engineers to install more expensive and more effective systems, there is a significant 
hesitation to spend more money.  The usual systems this trade off impacts are 
automatic sprinkler systems, which are complicated and have long-term maintenance 
requirements, but provide a significant level of safety when implemented properly 
(Subject 1, Subject 4, Subject 5, Subject 6, and Subject 8).  
 
One specific example cited by an interviewee (Subject 6) was an industrial 
building that was being rebuilt after a fire.  The building was manufacturing fiberglass 
poles and after the first fire which completely destroyed his building, the owner did 
not want to put sprinklers in the new building.  The owner’s reasoning was that after 
the fire he did not have enough money to be able to afford sprinklers.  One would 
think after a catastrophic fire where a loss of approximately 17 million dollars was 
incurred, the owner would want to take extra precautions in protecting the next 
building he owned.  As pointed out by Subject 6, sprinklers are an effective means to 
improve fire safety, even with their expense.  They make the building safer, often 
allow other fire safety systems to be deleted, reducing the cost, and make the building 
more flexible in terms of use and thus easier to sell.  Even so, building owners do not 
like the initial capital cost involved with these fire safety systems, and try to avoid 
installing them (Subject 6).   
 
Another example of building for a cost was Building B.  This building had the 
similar motive of cost.  The owner of the building decided not to put in a garbage 
chute.  The garbage chute may not seem to affect the PBD, but when there are 
excessive fuel loads in the hallway, such as garbage left in the hallway by the tenants, 
the egress path could become compromised.  While there were only two bags of 
garbage in the hallway during the visit, it should be noted that the cleaning staff was 
servicing the rooms and hallways at that time. This could have made the small amount 
of garbage seem smaller than it actually was prior to the regular cleaning.  There were 
procedures in place to prevent trash from being left in hallways.  The manager 
(Subject 9) informed the team that if the cleaning staff found any trash left outside the 
door they would have to report it back to the manager.  The manager could then take 
action against the tenant.  The manager reported trash left in hallways as a regular 
occurrence, and he was receiving many complaints from the cleaning staff. 
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12.2.3.2 Education 
The education or knowledge of the building owners/managers at design time 
varies depending on the project and the developers.  In some projects, the clients for 
the fire engineers are quite knowledgeable about what PBD is, how it can affect their 
project, and what concerns are important.  This level of knowledge varies greatly, and 
the perceptions of PBD change depending on the client.  Some see PBD primarily as a 
way of cutting costs, particularly seen in cases of reverse fire engineering, where fire 
engineering is simply a way of rationalizing previous decisions.  It has been the 
observation that the perceptions of PBD depends on the age and the experience of the 
developer, where older developers are more likely to see things in a prescriptive, 
black-and-white manner where deviations must be fixed sooner, and younger 
developers see PBD as a get-out-of-jail free card that can allow for cost cutting 
(Subject 1, Subject 6).   
 
 Once the building is finished, the level of education of the building manager 
did not seem to be as big an influence as one might think.  There did not seem to be 
any difference between compliant and non-compliant managers as far as their 
knowledge of fire engineering and the reasoning behind the various performance 
requirements.  Many building managers said they had little technical background and 
relied on contractors to actually carry out the maintenance requirements for the 
building.  The exception tended to be in the commercial buildings, which had on-site 
maintenance staff and occasionally engineers, who displayed a greater understanding 
of fire safety matters.  The technical maintenance of the systems relating directly to 
fire safety, however, was always performed by outside contractors.  Several interview 
subjects suggested that more education would make building managers more aware of 
the importance of meeting the requirements put forth by the FSE and therefore more 
willing to meet those requirements (Subject 4, Subject 5). 
 
12.2.3.3 Insurance 
One outside party that can affect the building process is an insurance 
company.  Of particular interest to this project was the understanding that insurance 
companies have of PBD.  From the experiences of the majority of interview subjects, 
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insurance has little effect on most building designs, with the exception of buildings 
where property protection is important.  The team found out that the insurance 
companies were not affecting the designs, but the team was unable to interview any 
insurance companies to find more information due to time constraints. Some 
examples provided of these were art galleries, where the paintings were the primary 
protection goal, and aircraft hangars, where the airplanes inside the hangar were worth 
several times more than the hangar itself.  In these cases, insurance companies are 
more likely to get involved early in the design process to ensure that adequate fire 
safety systems exist to protect the property stored in the buildings.  In some of these 
cases, insurance companies would provide a detailed list of fire safety systems that 
must exist to keep their insurance policy (Subject 3, Subject 4, Subject 5, Subject 6).   
 
The conclusion drawn from the interviews concerning insurance is that while 
insurance companies do have an effect in some instances, the majority of insurance 
policies are not dependent on the fire safety systems, as long as the building is code 
compliant.  In such instances, there are no insurance pressures to keep the PBD 
systems working properly.  Interviewees noted that in most cases the insurance 
policies and premiums are exactly the same regardless of the quality of the fire safety 
provisions (Subject 1).   
 
Interviewees noted a mix in the level of education that insurance companies 
had concerning PBD and its effects, as there were some that were aware of it uses and 
extra requirements, but many did not realize the significance of fire engineering in a 
building’s safety.  In an example cited by one of the interview subject (Subject 5), an 
insurance company refused to allow a PBD solution which would have provided 
better protection in favor of the DtS solution as it supposedly meets code better.  
There were other aspects noted by building surveyors interviewed that should be 
important to insurance companies, such as the legal requirements for maintenance, 
and that building owners could become liable if a building burned due to negligent 
maintenance (Subject 4, Subject 5).   
12.2.3.4 Public Pressure 
Another influence cited by interviewees on how a building is managed is the 
visibility of the building to the public.  The comparison was between a large, well-
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known facility such as the Melbourne Cricket Ground and a warehouse in a seldom-
traveled part of town.  In the case of a large stadium, if there are any safety concerns 
or violations, there is a fear of significant repercussions due to public pressure.  The 
rarely seen warehouse does not get any of this visibility.  Especially in the case of 
businesses that depend on trade with the general public, buildings cannot have a 
reputation as being unsafe, which would theoretically lead to safer management 
practices (Subject 6).   
 
This has an influence on the enforcement aspects of the process, as municipal 
building surveyors have found that building owners are reluctant to go to any sort of 
publicly recorded trial over a safety concern.  This fear leads to many instances where 
building owners would rather fix an unsafe building than risk their reputation 
disputing the safety requirements (Subject 4).   
12.2.3.5 Regulatory Requirements 
One important influence on building managers’ actions has been the regulatory 
requirements imposed by building codes and enforced by fire services inspections and 
municipal building surveyors.  The source of their enforcement power is that it is 
illegal to not maintain a building to the requirements on the occupancy permit.  
However, while there are legislatively granted powers to force problems to be fixed, 
all of the interviewees involved with the process cited a lack of personnel to actually 
perform the policing.  It was well-known by those in fire services and municipal 
building surveyors that a large number of buildings did not write annual reports on 
essential safety systems.  These reports are legally required, but all interviewed cite 
lack of personnel to actually track down the buildings that do not complete 
paperwork.  These sorts of problems in enforcing regulatory requirements make the 
influence of regulatory controls over buildings significantly weaker over building 
managers willing to ignore requirements (Subject 1, Subject 2, Subject 3, Subject 4, 
and Subject 5).  
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12.2.3.6 Building Surveyors 
Another area noted as a problem in the building process was the building 
surveying market.  Interviewees (Subject 1, Subject 5, Subject 12) cited a shortage of 
qualified building surveyors.  Several noted a frequent lack of technical capability to 
evaluate fire engineered buildings, and a more pressing concern, that some building 
surveyors are unaware of the limits of their own fire engineering knowledge.  This is 
worrying, as surveyors may be approving buildings based on an incomplete 
understanding of the fire engineering, particularly the subtleties of how systems are 
integrated.   
 
The clearest issue was the small number of building surveyors, which results 
in some building surveyors issuing very large numbers of permits.  As of April 2007, 
the Building Commission lists 484 building surveyors, with 31% of those that do not 
actively issue permits.  Those that issued permits were issuing very large numbers of 
permits, with 11% building surveyors issuing over 500 permits in the past year.  The 
average number of permits issued in a year by the average building surveyor was 303 
permits.  These numbers were cited by an interview subject (Subject 12) as an 
indication that there are a large number of building surveyors that churn through 
building designs too fast to thoroughly examine them or take the time to address the 
subtleties of the designs.  This interview subject was of the opinion that only about a 
third of these active building surveyors were likely to be qualified to examine the 
more sophisticated fire engineered buildings.  Combined with the observation that 
most building surveyors do not see buildings after the occupancy permit is issued, this 
shows a clear problem that building surveyors are unable to keep up with the amount 
of work while maintaining high standards.   
12.2.3.7 Fire Safety Awareness 
One influence on management effectiveness, initially expected by the team 
and others working on the project to be significant, was the level of fire safety 
awareness among building managers.  It was expected that the level of awareness 
would be proportional to the safety of the building.  However, Building A proved to 
be a counter-example for this hypothesis, as the manager (Subject 7) for the building 
with the best management had little understanding of fire safety matters.   
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 In this particular instance, the manager of Building A knew, for example, that 
fire doors need to be kept closed because they were on the list of usage and 
maintenance requirements.  He was aware that this policy was connected to fire 
safety, but did not know the role fire doors play in preventing smoke and fire from 
spreading into egress passages.  He was also completely unaware of the fire 
engineering report done on the building.  Even in this case, the building was 
extremely well kept, as the fire engineering requirements had been translated into 
operating manuals for the management, and the rules contained were rigorously 
followed.   
   
In Building F, there was similar example of a lack of awareness of the fire 
safety systems, but in this case the manager was breaking an assumption the FSE had 
specified. The manager was unaware of the storage restrictions on the building, which 
did not allow him to store materials at a height of over 4m or a volume of over 2000 
m3.  The manager was also unaware of the occupancy permit which specified this 
requirement.  
 
The manager for Building D was aware of the height requirements for the 
storage of paper rolls and that this was important because the building had no 
sprinklers.  This knowledge seemed to be enough to make the management put the 
effort into implementing policies which would prevent goods from being stored 
improperly.  They were also willing to put further controls into place when stacks of 
paper rolls were found to be too high.  Based on their response, these issues seemed to 
be anomalies rather than a common occurrence. The managers also followed up with 
the site inspector at the MFB that took the team on the site visit with a letter and form. 
This letter and form indicated they will now be conducting monthly and daily checks 
of the safety measures in place and reporting them appropriately. 
 
These examples seem to indicate that, provided the management for a building 
is aware of the fire safety requirements, they do not need any knowledge of the 
reasoning behind these requirements.  Management for both Buildings A and D were 
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aware of the requirements for their buildings and had taken steps to ensure those 
requirements were met.  The manager for Building F was not aware of the 
requirements for fuel load in his building and had serious issues as a result.   
 
The fact building managers have little understanding of the technical aspect of 
fire safety requirements was confirmed through interviews.  The general consensus of 
interviewees was that building owners and managers with technical knowledge are a 
rarity.  They believed most were just doing what was required for the simple reason 
that it was required.  Some of the interviewees indicated that if managers were to have 
more knowledge it would make them more likely meet the requirements (Subject 1, 
Subject 4, Subject 5, Subject 6). 
12.2.3.8 Hierarchies of Responsibility 
Another issue influencing the effectiveness of management is the number of 
people who have a role affecting building maintenance.  The issue, highlighted by 
discussions with MFB personnel, occurs when it is unclear who should perform 
certain maintenance tasks, such as in buildings that have tenants.  It may not be clear 
that a tenant was expected to perform a particular task, but the tenant may expect that 
the building owner or manager was responsible.  In such situations, it is possible for 
certain tasks to be ignored by both parties (Subject 4). 
 
Building C, the significantly flawed single-stair apartment building, 
highlighted how having complex management can make fixing problems in a building 
difficult.  Because the building was occupied by both apartment residents and 
builders, when problems were detected, there was difficulty in determining whose 
responsibility it was to fix the problems.  During this time, such issues as a 45kg LPG 
tank placed near an open fire door were not addressed by either the building 
management or the builders.  The complexity of the situation also made it hard for 
even regulatory controls through the MFB to force changes.   
 
A different way the relationship between managers, owners and corporate 
bodies can affect maintenance of fire safety systems is when there is pressure on 
managers to ensure that buildings operate cleanly and with no regulatory violations.  
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This can lead to very effective management, as with both proactive owners and 
proactive managers, problems are found and fixed very quickly.   
 
In the case of the best residential building, Building A, the most significant 
reason for the level of compliance with fire engineering requirements was the pressure 
from the outside body corporate to follow rules.  In both the interview with the 
manager (Subject 7) and the site visit, it was clear that a significant level of pressure 
existed on the manager to ensure the building met all of its maintenance requirements 
and that problems were fixed promptly.  
 
The effects of large-scale ownership of buildings varies on a number of 
characteristics, as in some cases the buildings will be run to higher standards, and in 
some cases to lower standards.  Some large-scale building owners will impose more 
stringent requirements on the buildings (Subject 11).  These can show up in the form 
of audits and maintenance requirements, such as in the case of Building A and some 
large corporations, or more stringent safety system requirements in the case of some 
hospitals or buildings with high insurance requirements.   
 
12.2.3.9  External Contractors 
While building managers are in charge of maintenance for the facility, the 
actual maintenance, especially for specialized fire safety equipment, is frequently 
performed by outside contractors.  As required by Australian Standard, the actual 
checks on the essential safety measures, such as automatic sprinkler systems and 
alarms systems, must be performed and logged on a regular (weekly, monthly, or 
annually) basis.  Of interest to this project is the level to which external contractors 
are used, how they are evaluated, and how they communicate problems to 
management for repair.  The logs that indicate when maintenance has been performed 
are useful as they can give a timeline when problems occur.   
 
In building A, the example of effective management, the manager (Subject 7), 
said that the official policy of the body corporate was to have all maintenance 
performed by outside contractors.  This maintenance included all plant services, 
essential safety measure maintenance, and housekeeping in public areas.  The reasons 
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for this were primarily the technical nature of the maintenance checks and that there 
was no business interest in hiring employees.  All case study buildings used similar 
external contractor methods for the maintenance of fire safety systems.  As shown in 
building A, it is possible for external contractors to perform sufficiently well for a 
building to be safe with otherwise effective management.  This manager did note, 
however, that there are few means for a non-technical manager to evaluate the work 
of these maintenance contractors, so if problems are missed, there is no means of 
alternative detection.   
 
In a situation where the management is less effective, it is possible for 
maintenance checks to detect issues in systems, but these may not be acted on by 
management.  The best example of this is in building B, one of the single-stair 
apartments, where there was a problem with the sprinkler pumps for over a year.  The 
particular problem was that the indicator alarm and light for the sprinkler pumps was 
not working, and the sprinkler pumps frequently were found to be running.  If left 
unchecked, this could burn out the sprinkler pumps, crippling the sprinkler system.  
This flaw was noted in the maintenance logs for over a year, but there was no 
evidence of work done to fix these problems during this time.  The fact that the owner 
was completely unaware of these issues seems to indicate that the contractors were 
simply not reporting the faults to the manager because they were written in the logs. 
 
Interviews showed that contractors are a major source of concern in actually 
performing the maintenance on fire safety systems.  One reoccurring issue is the 
number of contractors available, which is far less than necessary to actually complete 
all the work available.  This frequently results in checks and maintenance not 
occurring.  There is a solution to this problem already in use in some buildings, a 
system that places maintenance logs in a computer database that can be accessed 
offsite.  With the data stored in this manner, it is easy to determine how much work 
has been done and recorded properly, all displayed in convenient statistical form.  
While it cannot verify if the work listed in the log was actually done, this sort of 
documentation does provide a significant indicator to building managers.  This system 
also provides a financial measurement for building owners, as the owners are paying 
for all of the scheduled maintenance to be completed, not some smaller fraction.  This 
allows building owners a way to evaluate maintenance contractors beyond reputation 
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alone.  The statistics for the actual maintenance rates are fairly concerning, however, 
as only a fraction of the maintenance paid for by building owners is usually done.  
Maintenance contractors are becoming aware of this system, and will make sure that 
more work is completed on buildings that use this system. While it does not actually 
check work performed, it does provide a level of accountability among contractors 
that motivates improved maintenance (Subject 12). 
 
12.3 Communication 
In order to understand the background for the current situation of PBD 
implementations, it was necessary to understand the ways in which communication 
occurs between the main parties involved in the building’s design and use.  Of 
particular interest to this project were the communication mechanisms that handle 
usage changes.  In order to examine how recorded information passes between parties 
and communication mechanisms, an examination of the documentation was 
important.   
 
12.3.1 Changes in Use 
The primary focus of the research in this project was to evaluate the extent to 
which changes occur in a building’s use that undermine its fire safety systems, and of 
particular interest is finding what mechanisms detect these changes.  Because there 
are different situations in which usage changes occur to a building and through which 
fire safety is evaluated, this section groups changes in use by the mechanisms 
involved with detecting and fixing problems.  Of particular interest in each type of 
change was how the change could actually be detected by parties outside of building 
occupants, and what action can be taken to ensure that usage changes do not hinder 
fire safety systems.   
 
12.3.1.1 Changes in Occupancy Classification 
The interviews highlighted a procedural mechanism to reevaluate a building 
when it changed use, but only when a building changes sufficiently to require a 
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modified occupancy permit, frequently due to a change in occupancy classification.  
The common change cited by interview subjects was between offices, retail and 
apartments, which clearly change the occupancy classification along with several of 
the major assumptions underlying the fire design.  The sorts of changes that are not 
picked up in this process are those that do not change the classification, covered in 
Section 12.3.1.3, and the ones where the lines between classes are less clear in 
practice, such as between class 2 apartments and class 3 hotels, covered in Section 
12.3.1.2.   
 
All of the interviewees cited the more detailed mechanism that exists to deal 
with an occupancy change as being more effective in involving outside parties to 
evaluate the changes.  When a change requires more permits, then the relevant 
building surveyor reassesses the building with the new usage or modifications, and 
may even involve an FSE to determine the effect on the fire safety needs for the 
building.  The more extensive review from outside parties allows this mechanism to 
more effectively deal with usage change in a building, and in its proper usage, 
prevents the problems that occur due to other changes in use. 
    
12.3.1.2 Subtle Changes in Occupancy Classification 
One flaw in the process, noted by several of the interview subjects, was when 
there is a change in the usage from the stated design that would technically change the 
occupancy classification, but is too subtle for regulatory processes to identify.  A 
common example of this sort of change is between Class 2 and Class 3 buildings, 
which are long-term residential homes and short-term hotels, respectively.  The code 
is clear in the distinction, but in practice, the line is much less clear, and these changes 
were seen in examples cited by interview subjects during case studies.  In the case of 
the differences between Class 2 and Class 3, there were many examples of situations 
where a building was listed as a Class 2, but the actual occupants were there for very 
short periods of time making the actual use more like a Class 3 (Subject 1; Subject 4).   
 
In one case, Building B was listed as Class 2 apartments, but had a minimum 
stay of two nights, and in some places was even described as a hotel.  Observations of 
interviewees confirmed that this was a common occurrence, and it is not unusual to 
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have a situation where an apartment is treated as a hotel room and occupants are even 
told to say that they live in the room permanently if asked.  This indicates that owners 
are aware of the change from the listed occupancy, but either do not care or do not 
understand the reasons behind the difference in classification.   
 
This sort of change does have an effect on the assumptions underlying the fire 
safety systems, as familiarity with the building is a common requirement in many fire 
engineered safety systems.  Municipal building surveyors, Subject 4 in Appendix D, 
list hotels among the highest risk buildings, along with nightclubs and bars, but a 
Class 2 building could escape more regular inspections. 
   
12.3.1.3 Changes without Classification Change 
The most worrying changes to building usage noted by interview subjects and 
in case studies were buildings with changes in use that did not change the occupancy 
classification, but did change the assumptions underlying the fire engineering.  A very 
common example cited by interview subjects was in the case of a warehouse with a 
change in contents, and thereby a change the hazard level.   
 
Subject 6 provided one particular example that resulted in a fire.  A warehouse was 
fire engineered to require fewer safety systems (no automatic sprinklers or smoke 
detection system with brigade notification) because the intended contents consisted of 
noncombustible metal car parts.  Later in the building’s life, its contents were changed 
to a variety of combustible items, notably including 150,000 liters of motor oil. This 
was followed by a fire.  This fire was extremely costly, as the burning oil spread 
throughout the building and to the outside, where it destroyed several large trucks and 
a packing container.  The lack of automatic brigade notification meant that 
intervention took longer, and the fire was significantly harder to fight.  The total 
damage was $25 million.  Subject 6 estimated that if the correct sprinkler system and 
notification system were installed, the fire would likely have been isolated quickly, 
with about $50,000 in damages.  
 
The overwhelming conclusion of the interview subjects was that there is no 
effective system to detect and compensate for changes.  The sole means of detection 
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of problems for fire services is complaints from occupants. However, the occupants 
are unlikely to have the knowledge necessary to recognize these issues.  Private 
building surveyors and FSEs have no input here at all, and will only be notified of 
changes if the change is picked up by fire services due to complaints.  This was the 
consensus of all the interviews of FSEs, building surveyors and fire services 
personnel (Subject 1; Subject 4; Subject 6).   
 
Identifying a change in usage that breaks fire safety solutions on a large scale 
is difficult due to the lack of identification mechanisms.  In Building C, the flaws 
were picked up by a fire safety engineering professor who coincidentally happened to 
live in the building.  In another instance, Subject 8 complained about policies in a 
building he was working in when he discovered similar usage flaws to those found in 
Building C.  Interviews confirmed the team’s observation during case studies that the 
changes that do get picked up are often ones spotted by a whistleblower or other 
knowledgeable person who occupies the building.  In these cases, it was fortunate that 
aware fire engineers were involved with the buildings, otherwise these issues would 
likely have gone unnoticed.   
 
12.3.1.4 Changes in Ownership 
An issue cited by many of the interview subjects as being likely to cause a loss 
of information concerning building safety is the sale of a building.  When the building 
changes owners, some of the knowledge from the design process that the original 
owners have may not transfer to the new owners.  The other change that can occur is 
if the building is bought by an owner that is less conscientious of the fire safety 
requirements of the building.   
 
In some cases, cited by interview subjects, some of the depth of knowledge of 
certain fire systems was lost in the transition, with a common example being 
automatic sprinkler systems.  While automatic sprinkler systems are very effective, 
they come in a variety of forms and one may not be as effective if the hazard changes.  
Owners, especially those new to a building, sometimes think that sprinklers are a fail 
safe fire safety measure which gives them the freedom to do as they wish with a 
building.  Owners often use automatic sprinkler systems to justify changing the 
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hazard level of the contents in a building.  While an owner may pay enough attention 
to fire safety to note the sprinklers, they do not always know about the limitations of 
the system.  A more extreme example occurred in the previously cited warehouses 
with changed contents, as the $25 million warehouse fire was a case where the 
ownership had changed.  In such buildings, which do not have the fire safety systems 
in place to deal with increased hazards, the fire engineering places limits on what can 
be stored in the building, but it is necessary for the building owners to check on these 
limits (Subject 6).   
 
One mechanism mentioned by Subject 1 as a means of evaluating a building 
when it changes ownership is due diligence, which is a requirement on building 
owners to go through the process of finding all of the background information on a 
building.  Regardless of whether it is a fire engineered building or not, information as 
to what the important fire safety requirements are, should be identified through this 
process.  The difficulty, according to interview subjects, is in the lacking of building 
owners that actually go through this process in sufficient detail to identify the more 
subtle fire safety requirements.  The proportion that perform due diligence is very 
small, estimated at 20% by Subject 1.  One reason for the small number of owners 
performing due diligence is that if issues are discovered, they can result in the 
cancellation of the sale.  
 
12.3.2 Communication Mediums 
In examining the communication that occurs during the building process, it is 
important to examine the actual mediums by which information is distributed.  The 
primary written documents in the building process are the fire engineering reports and 
the occupancy permits.  The fire engineering report is the document created by the 
FSEs who designed the PBD, and must exist for all fire engineered solutions, which 
makes it a primary document in the transmission of fire safety requirements.  The 
occupancy permit, a shorter document prepared by the building surveyor, is issued to 
all buildings regardless of whether the building includes fire engineering.  This is the 
more visible document for each building, and is worth examining as a part of this 
project as the permit is meant to provide information to the building manager. 
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12.3.2.1 Fire Engineering Reports  
Fire engineering reports contain the analysis and solutions for a building’s PBD 
aspects.  The essential parts are: 
• A list of areas in which the design varies from the DtS requirements of the 
BCA. 
• A list of alternative methods of meeting performance requirements. 
• Rationale for each of the relevant performance requirements. 
• Analysis to prove a building meets performance requirements, usually 
including quantitative analysis and fire scenario modeling.   
There are several other pieces of information that need to come out of the fire 
engineering report in order for its information to be useful to other stakeholders.  In 
general, these are the assumptions underlying the analysis, with several specific areas: 
• Occupant characteristics 
• Contents of the building (fuel load, distribution, special circumstances) 
• Usage requirements 
• States of fire safety systems 
These areas were ones that should be examined not only during the technical 
analysis, but also when determining management policies, as it is imperative that 
these assumptions remain accurate.   
 
 The ability to identify the useful information in a report is critical to be able to 
begin to implement the correct maintenance policies.  The team, as students not 
trained in the specific technical area of fire safety engineering, was able to effectively 
read all of the reports used as case studies to extract the important usage information.  
This is not to say that all of the reports presented information in a way that made this 
process easy, as the quality of presentation varied significantly.  It is important to note 
that in the analysis of the reports, for the purposes of this project, the fire safety 
design and analysis is assumed to be technically correct, and this area of concern is 
focused purely on the reports’ ability to communicate important safety information. 
 
 In the best reports, all of the assumptions behind the design modeling were 
carefully listed and clearly labeled.  Background on each of the design considerations 
and the modeling process were included to allow for easy understanding of the 
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process.  The usage requirements and necessary management policies were clearly 
written and listed as well.  If a non-technical person were to read the report, it would 
at least be possible to find these important sections, even if the majority of the 
quantitative analysis is beyond their abilities. 
 
The worst reports were much harder to read, and frequently the usage 
assumptions underlying the design were much harder to find.  In these instances, it 
was necessary to scour the modeling sections of the reports to find what could be very 
important requirements, like keeping doors closed.  Certain requirements might be 
mentioned in a separate requirements section of a document, like a reliance on trained 
staff as a fire safety system, but the significance of such a requirement would not 
always be apparent until reading the modeling sections.  In these cases, it was clear 
that no one who was not able to understand the modeling sections would be able to 
understand the usage requirements from the fire engineering reports.   
 
The team’s observations of the ease of understanding fire engineering reports 
were consistent with comments of interview subjects, who reported that the majority 
of information contained in a fire engineering report will only be useful to a fire 
engineer.  The experience of fire services engineers who review the fire engineering 
reports indicates that most reports that pass review will contain the required 
information, because it is required for approval.  The presentation varies, in their 
experience, similarly to the reports seen during the case studies during this project 
(Subject 2, Subject 5).   
 
As for the ability of the fire engineering report to communicate important 
usage requirements beyond the initial design stages, case studies and interviews with 
fire services personnel indicated that the fire engineering reports never had an impact 
on the day-to-day management of buildings, and that building managers did not have 
any awareness of the report.  In the case of Subject 7, the manager for Building A, 
there was no awareness that such a report existed.   
 
It is particularly important that the building surveyor be able to understand the 
fire engineering report, as he/she is the one responsible for evaluating and approving 
it.  While building surveyors must have certain fire safety training in order to evaluate 
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a design without the aid of an FSE, many of the FSEs and fire services personnel 
interviewed indicated that the actual knowledge shown in practice by building 
surveyors is significantly less than what their credentials might indicate.  The other 
area highlighted where building surveyors lack knowledge is in the awareness of their 
own expertise.  Some building surveyors were reported by interviewees to have 
thought they understood much more than they actually did, which can lead them to 
make evaluations themselves rather than consulting an engineer.  This is a particularly 
difficult issue, as it is easy to write a report that could make a design look sufficiently 
safe, but there could be problems lost in the complexity of a design (Subject 6).   
 
12.3.2.2 Occupancy Permit 
The document that plays a greater role in the communication between FSEs 
and the building managers and owners is the occupancy permit, which lists the 
essential safety measures that need to be maintained.  The occupancy permit must also 
be displayed in the building and available within 24 hours if requested by a brigade 
inspector.  Actual occupancy permits are much shorter than engineering reports, 
usually between one and ten pages, and the focus is specifically on what must be done 
as a matter of law to keep the building safe.  Fire engineered buildings may reference 
the fire engineering report in the occupancy permit, but the fire engineering report 
does not have to be with the occupancy permit.   
 
As a means of communication to the managers, many of the building 
managers, building surveyors and FSEs cited the occupancy permit as including the 
necessary information to create maintenance policies and requirements to keep the 
building use from changing.  However, the actual permit appears to play a smaller 
role in some cases than thought in actually educating building managers, as indicated 
by the case study of Building A and conversations with Subject 7.  In this particular 
case, the permit itself was not used in the day to day management of the building.  
Instead, there were much more detailed manuals for building maintenance provided in 
collaboration between the developers, who build buildings with the intention of 
selling them upon completion, and the builders.  These manuals were used to create 
management policies, so the occupancy permit was less important.   
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 Because there is no standard format for an occupancy permit, there is a 
significant amount of variation between them which results in some occupancy 
permits being more detailed and easier to understand than others.  An example of a 
well written occupancy permit was that for Building D.  This permit included the 
requirements for all the essential safety measures in the building in an easy to read 
table.  It also identified the performance aspects of the building and the associated 
requirements.  The usefulness of this sort of permit was demonstrated during the site 
visit, when the permit was used to check the actual requirement for the storage of 
paper rolls. 
 
 At the opposite end of the spectrum was the occupancy permit for Building F.  
This permit provided very little actual detail on the requirements, instead referencing 
external documents such as the BCA, which the manager is unlikely to have readily 
available.  This was particularly true for the requirements governing the volume and 
height of storage in the building.  The occupancy permit merely stated that the 
building not contain “excessive hazard” and referred to the BCA to define what this 
meant.  This made it difficult for the building manager to understand what was 
required and was at least partially responsible for the fuel load requirements not being 
met. 
 
12.3.2.3 Operating Manuals 
One additional area of documentation, noticed both in case studies and through 
interviews, was custom operating manuals for a building created at the completion of 
construction by the designers and builders.  This documentation varied in 
completeness, and was an option available to developers during the design and 
construction process.   
 
In the one case study example in which the team observed the use of these 
manuals, Building A, the documentation was the primary means through which the 
building manager knew about the building’s usage and maintenance requirements.  
The documentation included ringed binders for each building in the complex, 
detailing all the specific information necessary to manage the buildings.  This could 
then be used to inform external contractors of the building’s requirements, as well as 
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keeping track of the maintenance schedules.  In this example, the manager did not 
have any understanding of the actual fire engineering behind the requirements.  The 
custom documentation, to the exclusion of the occupancy permit itself, became the 
source of information necessary for fire safety in this instance.   
 
Discussions with fire services indicates that this sort of documentation is 
commonly available as a service by the designers, but that it is not frequently taken 
due to the additional cost to the developers.  The concept of operating manuals for a 
building, which detail in clear language the usage requirements, was described by 
Subject 1, a private FSE, as an effective way of communicating fire safety 
requirements for performance-based buildings.  These manuals were currently being 
implemented in Singapore and were reported to be working well.   
 
 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 78 
May 1, 2007 
13 Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
This pilot study is designed to show whether a problem of Performance-based 
Designed (PBD) buildings deviating from their usage requirements exists.  During the 
course of the project, the team visited six buildings including three residential 
apartment buildings and three commercial warehouses.  In these cases, the level of 
compliance with usage specifications from the fire engineering reports varied between 
buildings with significant usage deviations that could seriously affect fire safety, to 
buildings that were well managed and complied with the usage specifications.  
Building managers were interviewed as a means of determining the level of awareness 
of fire safety requirements and policies in place to maintain their buildings’ safety.  It 
should be noted that that there were not enough case studies to be able to generalize 
the distribution of compliant buildings over all of Victorian buildings.  In order to add 
more breadth to the project and examine some of the underlying issues behind PBD 
implementation problems, building surveyors, fire safety engineers, and fire services 
personnel were interviewed.  In the absence of a statistically significant number of 
case studies, the interviews allowed the team to draw on the experiences of the 
interviewees to gauge the prevalence of PBD usage deviations.  The interviews also 
gave insight into the building processes and influences that affect the final usage of 
buildings.   
 
From this research, the team was able to draw a number of initial conclusions, 
as well as make a series of recommendations on areas that can be improved.  Because 
this study has been designed as a pilot study, other areas for future research have been 
identified.  There are a number of conclusions, with the most notable being that a 
problem with the current implementation of PBD in buildings exists.  The other 
conclusions focus on more detailed analysis of the findings to characterize the issues 
found with the current PBD implementation.  Based on the research done in this 
project, there are also areas where more research needs to be done, particularly on the 
long-term usage changes that occur with fire engineered buildings.  While more 
research is necessary, the team was able to identify several methods to help solve the 
problems found with the current PBD implementation scheme.  These include a 
number of procedural and enforcement changes, as well as some changes that can be 
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implemented by fire engineers and building surveyors to improve compliance with 
usage requirements.   
 
13.1 Conclusions 
Based on buildings examined as a part of this project, as well as discussions 
with fire safety professionals, there is sufficient evidence to show a problem exists 
concerning the implementation of PBD in buildings.  One of the buildings examined 
contained flaws significant enough to present a significant egress hazard in the event 
of a fire, and two other buildings had deviations that could affect the assumptions 
underlying the design.  The experiences of interviewees indicated that the problem is 
very widespread, and that great numbers of buildings with similar flaws could be 
easily found.  The knowledge of these problem areas among building management 
was mixed, with a few building managers that knew of fire safety requirements, and 
some that even understood the fire engineering involved.  There were building 
managers, however, that were unaware of usage requirements placed on the building, 
and in some cases they were unaware of logged problems in their buildings.   
 
Beyond verifying the existence of a problem with the implementation of PBD 
in buildings, the team worked to characterize the nature of issues found and determine 
causes.  These causes could be found through a mix of interviews performed and 
through comparisons between the case study buildings.  Because of the complexity of 
the building process and the number of influences over a long period of time, there are 
some areas that the project could not fully investigate, such as the intricacies of the 
marketplace for FSEs, building surveyors and contractors, or any of the technical 
aspects of the designs.  Of particular interest in this study are the systems in place to 
detect usage changes in PBD buildings, as well as what management policies actually 
work to comply with fire engineering requirements.   
 
13.1.1 DtS and PBD Issues Overlap 
There were a variety of problems found in the buildings, ranging from smaller 
issues, such as unclear signage, to significant problems, such as wedged open fire 
doors.  Because of the complexities of fire engineering, it is difficult, as a part of this 
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study, to determine the effect of these changes to the overall safety of the building.  
There are, however, some notable characteristics as to the interactions of the usage 
changes with the design.  One of the most common was the mix of compliance issues 
with both Deemed-to-Satisfy (DtS) and fire engineering requirements.  In many cases 
flaws were found, but not precisely as a part of the PBD assumptions.  These flaws, 
such as maintenance shortfalls or exceeded storage volumes, are not explicitly 
mentioned in the fire engineering reports, but are still connected to the fire 
engineering solutions.  In the fire engineering reports reviewed, a common 
requirement was that all safety systems would be operational and working properly, 
or that all aspects of the building not involved with the PBD are fully DtS compliant.  
These sorts of requirements can mean that all of the DtS requirements can effectively 
be requirements for the fire engineered elements of the design.   
 
The catchall requirements that all fire safety systems work and that all DtS 
aspects of a building comply entirely with DtS requirements make determining the 
aspects of the building that affect the PBD more difficult.  In several of the case 
studies, buildings had deviations in the DtS areas, such as the increased fuel load in 
Building F, or maintenance shortfalls and impeded egress paths in Building B.  These 
do not immediately change the assumptions behind individual PBD aspects, but rather 
change some of the general parameters underlying the fire scenarios.  While these 
changes might usually be less significant in a DtS building, the alternative solutions 
were implemented to eliminate some of the DtS fire safety measures.  The removal of 
redundancy in the fire safety measures compounds the effect of the smaller DtS 
violations, and can result in a less safe building.   
 
13.1.2 Compliant Buildings and Proactive Management 
While there were examples of buildings where the usage deviated from the 
design in dangerous ways, there were also buildings that were very well managed.  
For a building to work properly, a number of policies and attitudes must be in place.  
The most prominent characteristic of buildings that avoided significant problems was 
management that was proactive in both detecting and fixing problems.  For example, 
in the best case building (Building A), there had been a significant problem with the 
warning system.  What indicates that this was the best case building was that 
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management knew about the problem, coordinated its repair, and adjusted emergency 
procedures to compensate for the problem while waiting for it to be repaired.  These 
building managers frequently had proactive owners and corporate bodies with 
proactive policies towards building maintenance, which gave the managers incentive 
to ensure the building complied with regulations.  From all indications given during 
the case studies, there was effective communication with the contractors performing 
the maintenance, and no immediate concerns, such as reoccurring problems in the 
maintenance logs.  In the best buildings, the managers were aware of what the 
maintenance requirements were, and how to implement them effectively.   
 
13.1.3 Understanding of the Fire Engineering Report 
An interesting finding from the case studies was that it is not necessary to 
understand any of the fire engineering in order to manage a building well.  A building 
manager is unlikely to know very much of the existence of the fire engineering report, 
and in many cases, they may not know that their building is fire engineered.  In the 
best case residential building, Building A, the manager relied on a series of fire safety 
requirements documented in the building’s operating manual, but did not understand 
why the fire safety rules worked.  For example, he knew that the fire doors must not 
be kept open, and that this was a fire safety issue, but he did not know that this is to 
prevent smoke spread through the stair.  With a rule-following attitude and a well 
documented set of building requirements, it is possible for a manager to maintain a 
building without fire safety education.   
 
13.1.4 Areas of Management Failure 
While there were buildings that did comply with their fire engineering 
requirements, there were a number that failed in various degrees.  In terms of 
management attitudes, if any of the major characteristics of well-managed buildings, 
such as an aware and proactive management, were absent, then the building tended to 
show flaws.  In one case, the building manager was unaware of certain requirements 
placed on the building, Building F, and unknowingly exceeded them.  In Building B, 
the manager was unaware of maintenance issues which had been occurring for the 
past year.  The management of one building, Building C, even was misleading 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 82 
May 1, 2007 
inspectors to avoid fixing extremely simple problems.  These problems indicate that it 
may not be unusual for building managers to be unable, for a variety of reasons, to 
improperly maintain their buildings.   
 
13.1.5 Detection and Prevention Usage Changes 
A more worrying observation, almost unanimously indicated by interviewees 
and apparent during the project’s long-term case study, is that there is no effective 
method in place to detect subtle usage changes after a building has been built.  
Problems in the long-term case study were only detected by an occupant, who 
conveniently happened to be a fire safety engineering professor.  Other detected usage 
changes were usually due to a knowledgeable whistleblower, or in one example cited 
by an interviewee, in the incident analysis after the building had a fire.  What makes 
relying on knowledgeable whistleblowers more challenging is the level of persistence 
necessary to affect change in a building that may be dangerous.   
 
Not only is there a lack of an effective means to detect usage changes after 
occupancy begins, there is a lack of feedback in the design process itself.  FSEs 
almost never see the design after it has been accepted, on paper, by fire services and 
the client.  Building surveyors usually do not see the design after the occupancy 
permit has been issued.  This is a major problem in the design process that needs to be 
addressed in order to improve the use of fire engineering.  Fire safety engineering is 
different from many branches of engineering as there is little ability to do a thorough 
prototyping and testing stage in the design.  In other branches of engineering, many 
prototypes may be made before one is deemed ready to be a final product, and at each 
stage, any defects found feed back into earlier design processes.  Fire safety 
engineering in buildings has the difficult requirement that the prototype must also be 
the final product, and there is more limited testing capability, as burning several 
buildings before approving a design is not cost effective.  Because of this inherent 
limit on design feedback, it is very important to carefully monitor constructed 
buildings to ensure that they work properly.  If the early use of the building is viewed 
as a test phase, rather than a final product, it would seem apparent that any problems 
found need to be fixed.   
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13.1.6 Shortage of Personnel 
A major implementation issue cited by interviewees was the personnel 
shortage throughout the building industry.  The regulatory bodies are particularly 
understaffed given the number of buildings.  Interviewees from both the city council 
and the MFB indicate that there are not enough inspectors to inspect the all the 
buildings needing assessments.  Often, the town council is forced to focus only on 
high risk buildings and respond to complaints.  It simply does not have enough 
personnel to be very proactive in ensuring that buildings are compliant.  The same 
lack of personnel among building surveyors creates similar problems, as there are not 
enough well-qualified building surveyors to thoroughly analyze all the buildings 
seeking building approval.  The result, in this case, is that some building surveyors are 
writing very large numbers of building permits, and simply cannot be spending 
sufficient time to be very thorough.  There are a small number of building surveyors 
considered to be very reputable by others in the industry that get the bigger jobs, but 
there are not enough building surveyors to handle the volume of building projects.  
Interviewees also indicated that fire safety system companies are understaffed.  
Because of this, they tend to focus on new systems installations, which are more 
profitable, rather than their obligatory maintenance.  This can lead to the required 
maintenance in buildings being neglected.  These understaffing issues are significant 
in approaching any possible solutions, as simply getting more people, especially 
qualified people, into these positions is likely to be a very difficult proposition. 
 
13.2 Recommendations 
 
In addressing many of the problems found during the course of the project, 
there are a number of recommendations that the team has, both for further research 
and to make direct improvements.  Because this project is primarily a pilot study, 
there are several areas where continued research is necessary, not only as a larger 
scale and longer term version of this project, but in a few more targeted areas.  
Beyond the need for more research, there are several solutions to problems that the 
team can propose even with the current level of research.  These steps try to take into 
account some of the constraints on the process found during the research, particularly 
limitations on available personnel and funds.  Several recommendations are 
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procedural changes which may need legislative changes to implement.  These 
recommendations have been designed to minimize the amount of legislative action 
necessary in order to maximize the chances of successful changes to the system.  
Recommendations to improve the process from a design perspective have also been 
constructed to help gather information to further the research in this project.   
 
13.2.1 Additional Research Goals 
Of particular interest in a larger study will be the same areas targeted in this 
study: the level of compliance with PBD usage requirements and the approach 
building management takes to fire safety.  One area this project cannot target is long-
term compliance with usage requirements, as the buildings examined in this study 
were only a few years old at most.  These buildings should be visited in several years 
to see if maintenance policies or building usage have changed.  This will allow an 
understanding of what management policies and practices can actually be maintained 
over longer periods of time.  If possible, it would be useful to follow buildings 
through changes in ownership, as this is a known time when the knowledge of special 
building features may be lost.  Another area to examine is how contractors are 
evaluated over longer periods of time, as many of the buildings that were investigated 
were still using the contractors that originally installed the fire safety systems.  A 
comparison between the compliance levels in DtS-only buildings and PBD buildings 
would also provide information as to what areas of non-compliance are specific to 
PBD buildings.   
 
Another goal for more research should be to identify what promises made at 
design review are actually maintained once the building is in use.  This information 
should include a comparison between specific DtS deviations and PBD solutions 
which rely on assumptions about human behavior and usage of the building. The goal 
should be to determine how effectively policies and usage requirements in the fire 
engineering report are being communicated and implemented.  This information will 
be useful to both FSEs designing systems and design reviewers working with fire 
services.  FSEs benefit by knowing what sorts of management policies they can 
require that will actually be implemented. This could help FSEs avoid including usage 
requirements that are unlikely to be effectively implemented.  Engineers performing 
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design reviews would be able to use the same information to keep generally 
inaccurate usage assumptions from being accepted early in the process.   
 
An example of one of these building-use-based research areas would be the 
use of staged occupancies in single-stair apartments, an area found during this project 
to be very difficult to implement properly.  Further research would determine if there 
are any effective means by which this sort of staged occupancy could be implemented 
properly, and if not, FSEs in both private design and fire services review can be aware 
that this particular implementation does not work in practical implementations.  If a 
developer tries to use a PBD solution that relies on a usage assumption known to fail 
in the past, fire services can require more significant reasoning as to why this 
particular building will succeed where many others have failed.  This additional 
research would add more feedback in the design process and would proactively 
address the problem of buildings deviating from PBD usage requirements.   
 
Actually performing this research is a more difficult task, especially given the 
small number of people available to gather information and the number of buildings 
involved.  Fire services, as it is already involved in the research process, will likely 
play a large role in gathering this information.  To get more people working on the 
problem, however, professional societies focusing on building and fire safety will be 
able to coordinate the research on a larger level and involve a greater number of 
engineers.  The combined experience of many FSEs will allow for a wider breadth of 
research, and will carry more weight with decisions made based on the research.   
13.2.2 Maintenance Contractor Evaluation  
Another area of concern noted in many of the case studies and interviews was 
the use of contractors to perform fire safety system maintenance.  Because of the 
technical nature of fire engineered systems, building managers are unable to verify the 
quality of the work performed by outsourced maintenance contractors.  There is an 
existing solution that helps solve the lack of effective evaluation of maintenance 
work: making electronic copies of all maintenance logs and storing them in a 
database.  The particular company operating this solution can then provide statistics to 
building owners concerning how much maintenance actually occurs in accordance 
with the schedule.  This is information that building managers and owners would be 
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especially interested in, because they are paying for 100 percent of the maintenance 
contract, and only a small fraction of this maintenance may be scheduled.  The 
interviewee (Subject 12) citing this system noted that in many cases the actual 
percentages of work completed was very low, but contractors quickly learned to be 
more thorough on the buildings using this system.   
 
13.2.3 Increase Penalties 
A more direct approach to forcing higher compliance with PBD requirement is 
to more aggressively fine building owners with noncompliant buildings.  It has been 
noted by interview subjects that many building owners simply do not see the 
importance of maintaining buildings from a financial viewpoint.  With a simple 
cost/benefit analysis, some building owners find that it is cheaper to leave problems 
unfixed, especially since they will not see the true benefit of an effective fire safety 
system unless there is a fire.  The simplest fix to this problem is to increase fines for 
non-compliance, probably by at least an order of magnitude.  Queensland currently 
implements an on-the-spot fine system, where fines can be issued on a per-infraction 
basis.  For example, a fine could be issued for each fire door open, and at the rates 
used in Queensland, this would be $1,875 per door (“Building Fire Safety”).  
Increasing enforcement like this would provide an additional technique to use, 
however it will not solve the problems of a lack of personnel to provide regular 
inspections. The city counsel could make an example of a building that was not well 
maintained. If this building owner could be fined a large sum of money for not being 
compliant, many other building owners could hear about the infractions and might 
ensure that their building is well maintained.  
 
13.2.4 Improve Education 
Another method of making properly maintaining a building for financially 
attractive is to educate building owners, managers, tenants and insurance companies 
about PBD and the liability involved in failing to meet the requirements specified by 
the FSE.  For building owners, managers, and tenants, there is a need to highlight the 
level of liability owners face in the event that there is a fire and fire safety systems fail 
due to usage changes and maintenance shortfalls.  Insurance companies should also be 
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more aware of the effect that additional fire engineering requirements can have on a 
building, and how breaking these requirements can make a building a financial risk.  
The intended effect of educating insurance companies is to make insurance premiums 
and policies more dependent on effective maintenance and correct usage of a 
building.  This will add another level of financial pressure and usage enforcement 
onto building management.   
 
13.2.5 Operating Manuals to Communicate Usage 
Requirements 
Another, more important, area of education in the continued use and 
maintenance of buildings is educating building managers and owners about the 
specific requirements of their building.  In case studies, it was apparent that some 
buildings had little to no documentation concerning how they should be maintained 
and operated.  The best buildings, however, had clear documentation that could be 
implemented directly as policies.  The most useful means of communicating the usage 
requirements came in the form of an operating manual.  This was a set of documents 
provided by the builder and design team to describe how the building must be 
maintained and used.  While the legal requirements for a building’s use are listed on 
the occupancy permit and the essential services list, these were occasionally found to 
be unclear, especially to a non-technical manager.  Occupancy permits frequently cite 
other documents, such as fire engineering reports or even the BCA, which means few 
people are able to extract the necessary information.  A lengthier operating manual 
focuses on providing all the information necessary to maintain and run the building in 
a single document, explained in the form of policies that management can implement.  
This operating manual form of documentation was also cited by an FSE interview 
subject as currently in place in Singapore’s new performance-based code, a policy 
that seems particularly effective.   
 
13.2.6 Implement Self-Policing Policies 
Another means of approaching control of usage is to encourage the use of self-
policing policies.  A self-policing policy is one that occupants will not break simply 
because breaking the rules is inconvenient or counter-productive.  One example 
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would be stringing wire at the height requirement in a warehouse to prevent storage of 
goods above the limit, such as in the case of Building D.  Another example commonly 
occurs in warehouses, in most cases unintentionally, where a very common 
requirement is to keep egress paths clear of debris.  This was generally followed in 
commercial buildings, with a few exceptions.  The characteristic these buildings had 
in common was the use of forklifts, which need open, clear space in which to operate.  
While the users were keeping the floor clear as a means of facilitating the needs of the 
forklift, they were also following a fire safety requirement.  As a part of design, 
engineers should look for areas where usage constraints can be built into construction, 
by facilitating correct usage, and making incorrect usage inconvenient.  For example, 
to keep building users from storing debris in the space underneath a fire stair, as was 
the case in Building B, the engineer could simply get rid of the space.  One way to 
prevent fire doors from being chocked open is to add an annoying buzzer that goes off 
after the door has been open for over a minute.  While these sorts of solutions may not 
exist for every usage requirement, they should be a goal during design.   
 
13.2.7 FSEs Liable and Involved After Permit Is Issued  
One of the major flaws with the building process itself is the lack of feedback 
in the system, as most building surveyors and FSEs are not involved with a building 
after permits have been issued.  Combined with very limited liability on the part of the 
FSE, there is no method to ensure that the final building actually meets engineering 
requirements, and that those requirements are reasonable to begin with.  Adding 
feedback to the design process could be approached several ways, with varying levels 
of procedural and legislative changes.  Adding a more significant degree of legal 
liability on the effectiveness of the work of the FSE will provide an incentive to FSEs 
to verify the correct implementation of the fire safety system.  An additional step in 
adding design feedback is to make granting occupancy permits conditional on a fire 
engineering inspection, with the name and signature of the design FSE appearing on 
the Occupancy Permit.  This very prominent signature would highlight the fact that 
fire engineering occurred as a part of the design, and FSEs will be more likely to be 
careful in the design because their names are attached to the design.  Not all of this 
change is simply to add more liability exposure to the FSE, it also provides a chance 
for the FSE to see how the design actually worked, and even enable changes before 
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signing the design off for occupancy.  A requirement of this additional inspection 
should also include a requirement on the FSE to communicate the usage assumptions 
to the building owners and managers.  This provides extra impetus on the FSE to 
ensure that building management understands the necessary usage requirements, and 
that the usage requirements are translated into policies that non-technical managers 
can implement and enforce.    
 
13.2.8 Hire More Building Surveyors and Inspectors 
One of the major issues underlying the problems found in this research project 
has been a lack of personnel, both at design time and during enforcement.  There are a 
lack of building surveyors to thoroughly examine all the buildings that need approval, 
and a lack of fire services personnel and municipal building surveyors to inspect the 
buildings.  The solution to this problem is to hire and train more building surveyors 
and inspectors.  While this solution is relatively straightforward, actually attracting 
more people for these roles is a more difficult problem which is beyond the scope of 
this project.  This project can, however, emphasize the importance of these 
understaffed roles, as these are the primary checks in the building process.   
13.3 Closing Remarks 
While these recommendations and conclusions are designed to apply primarily 
to the Victorian implementation of PBD, this research could be applied by other 
Australian states or even other countries.  Because PBD is relatively new, research 
such as this project will be important to ensure that each PBD implementation 
successfully takes into account knowledge as to how accurate certain usage 
assumptions are.  This will allow engineers and building surveyors to better 
communicate information to building managers, as well as identify commonly non-
compliant usage requirements.  Combined with additional research, a mix of proactive 
evaluation and reactive enforcement techniques will allow for a more robust program 
to prevent usage changes from reducing the effectiveness of fire safety solutions.   
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Appendix A: MFB Description 
 
The Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB) is an organization that provides several 
important services to the Melbourne community, including response to a wide variety 
of emergencies, as well as community education programs and fire safety engineering 
services to buildings under construction.  The MFB is the umbrella organization that 
coordinates fire stations throughout the city.   
 
A.1 MFB Background 
 
The MFB’s coverage area includes over 1,000 square kilometers, $200 billion 
in assets, and over 3 million people.  MFB provides a wide range of emergency as 
well as non-emergency services, including response to all types of fires, rescues, 
automobile accidents, as well as community educational services.  There are over 
1,700 emergency personnel spread over 47 fire stations throughout the city, providing 
emergency response 24 hours a day, often responding within eight minutes of a call.  
The non-emergency divisions of MFB provide several services, such as preparedness 
and awareness educational campaigns, advising city councils on issues related to fire 
safety, and acting as a statutory organization playing a role in the application of 
building codes.  The MFB receives funding from several sources, including local and 
state agencies as a public service organization, as well as additional funding from 
outside stakeholders such as insurance companies.  The MFB, however, is a non-
profit organization (Metropolitan Fire Brigade). 
 
The MFB has several internal divisions (see Table A-1).  Below the CEO, 9 
directors each lead a division.  Two divisions are on the ‘frontline’ in delivering 
MFB’s primary services: Operations oversees emergency response, and Community 
Safety oversees the educational and statutory programs.  The remaining divisions are 
Corporate Strategy, Corporate Relations, Human Resources, Technical Resources, 
Finance & Administration, Corporate Governance, and Office of the CEO.  The 
Community Safety Division is sponsoring this research project, and this project’s 
liaison is Community Safety Technical Department Executive Manager Jarrod 
Edwards (Metropolitan Fire Brigade).   
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Table A-1: MFB Organizational Chart (Source: MFB Organizational Chart) 
 
The first volunteer emergency fire services in Melbourne were in the form of 
independent fire brigades, each funded by a different insurance company.  The first 
known fire brigade was the Melbourne Fire Prevention Society which was formed in 
1845.  These groups were extremely competitive; it was common practice for the fire 
brigades to do their best to impede rival brigades’ firefighting attempts.  This changed 
after a series of destructive fires in 1889.  In 1890 the Fire Brigades Act was passed, 
unifying the independent fire departments into the Melbourne Fire Brigade (MFB), 
which began operation on May 1, 1891 (Metropolitan Fire Brigade). 
 
The MFB originally consisted of fifty-nine full-time firefighters, 
supplemented by 229 auxiliaries, four steam fire engines and twenty-five horse drawn 
carts.  Over the years, the MFB has grown with the city of Melbourne.  In 1889, the 
motto ‘Audax et Promptus’ was adopted, which is translated as ‘Brave and Swift’.  
The organization also had to adapt to changing technology.  By 1918, they were fully 
motorized with their own mechanical and electrical repair shops.  In 1950 the MFB 
disbanded its volunteer branch in favor of a professional firefighting staff.  By 1960 
the Brigade employed 888 firefighters due to both the increasing size of Melbourne 
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and the forty hour work week.  Throughout the 1970s and 80s the MFB expanded its 
fleet of vehicles, adding a group of vehicles designed for motor vehicle accident 
rescues and a variety of multipurpose vehicles (Metropolitan Fire Brigade ). 
 
With the increase in the availability of electronics the MFB began 
incorporating computers into its rescue operations.  In October 1983 the Computer 
Aided Communications Centre was added, processing a majority of the Brigade’s 
emergency calls.  In 1984 the MFB began using a computerized hazardous chemical 
system called Detachem.  The MFB made strides in gender equality in 1988 by 
employing its first female firefighters.  Through the course of more than a century the 
MFB has evolved into the organization it is today (Metropolitan Fire Brigade).   
 
A.2 MFB’s Role in PBD 
 
The MFB’s role in the process of applying building codes is a complex one, 
due to the many parties involved.  The person actually in charge of a building’s 
certification for use and occupancy is the building surveyor, who acts on behalf of the 
town council.  If the building uses a design that makes use of a design that is not 
covered under the Deemed-to-Satisfy requirements of the BCA, then the chief officer 
of the MFB must sign off on the safety of the design.  In these cases, MFB engineers 
will evaluate the design to determine if it meets safety performance requirements, and 
make recommendations as to whether the design can proceed.  The building surveyor 
is not required to involve the MFB if the building meets BCA Deemed-to-Satisfy 
requirements.  After the building has been constructed, it has enforcement power 
limited to the fire appliances of the building (Barnett) (Edwards).   
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Appendix B: Interview Questions 
B.1 Fire Safety Engineers 
Information needed:  
• The areas in PBD where issues may occur that may result in a building 
different from fire safety specifications. 
• The effects of outside issues and constraints (such as design goals that require 
more safety, needs for particular types of building arrangement, specific cost 
goals, etc) on the design process and influence the choices made. 
• How engineers help to pass information down to 
owners/maintenance/occupiers, and whether there have been attempts to 
measure the effectiveness.   
• The engineer’s opinion on the building code implementation in its present 
form. 
• Opinions of the effectiveness of PBD (advantages, disadvantages, 
consequences). 
 
 
Questions: 
1. Communication: 
a. How much communication between Fire Safety Engineers and 
building designers is there? 
b. How much communication between FSEs and building owners and 
managers is there?   
c. How are building owners/maintenance staff/occupants made aware of 
fire safety information and requirements?   
d. Is there a way of verifying the level of awareness of the building 
occupants? 
2. Design: 
a. What sorts of assumptions are made as to the use of the building and 
where do they come from? 
b. How are future changes in building usage taken into account in the 
design process? 
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c. What are some of the constraints that show up from the 
designer/developer and how do they affect the design? 
d. What sort issues arise in finding a balance between cost and safety? 
3. Regulatory Process: 
a. What are practical differences between an idealized build/regulatory 
process and the actual processes? 
b. In practice, how thorough are approval processes in requiring thorough 
analysis of buildings? 
c. Are enforcement officials knowledgeable enough to make good 
evaluations of buildings’ safety? 
4.  General Opinions: 
a. In your opinion what are some of the advantages and disadvantages to 
PBD? 
b. Are there any extra consequences (tradeoffs, changes in the way the 
process works) due to PBD?  If so, please elaborate. 
 
 
B.2 Owners, Managers and Maintenance Personnel 
Information needed: 
The amount of knowledge the occupants have of what their responsibilities are in 
maintaining the fire safety level in the building, specifically with regards to 
maintaining the accuracy of the assumptions made during design. 
The amount of input owners have in the design process. 
The general level of concern about fire safety issues among the occupants of a 
building. 
 
General Purpose Questions: 
1. Can you describe your job and some of the responsibilities it entails?  How 
long have you worked here? 
2. What sort of experience and training have you had related to your job? 
 
Questions for Building Owners: 
1. Can you describe the design process, specifically your role in it?   
2. How much communication was there with the rest of the design team?   
3. Do you feel that the final design met your objectives?  If not, please explain. 
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 Questions for Building Managers: 
1. What sort of fire safety policies are currently implemented (Fire Marshals for 
evacuation, fire drills)? 
2. How familiar are you with the design documentation for the building, 
specifically the parts that deal with maintenance requirements and the intended 
usage of the building? 
3. Do you feel the usage assumptions made in the documentation match the 
actual current building usage?  If not, please explain. 
4. How aware are you of the effects of any discrepancies in building usage from 
the original design assumptions? 
5. What sort of information have you been given on the critical assumptions 
made in the design of the building and what needs to be done to ensure they 
continue to remain accurate? 
6. What sorts of fire safety programs have been implemented? 
Questions for Maintenance Staff: 
1. How familiar are you with the fire safety systems in the building such as 
sprinkler systems, smoke detectors, etc.? 
2. What maintenance programs are in place for these systems? 
3. How much concern do you have for fire safety as you go about your job? 
 
B.3 Building Surveyors 
Information needed: 
• Any experience in practical implementation of building codes and opinions on 
the implementation as it stands now. 
• Building Surveyor’s role in design process. 
• General opinions on PBD. 
 
Questions: 
1. How long have you been a building surveyor?  What sort of background and 
experience do you have? 
2. How involved are you in the design process for a building?  How much input 
do you have? 
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3. How often do designers take advantage of alternate solutions?  What are some 
common reasons for using alternate solutions as opposed to the deemed-to-
satisfy conditions? 
4. Do you feel that PBD results in safer buildings than if the deemed-to-satisfy 
conditions were used?  Please explain. 
5. How does the approval process work for a PBD?  How thoroughly is the 
design checked?  Is there any way to improve this process in your opinion? 
6. How often are the surveyors called in to reevaluate the building? Is there a 
certain amount in the building that has to change in order for an inspection to 
take place? 
7. What is your opinion of the building code implementation in place now?  
Does it generally result in safe buildings? 
8. How often do buildings fail to satisfy the building code requirements?  What 
are some common reasons for this? 
9. What happens as the use of a building as it changes over time?  Are there any 
systems in place to regulate this and mitigate any negative effects? 
B.4 MFB 
Information needed: 
• Opinions on the building code implementation, specifically with regards to the 
Fire Brigade’s role.  Recommendations for improving the building code 
implementation. 
• Opinions on how much building occupants know about what needs to be done 
to keep their building safe. 
 
Questions: 
1. What is your role in the MFB?  How long have you worked here?  What kind 
of background and experience do you have? 
2. What kind of powers does the MFB have with regards to building code 
enforcement?  How often does it use these powers? 
3. How much do you think building occupants know about the assumptions made 
during design and how their actions can affect the fire safety level in the 
building? 
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4. Do you know of any instances where changes in building usage have occurred 
which invalidated the assumptions made during design?  If so, please 
elaborate. 
5. What do you think needs to be done to ensure that the design assumptions 
remain valid throughout the building’s life time? 
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Appendix C: Case Studies 
In order to maintain confidentiality, all identifying information has been removed 
from the building descriptions and site visit notes.   
C.1 Building A 
 
Description of the Buildings  
  
Building 
Name (Letter) 
Building 
Number  
Levels Above 
Ground 
Number of 
Units  
Comments 
A 1, 2, 3 6 40 Retail at Plaza 
Level 
W 4, 5 4 33 - 
P 6 9 60 - 
K 7, 8 6 65 - 
C 9 5 17 Retail on 
Ground Floor 
B 10 8 - Retail on 
Ground Floor 
V 11 14 213 Retail on Plaza 
Level 
M 12 2 3 Retail on Plaza 
Level 
 
Only one building in the complex that will be examined, as it is the most complicated 
and has the largest amount of people in danger for a fire emergency situation.  The 
building includes serviced apartments, retail stores on the Plaza level, and car park on 
the Basement floors. The apartments accommodate for one and two bedroom self 
contained boutique apartments. All apartments have king or twin bedding, separate 
bathroom, fully equipped kitchen, and separate living/dining area, reversed cycle air 
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conditioning, DVD player, private laundry facilities and balcony. 
 
Primary Building 
Stories – 14 above ground, with 4 below ground for car park 
5Age – 2-3 years
Use – Residential Accommodations (apartments), Retail (on ground floor), 
and  
 Car park (below ground levels) 
Building Class – 2 (Living), 6 (Retail), and 7 (Car Park)  
Height – 60.750 m 
Construction – Construction Type A, Constructed of Masonry, steel beams 
and columns, and new reinforced concrete. 
 
Fire Safety Systems 
Sprinkler System throughout entire building (car park, retail stores, and 
apartments) 
Exhaust System in the car park 
Smoke Detection System throughout the entire building 
Hoses, hydrants, extinguishers, booster, and signs 
Automatic fire doors that close when smoke is detected 
Smoke sealed doors  
Alarm Systems 
Signs indicating devices and exits 
 
Special Constraints  
 All buildings obey the following rule:  
“All apartments are to be documented and issue to each new tenant the 
evacuation requirements and the emergency alarm requirements. This 
is to be reissued to each apartment every 12 months. This document 
encompasses straight forward information and instructions concerning 
the nature of the alarm systems and the requirements of the occupants 
in the event of a fire emergency.”  Stated directly from PBD 
                                                 
5 All building ages are from the time this report was written 
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 Deviations from DtS Conditions for Apartments 
• Travel Distance to exit exceeds 6 m  
• Stairs discharge within building 
• Solid core doors not less than 35mm think with self closers to apartments 
• Replacement of EWIS with BOWS 
• Single exit from plant room area > 100m2 
• Floor Slab above the retail to have FRL of 90/90/90 
 
Evacuation and egress  
• Analysis done for people who are not aware of the fire before automatic 
detection due in part that they will be unaware of the fire before the alarms. 
Doors do have functional self closing mechanisms  • 
• This analysis uses a door opened for 60 seconds which would be less likely to 
happen with self closing doors. 
The maximum travel distance in any building from an apartment is less than • 
about 30m 
• The Spread of smoke will be severe in the shorter corridor lengths because of 
the smaller volume of space into which it vents 
Premovement time of 4 minutes•  
Travel Speed of 1 m/s for travel to stairs•  
 
Stairs Discharge in the building  
 Only one fire occurs and more than one egress route will not be block • 
• Occupants using a stair for which egress is effectively blocked may return to 
the other stair for egress 
 
The use of solid core doors  
Max fuel loads used for apartments: Living, Dining, and Bedrooms = 40 • 
kg/m2  wood equivalent, Kitchen = 15 – 20 kg/m2 , Bathroom = Neglected 
The fire totally consumes the fuel load•  
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• For charring rates of about 0.6mm/minute, which are typical for medium 
density timber, the time to penetrate a 35mm solid core door may be 
determined as 58 minutes 
• The worst credible situation, with sprinkler failure, would prevent fire spread 
and the door’s integrity in 20 minutes, this is very conservative.  
 
Replacement of EWIS with BOWS  
• There will be no warden system to control or direct evacuation. 
• The occupants should be provided with information concerning the nature 
of the alarm in the building and their required action in the event of it being 
activated 
• Evacuation process should be completed before the fire brigade commences its 
activities. With minimal intervention from the MFB to help people get out of 
the building.  
 
Provision of single exit from plant room  
The occupancy of people in the plant room are going to be people that are able • 
bodies and people that are familiar with the building 
Small number of people in the plant room at one time so there won’t be a • 
queuing at the exits 
• No Specific analysis has been done for fires in Plant rooms 
• Electrical faults would most likely be the reason for fire in the plant room 
 
Floor Slab protection from Retail to apartments  
• If sprinklers are operating during a fire the slab will keep its integrity 
• If an unlikely event of sprinklers not functioning the fire severity of a retail 
part may be estimated using a fire severity equivalence analysis 
Fuel load densities in retail shops are given as 600 MJ/m2 •   
• With glass areas of 20m in length and 2m high, if the glass were to break, the 
severities of about 30 – 45 minutes exists 
• If the glass remains intact, then the severity is about 90 minutes 
• Both severities do not take into account the fire brigade intervention in which 
the fire brigade would be there in 20 – 30 minutes in most major cities 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 105 
May 1, 2007 
 Deviations from the DtS conditions for the Car Park  
• Deletion of stair pressurization to car park stairs over maximum of 4 levels 
• Compartment exceeds 5000m2  
• Discharge of stairs within plaza level lobbies of building 
 
The Deletion of stair pressurization to car park 
• Pressurization of the stairs is primarily concerned with the fire brigade’s 
activities 
• The basement car parks are both sprinkler protected and provided with a 
smoke exhaust system 
• Sprinklers are regarded as a reliable means of controlling the spread of fire 
and consequently the volumes of smoke produced 
• The exhaust systems provide enough ventilation with no volumes of smoke 
leaving the through the ramp, in the case of a car fire 
 
Compartment exceeds 5000m2  
The chances of a fire spreading in a sprinkler protected car park is very low•  
Based on the same test/analysis proving that the deletion of the stair • 
pressurization satisfied the performance-based requirement 
• The Sprinklers provide effective compartmentation as is equivalent to a 
smaller size car park 
 
Discharge of Stairs from car park to plaza level  
• The major concern for this solution is when the fire is at egress level or the fire 
will block off the egress route 
• There are alternative egress routes 
The assumption is that there will only be on fire at the time of the accident, • 
which will always leave one egress route open 
• This building has two stairs which provide alternative egress routes to the 
outside 
• Occupants that find that the first egress route is blocked can then proceed to 
return to the other stair for egress 
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Visit Check List 
 Apartments and Retail 
 
1. Doors closed to apartments are closed  
2. Doors to stairway are closed 
3. Doors have functioning self closing devises  
4. Doors are properly sealed 
5. Maximum distance to stairs is less than 30 meters for egress 
6. Shorter time of egress for shorter corridors 
7. The right size doors (thickness) 
8. Rooms, lift lobbies, or hallways aren’t filled with excess amounts of 
fuel 
9. The occupants (Short-term and long term) have the required 
information concerning the nature of the alarm in the building and their 
required action in the event of it being activated (not in serviced 
apartments): 
? Check to see if they received the information upon moving in 
(Short-term and Long-term Tenants) 
? Check to see if they receive the information every 12 months 
(Long-term Tenants)  
10. Postings for maximum occupancy for plant room 
11. Sprinklers aren’t shut off or isolated 
12. There aren’t any isolations or faults in the fire alarms, checked through 
the fire brigade’s instrument panel in the fire control room 
13. Glass windows are cracked or broken in retail stores 
14. Egress routes are indicated throughout building 
 
Car Park 
 
1. Doors to car park are closed 
2. Sprinklers aren’t shut off or isolated 
3. Exhaust system is running 
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4. Sprinklers aren’t damaged or broken 
5. Signs indicating all egress routes 
 
Questions to ask Managers/Owners 
 
1. Have you given the occupants their evacuation information? 
2. Have you continued to give it to the occupants every 12 months? 
3. Are there any procedures that you perform to check on the fire safety 
systems so they still are in working order? 
4. Do you have a log of any maintenance done on the fire safety systems? 
5. Do all the tenants (short-term and long-term) get the evacuation 
procedure? 
6. What do you consider a short-term resident?  
 
Site Visit Notes 
 
Apartments and Retail 
1. The tenants of the apartment did have their doors shut and were not propped 
open. It seems that the people wanted to keep their doors shut just due to 
privacy issues. Inherently, they keep themselves safe in this process.  The self 
closing mechanisms helped in keeping the doors closed. 
2. The doors to the stairway were closed at all times. When opening the doors, 
sometimes the doors would not shut due to the wind or suction in the stairway. 
This could be a problem when trying to keep the doors closed for the 
pressurization to stay effective, but the doors were monitored and they knew 
to check to make sure that the doors were adjusted if they were not shutting 
properly. The self closing mechanisms helped in keeping the doors closed.  
3. As referred to in the last two conclusions, all the doors do have the self closing 
devices and they are functioning properly. They are also monitored to make 
sure the devices are functioning properly that way if there is a problem it will 
be fixed in a very timely fashion.  
4. All the doors were properly sealed that includes both the doors into the 
apartment as well as the doors into the stairway. 
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5. On the floors with longer egress routes, the distance was checked to see if it 
complied with the fire engineering report. The distance was check and also 
this path clear of any debris. Any rubbish or trash that was in the path would 
have inhibited people to get to the stairway. Actually there was no debris 
found in those hallways or in any hallways and the distance was compliant 
with the report. 
6. The hallways were all pretty much the same width and same height so the 
need for shorter egress time for narrower corridors was not prominent.   
7. The doors were all in order. The thickness was correct and they did use the 
same doors through out the entire building. Also the doors were solid core 
therefore ensuring that they were the right fire rating.  
8. In this building the hallways, stairways, lobbies, and lift lobbies were all clean 
and clear of trash. The trash chute room was not filled with trash either 
ensuring that people would be able to easily get rid of the rubbish they had. 
Like stated earlier, all the hallways were clear which helps for the egress. Both 
stairways were clear of trash and the lobby at the main entrance had no excess 
fuel that would cause any concern for safety.  
9. All of the occupants are given the evacuation procedure, short term and long 
term, and are required to read and also it is also posted on the back of the door 
that leads to the hallway from the apartment. The thing that made these 
evacuation procedures even better than normal is that they hand make all of 
the evacuation procedures for each individual apartment. They feel by doing 
this that there is no confusion for what to do in the case of an emergency. 
They are given this procedure when they move in and if they are living in the 
same place for a year or more than they will receive updates to their 
evacuation plan. At the time of the visit there was actually a problem with the 
facility, but it made it so the people from the 7th th floor to the 13  were not able 
to evacuate the building. This would be a problem, but the manager of the 
building had informed everyone on those floors of the situation and also 
informed them what to do in an emergency situation. This one on of the first 
things that we learned about upon talking to the manager. This just showed 
how involved and understanding the manager is with the building. This 
satisfies the replacement of EWIS with BOWS since it is managed correctly.  
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10. The team was not able to get up to the plant room during the visit, but the 
owner was questioned about it. The plant room was not accessible to the 
people in the building so there is no way that the plant room would be over 
crowded at any point. Therefore, there was no necessity for a maximum 
occupancy sign to be posted. This also shows that the need for a larger exit 
door would not have been necessary as discussed in the FER. 
11. In this building there were sprinklers that were isolated at the time of the visit. 
The manager informed the group and the inspector upon meeting with him. He 
was very knowledgeable about the situation and was following the necessary 
precautions in this type of situation. As discussed in the conclusion number 
nine, there were isolations from the 7th floor to the 13th floor and the manager 
informed the occupants of the situation. The inspector was very pleased to see 
and hear that the correct precautions were being followed. The fault was found 
from the bi-yearly check that the manager performs and he was following 
procedures to fix the problem as soon as possible. It was also noted that the 
Pump Room and the Fire Control Room were clean and clear of extra fuel and 
obstructions. The Pump Room was properly sealed from any penetrations. The 
Fire Control Room was wide open and also very organized giving the fire 
brigade plenty of room if they were to come into the room in the case of an 
emergency. The one thing that the MFB inspector did notice that the log was 
not kept in the Fire Control Room or the Pump Room because it was in the 
manager’s office. The inspector suggested that the manager put a sign in both 
rooms to let emergency personnel know that when they arrive in an 
emergency. The manager right away wrote it down and said he will put up the 
sign right away.  
12. In the Retail Stores on the plaza level, all the windows were in good condition. 
This is important to prevent and fire spread. None of the windows were 
cracked or broken and this will ensure a good FRL. 
13. The exits were all clearly indicated and all the signs were fully functional. The 
manager uses a program that monitors all the lit exit signs so when it is time to 
check the signs, the manager starts the program before he leaves one night and 
then by the time he comes in the next morning the document is on his 
computer. This document indicates all the lights in the building that are 
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functioning or not functioning. The manager then has all the ones that must be 
fixed, repaired or replaced. 
 
Car Park 
1. In the car park, all the doors leading into the building were shut and using the 
similar closing devices that the apartments used. These doors were all 
functioning, but they were also monitored. The doors into the fire control 
room and the pump room were also closed and locked so no one that isn’t 
suppose to be in the room was kept out. 
2. In the car park none of the sprinklers were isolated or turned off. There was 
one concern from our advisor who had seen the car park earlier that week and 
that concern was that the sprinklers couldn’t handle the load of the storage 
cages that were overfilled. Upon further review of the fire engineering report, 
there was nothing in the report that indicated that this was much of a problem. 
3. The Exhaust system was running which prevented any collection of fumes 
from the cars. This system, in the case of a fire, is strong enough to discharge 
the smoke from the car park with out any volumes of smoke leaving through 
the ramp.  
4. All the sprinklers that were searched were all in good condition. None of the 
sprinkler guards were on them either. The only concern was that the sprinklers 
in the storage area were unable to contain a fire if a fire were to start in a 
storage cell. However, as said before, the fire engineering report did not 
specify that any provisions had to be taken into consideration.  
5. As explained in number 13 of the conclusions for the apartment section, all of 
the exit signs were clearly indicated and all were fully functional. These exit 
signs were also monitored by the same program indicated in conclusion 
number 13. 
 
 
C.2 Building B 
General Building Description: 
 
• Age: 3 Years 
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• Height: 26.8 m 
• Stories: 9 
• Construction: Type A, primarily reinforced concrete floors, precast load 
bearing and non load bearing, light weight walls and masonry with an FRL of 
90/90/90. 
• Use: 
o Ground Floor: Carpark (six cars), Foyer, Retail (Class 6) 
o Levels 1-9: Residential Apartments (Class 2) 
• Occupancy: 80 apartments, ~252 occupants (number used for RSET 
calculations) 
• Special Features: Single stair, 2 stage alarm system (2 smoke detectors in lift 
lobbies; upon activation of one, smoke doors close and pressurizations system 
activates; upon activation of second, MFB is automatically called to scene) 
 
Fire Safety Systems: 
 
• Fire hydrants on all levels 
• Automatic sprinkler system covering entire building 
• Fire pumps for hydrants and sprinklers 
• Booster connections for hydrants and sprinklers 
• Brigade fire alarm connection 
• Stair pressurization 
• Portable fire extinguishers 
• Smoke detection in common areas 
• Smoke alarms in apartments 
• Emergency lift and stretcher facilities 
• Emergency lighting and signage 
• Emergency Warning System 
• Apartment walls have FRL of at least 60 minutes 
• Solid core apartment doors with smoke seals 
 
Deviations From Deemed to Satisfy Provisions: 
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• Unprotected openings of building closer than 3m to property boundary on 
West, East and North sides 
• Single fire isolated stair through entire height of building discharging to street 
• Deletion of Warden Intercommunication Points (WIPs) 
• Grade II Water Supply instead of Grade I 
• Construction FRL of 90/90/90 instead of 180/180/180 required for Type A 
Construction 
• Solid core doors for apartments instead of fire doors 
 
Usage Assumptions Used for Alternate Solution: 
 
Unprotected openings of building closer than 3m to property boundary on West, 
East and North sides: 
 
• No usage assumptions made (reliant on design features such as wall-wetting 
sprinklers) 
 
Single fire isolated stair through entire height of building discharging to street: 
 
• Stairs will be pressurized to maintain tenable conditions 
• Compartmentalization critical to maintain tenable conditions in egress route 
o Doors to stairway must be kept closed 
o Doors to apartments should be kept closed (FEB indicates that with 
apartment doors open untenable conditions will occur in corridor prior 
to RSET but that sprinklers will then activate and make corridor 
tenable again.  No analytical evidence provided to support this) 
o Penetrations between compartments should be sealed or enclosed to 
prevent spread of smoke, fire, etc. 
o Egress paths (Corridors, lift lobby, stairway, etc.) must be kept clear of 
combustible materials 
 
Deletion of WIPs: 
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• Because of transient nature of occupants, not likely that residents will be given 
Fire Warden responsibility 
• Emergency Management Procedures will be prepared and occupants made 
aware of what to do in an emergency 
 
 
Grade II Water Supply instead of Grade I: 
 
• No usage assumptions made (redundancy that would be provided by Grade I 
water supply replaced with redundancy of fire protection measures in 
building) 
 
 
Construction FRL of 90/90/90 instead of 180/180/180 required for Type A 
Construction: 
 
• Excessive fuel loads in retail area (assumed to be maximum of 1300 MJ/m2 
for news stand) or electrical switchboard room (assumed to be maximum of 
300MJ/m2 for cable) could invalidate these calculations; this will be done by 
estimating the weight of the fuel in each area. 
 
Solid core doors for apartments instead of fire doors: 
 
• No usage assumptions made (combination of automatic sprinklers and self 
closing, smoke sealing, solid core doors will maintain tenable conditions 
outside Room of Fire Origin (ROFO) long enough for occupants to safely 
evacuate) 
 
In general, assumption made that sprinklers will be unobstructed and no point on floor 
will be further than 3m from a sprinkler 
 
Assumption made that sprinklers will contain any fire to room of origin 
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Fire Safety Policies: 
 
• Minimize unnecessary combustible loads 
• Regular housekeeping 
• Ensure clear and accessible exit paths 
• Ensure fire and smoke doors closed 
• Periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of all fire safety systems should 
be performed.  No further details are provided. 
 
Specific Questions for Building Owner/Manager: 
 
• What kind of maintenance is performed on fire safety systems (sprinklers, 
pressurization system, etc.) and how often is this done?  Are records kept for 
this maintenance and do you have it available for us to see? 
• Have emergency procedures been prepared and distributed to tenants? 
 
Additionally, we will need information on the existence, or lack thereof, of the fire 
safety policies specified in the FEB 
 
Visit Checklist: 
 
1. Stairway doors closed 
2. Stairway clear of obstructions 
3. Stairway clear of combustible material 
4. Lift Lobbies clear of obstructions 
5. Lift Lobbies clear of combustible material 
6. Corridors clear of obstructions 
7. Corridors clear of combustible material 
8. No penetrations between compartments 
9. Residents aware of emergency procedures 
10. Fuel loads similar to those used in analysis 
? 1300 MJ/m2 for retail (estimate dimensions and weight) 
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? 300 MJ/m2 for switchboard room (estimate dimensions and 
weight) 
? Ceramic Tiles/Stone floors in egress route 
? Plaster Walls in egress route 
11. Apartment doors closed 
12. Fire safety systems functional (as best can be determined on visit) 
? Smoke doors 
? Sprinklers 
? Pressurization system 
? Fire detection 
? Alarm systems 
? Exit signage 
? Emergency lighting 
? Fire extinguishers 
? Fire Hydrants 
? Fire Pumps 
? Boosters 
 
Site Visit Notes 
 
After obtaining a master key, the team entered the lobby and observed that the fire 
extinguisher closet contained a mop and bucket instead of a fire extinguisher.  The 
team then went to the top floor and worked its way down.  The specific details for 
each floor are noted below.   
 
The most common flaw was with the fire extinguishers.  These were missing in 
several areas and the ones that were present were not maintained properly.  In general 
the corridors were kept clear of debris and combustibles.  It was also observed that 
many of the lighted emergency exit signs were not working properly.   
 
On the second floor, the team went inside a room that was being cleaned.  The room 
did not seem to be occupied and was observed to meet the requirements for smoke 
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detectors, sprinklers, etc., although it was noticed that there were no floor plans or 
evacuation procedures in the apartment.   
 
All the doors to the stairway were closed and the stairway itself was for the most part 
clear of debris.  At the bottom of the stairway, however, there was a significant 
amount of furniture, washing machines, and other debris.  In the sprinkler and hydrant 
pump room there were several penetrations for ducts which were not sealed.  The 
maintenance records also indicated that for a long period of time the sprinkler running 
warning light had not been working, which means the pump could be running without 
anybody knowing about it and eventually burn itself out.   
 
The exit to the street was blocked by several rubbish bins and a dumpster.  The door 
still opened and the bins could be pushed out of the way if needed but it would still 
provide impedance to evacuees.  In the mailbox area of the lobby approximately 40-
50 phonebooks and other paper/cardboard debris was found.  The mailboxes also 
would likely obstruct the flow of water from the sprinklers to these objects.   
 
It was not possible to get into the switchboard as it was locked, but the retail area, 
which was assumed to be the office area, seemed to have a relatively light fuel load. 
 
 
• Lobby 
o No fire extinguishers in either marked fire extinguisher cabinet (one 
had mop, another had painting supplies) 
o Stacks of phone books in mail area, obstructions in the way of 
sprinklers 
• Floor 9 
o No fire extinguisher near sign 
o Large gap at bottom of door 
• Floor 8 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
• Floor 7 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
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• Floor 6  
o Smoke seals 
o Cabinet doors unlocked 
• Floor 5 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
o Small trash bag in hall – how is trash handled? 
• Floor 4 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
• Floor 3 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
• Floor 2 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
• Individual Unit 
o No marked evacuation instructions, map on door-how are emergency 
procedures distributed, if at all?   
• Floor 1 
o Fire Extinguisher not maintained – March 05 
o Lit exit sign doesn’t work on AC 
• Stair 
o Don’t appear to be wider than usual 
o Washing machines, refrigerators, and other debris in bottom of stair 
o Hydrants not maintained 
o Many of the emergency lights don’t test properly 
• Basement 
o Propped door to store room, however little fuel 
o Pump room 
? Sprinkler logs indicate a reoccurring problem with the 
indicators on the pumps – could result in pumps running 
excessively and burning out the motors.   
? Open penetrations in walls near ducts 
? Rear Exit has trash bins and a dumpster very close to the door, 
would move trash bins to escape 
• Office 
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o Pictures to determine fuel load – small area visible in office 
o Protective cap on one sprinkler 
 
C.3 Building C 
 
Age: Still under construction, opened for staged occupancy in December 2006 
 
Description: The building is a 36 story residential apartment building with a carpark 
from the basement to the 6th floor shared with an adjoining apartment tower 
on the same property.  Basement includes an Avis rent-a-car business (with 
exposed 10,000 gallon petrol tank in the carpark), and at ground level there 
is an Aldi grocery store.  The building is a single-stair design, with a central 
core to the building containing three elevators, a lift lobby, a storage and 
garbage chute room connected to the lobby, and a pressurized stairwell 
through the length of the tower.  There is a 4th lift that runs through only the 
carpark levels.  The lift lobby is separated by smoke doors with magnetic 
door release systems, and they are meant to separate the corridor from lift 
lobby should smoke detectors trigger.   
 
Special Circumstances: The building used staged occupancy to allow for occupants 
and builders at the same time.  During this time, there are two of the three 
main lifts open for use, and only floors 8-25 were under occupancy, with 
ongoing construction on the above floors.  The 6th floor carpark level was 
being used as a staging area for the construction, rather than for parking cars.   
 
Fire Safety Systems:  
Stair Pressurization System – keeps smoke from spreading into the single 
stair 
Automatic Sprinkler System 
Smoke Detection/Smoke Doors – doors separate corridor from lift lobby 
when detectors activate.   
 
Occupants:  
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Residents: Those living in apartments. 
 
Note:  This building was observed over a longer period of time because it was the 
housing for the team and advisors.  This allowed frequent observations to be 
made of the building itself, as well as further observations on the process of 
making changes to the building’s systems to force compliance with 
performance requirements.  The main aspect influencing the implementation 
was the presence of builders during construction.  The flaws found in the 
implementation changed over time, and the description here includes a 
timeline to show the effect of these changes.   
Site Visit Notes 
 
Initial Flaws in Implementation:  
1.  Virtually all of the stairway doors from the first through the 36th floor were 
open during the day when the builders were in the building.  After about 4:30 
PM most of these doors were closed, but approximately twenty remained in 
the open position.  This included the doors on the third, forth and sixth car 
park levels.  All doors are marked “DO NOT PROP OPEN” 
2.  None of the communication cable closets in the exit access corridors on the 
residential floors were locked shut.   As a result a fire in this space threatens 
the egress path.  In addition, because wires are still being pulled throughout 
the building, there was no fire stopping between floors within these closets. 
3.  About half of the garbage chute closet doors were chocked open. 
4.  Many exit signs to the one exit stair were not installed; this is especially true 
above the twentieth floor.  Exit signs were lacking or inadequate (in numbers 
and location) on most levels of the car park. 
5.  Fire stopping within the exit stairs was lacking. 
6.  Gaskets between the lift lobby smoke doors were missing on most floors. 
7.  Not all of the door latches to the exit stair were functioning. 
8.  Many of the doors between the lift lobby and the car park lack closers or 
adequate latching mechanisms with the ability to close doors completely. 
9.  There was a 45 kg (100 lb) cylinder of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in the 
6th floor lift lobby.  The door to the car park on this floor was chocked open, 
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as was the door to the exit stair.  In addition to the LPG, rolls of construction 
material were also present in the lift lobby.  
 
Timeline for fixing implementation issues: 
 
As a result of these issues, a formal complaint with the MFB was filed late in the 
afternoon of the 9th of March.  Due to the lateness of the day, the MFB was unable to 
inspect the building until the next working day, the 13th of March.  However, contact 
was made with the fire safety engineer who had designed the building and the 
building inspector for the City of Melbourne.  The fire safety engineer stated that his 
design had not anticipated a phased occupancy of the building and that he was 
unaware of the current situation.  At this point, there was nothing else that could be 
done that day by the MFB. 
 
Additional Flaws found in MFB Inspection: 
10. No fire extinguishers to compensate for lack of hose reels on floors 
11. Garbage chute rooms lack fire extinguishers (signs exist for mounting 
brackets) 
12. Fire control room has no signage, and also stores cleaning supplies.   
13. Holes in doorjambs could result in airflow even if doors are closed.   
 
Due to this delay, the original complainant returned to the building and closed any 
open stairway and lift lobby doors and moved the LPG from the 6th floor lift lobby to 
an area just outside the lift lobby door in the carpark (on this floor this is the portion 
of the car park used by the builder to store construction materials), and secured the 
door to the lift lobby and exit stair on this floor. 
 
On the 13th of March the MFB inspected the building.  A report was written by the 
MFB and hand delivered to the City of Melbourne Municipal Building Surveyor.  The 
complainant continued to observe all of the items listed above, except for item 9 as 
the LPG was still in the location on the 6th floor where he had moved it on the 
previous Friday.  During the day of the 15th of March the building manager notified 
the MFB that the LPG had been removed. 
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On the evening of the 15th of March, the complainant walked through the building, as 
he had every day he’d been in the building.  Most of the issues listed above were still 
a problem.  He wrote the MFB that evening with a report of his observations. 
 
On Friday, the 16th of March, the complainant learned from the company WPI rents 
the apartments from that the building owner and management team had been notified 
by the City of Melbourne about the fire safety issues and was fixing them.  In 
particular, the stairway doors would no longer be left open and the LPG tank had 
already been removed.  That night he found most of the stairway doors were closed, 
but the doors to the car park were still open.  This included the doors on the 6th floor 
where the LPG tank was still present. 
 
On the morning of the 17th of March at about 10 AM, the complainant walked down 
the stairs closing many stairway doors, which the builder had chocked open that 
morning. 
 
On the evening of the 17th of March, the complainant closed the doors between the lift 
lobby and the car park on the 6th floor and observed that the LPG tank was still 
present. 
 
thOn Monday morning, the 19  of March, the builder and the owner had a meeting 
where a representative of the company WPI rents the apartments from was present.  
At this meeting they discussed the fire safety issues.    At that time they apparently 
issued strict orders to keep the stairway doors closed.  They denied that the LPG tank 
was present. 
 
At about 4 PM on the 19th of March, the complainant called Worksafe Australia and 
filed a complaint about the LPG in his capacity as a site visitor.  This was on the 
advice of the MFB who stated that they had no jurisdiction over the LPG tank.  
Worksafe assured that an inspector would visit the building on Tuesday the 20th of 
March.  Such an inspection did take place and by 6 PM that evening, the LPG tank 
was no longer near the lift lobby of the 6th floor.  That evening, one of the workers for 
the builder was observed going through the building checking for open doors and was 
apparently securing any doors that were open.  At 11 PM that evening the 
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complainant walked down the exit stair from the 23rd floor to the ground level and 
found all of the doors closed, although two were not properly latched.  The doors to 
the lift lobby on the 4th th and 6  floors were open and he closed them.  
 
On the morning of the 21st of March, the complainant observed that the stairway 
doors were closed.  However, the latch mechanisms were disabled by being taped 
open.  He notified the MFB of this and enquired as to whether the stairway smoke 
pressurization system had been commissioned.  
 
Additional Flaws (21 March):  
14. Door latches defeated through the use of duct tape.   
15. Large volumes of construction debris on the first floor carpark and lift lobby, 
doors chocked open.  Note: This area has no sprinklers.  
16. Trash container in stair 
17. Dust cap on lift lobby smoke detector 
 
Additional Flaws (22 March): 
18. Latches jammed open with screws and nails to prevent doors from latching 
properly. 
 
Changes (23 March):  
Doors now unlocked and kept latched for the most part rather than chocked open or 
with defeated latching mechanisms.   
 
Additional Flaws (27 March): 
On Tuesday evening, outside of the gym there was a 45kg LPG that was 
unprotected and unsecured. This LPG was placed outside of the secondary 
entrance/exit to the workout facilities no more than 2 m away from the glass windows 
underneath the awning.  
 
Management Response Notes:  
During the initial meeting with the building manager with an MFB 
inspector, the manager was very quick to be helpful to the inspector in finding 
problems, and trying to find ways of fixing the problems, specifically after being 
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shown photos of implementation flaws.  It did appear that the manager was at least 
unsurprised at the existence of the flaws.  At this time the manager promised that 
existing security staff would immediately start checking for open doors and such 
things as the LPG tank would disappear.  In the days that followed, little actually 
changed, however.   
 
There appeared to be a disconnect between the builders and the management 
in terms of communication, because any new orders from the managers didn’t 
actually make it to the builders.  The communication in the other direction was a 
problem as well, as management reported that the LPG tank was removed when it was 
still there, and also suggested that it was air conditioning fluid (photographic evidence 
indicates otherwise).  This indicates either significant gaps in communication or a 
certain level of deception (possibly a mix).   
 
Only after significant work, including notices from the City Council, 
Worksafe Australia (Australia’s occupational heath and safety organization), and from 
MFB, did any changes really start to occur in the building.  The builders, in particular, 
were behind many of the problems, and not only did it take too long to force changes, 
they found new ways of keeping doors from closing when the door chocks were 
removed.  This is a particularly bad area of communication, as there are signs on all 
the doors that clearly state “DO NOT PROP OPEN,” and the builders still kept the 
doors open after being told several times not to close the doors. 
 
C.4 Building D 
 
General Building Description: 
 
• Age: 2 Years 
• Height: 7.8 m 
• Stories: 1 
• Floor Area: 7,550 m2 
• Volume: 58,890 m3 
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• Construction: Defined as Type C, in actuality mostly type A, 150mm thick 
precast concrete panels with FRL of 180/180/180. 
• Use: Storage of large rolls of paper (Class 7b) 
• Occupancy: employees, >30 for a given shift 
 
Fire Safety Systems: 
 
• Smoke Detection  and Alarm System 
• Fire Hydrant System 
• Hose Reels 
• Drenchers in Canopy 
• Concrete Walls have FRL of 180/180/180 
• Emergency  and Exit Lighting 
 
Deviations from Deemed to Satisfy Provisions: 
 
• Deletion of sprinkler system despite storage height greater than 4m 
• <18 m clear space surrounding building 
o 7 m clear space on southern boundary 
o 11 m between new and existing building with canopy located in 
between 
• Construction of steel framed roofed canopy over 6m vehicular access path 
between buildings 
• Ignore the interconnection of the two buildings via the canopy on hydrant 
system demand 
 
Usage Assumptions Used for Alternate Solution: 
 
• Rolls stacked no more than 4 high (5.2 m) 
• Rolls tightly wound and bound by steel bands 
• <100mm separation between rolls 
• Lightweight and Medium weight paper (no tissue paper) 
• Bulk storage less than 4 m 
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• Low occupant density 
• Security guards present 24 hours a day 
• Occupants trained in fire safety 
• Emergency plans prepared and practiced 
• Emergency plans posted including: 
o Location of exits 
o Location of extinguishers 
o Location of assembly reels 
o Procedures 
• Maximum travel distance of 40m 
• No combustibles stored under canopy 
 
Visit Checklist: 
 
1. Rolls stacked less than 4 high 
2. <100mm separation between rolls 
3. Rolls tightly wound (i.e. no used rolls) 
4. Steel binding around rolls 
5. Rolls consist of lightweight or medium weight paper only 
6. Other materials stored less than 4m high 
7. Travel distance no more than 40 m 
8. Emergency plans posted 
9. Staff properly trained (likely will need to ask manager to determine this) 
10. Building occupied 24-7 (likely will need to ask manager to determine this) 
 
Questions for Building Owner/Manager: 
 
• What sort of emergency procedures are in place?  How often do you practice 
them? 
• How many people are here at any given time?  Is there somebody here at all 
times? 
• What policies do you have in place concerning the storage of goods in the 
warehouse? 
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 Site Visit Notes 
 
Site Visit Notes: 
The team visited the site with an inspector from the MFB.  The team was 
accompanied initially by the chief engineer for the building and later joined by the 
factory manager, who had more knowledge about some of the policies in place.  The 
primary focus of the site visit was the new warehouse that had been added to store 
paper for use in the neighboring manufacturing area.  During the documentation 
review, a canopy joining the two buildings was also identified as an area of concern 
but it was discovered upon arrival that this feature had been omitted due to pressure 
from the MFB. 
 
The warehouse was found overall to be clean and well maintained.  The rolls of paper 
were stored in clearly defined areas and were all new, tightly bound rolls as the design 
specified.  One critical requirement specified in the design was that paper rolls were 
not to be stacked any higher than 4.8 meters.  There were policies in place for this, 
with signs posted at the correct height.  The number of each type of rolls that could be 
stacked under this height had also been calculated.  For the most part these restrictions 
were followed.  There were a few areas were the rolls were stacked to an approximate 
height of 5.2 meters.  This was brought to the attention of the factory manager who 
promised to fix the problem. 
 
The other major requirement was that paper be stacked as close together as possible, 
with maximum separation between rolls being 100mm.  This was found to be true 
within each grouping or row of paper although there was some question as to the 
separation needed between each single row of paper.  This was found in many areas to 
be more than 100mm.  When the manager was questioned about storage policies, it 
was found that there were no set policies on distance between rolls, other than that 
they had to be within the lanes painted on the floor.  They were stacked closely 
together simply because it was more economical, not necessarily because of fire 
safety. 
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The rest of the building was largely found to be compliant.  All the extinguishers, 
hose reels, and exits were clearly marked and had been recently maintained.  The 
MFB inspector did raise the issue that the manager had not been completing the 
annual essential safety measures report and that this could result in large fines.  The 
manager agreed to do the report and the MFB intends to return in a month to perform 
an audit. 
 
The occupancy permit for the warehouse was particularly interesting.  Not only was it 
clearly displayed in the warehouse, it was also much more detailed than other 
occupancy permits the team has seen.  Instead of referring to other documents, the 
permit clearly listed all the essential safety measures and the requirements for each, in 
addition to identifying the alternative solutions used in the building and the 
requirements for those. 
 
Issues: 
 
• Storage of paper rolls 
o Design specified that paper rolls be stored under 4.8 m and less than 
100mm 
o Flaw: Some areas had rolls stacked as high as 5.2 m 
o Flaw: Some rolls were separated by more than 100mm 
 
• Maintenance of essential safety measures 
o Annual essential safety measures reports were not being completed 
 
 
 
C.5 Building E 
 
Description of the Buildings  
 
 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 128 
May 1, 2007 
 The Building was extended from its original floor area 16,670m2 to 18,730m2. 
This is therefore considered to be a large isolated building.  
Floor to Ceiling Height: 8.5m 
 
 
Number Buildings Single large isolated building 
Rise in stories, number of levels Rise in stories of 1. Single level 
Classes of use Class 8 Distribution Centre 
Class 5 Offices 
Floor Area and Volume Following the Extension:  
Approximately 18,730 m2 
And Approximately 108,000 m3
Type of Construction Type C 
Type of Structure Steel Portal frame with 5 degree roof 
pitch. 7m Springing height with 10m 
apex approximately  
Fire and smoke compartmentation No fire and smoke compartmentation in 
building. Office separated from DC by 
precast concrete walls containing 
windows and doors 
Number of exits  Exits distributed around perimeter of 
building to achieve DTS compliant travel 
distances in original building as well as 
the newer extension. 
Boundary distances >18m to side and rear boundaries  
Generally >18m between buildings on the 
same site, except for conveyor connecting 
buildings at high level. 
 
 
Fire Safety Systems, Active Systems, and Non-active Systems 
• No Sprinkler System 
• No fire detection system 
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• Internal communication system with each “team leader”, present at each bay 
in the main building, having a mobile phone to contact the permanently 
manned security gatehouse. Security would then activate the alarm which is 
heard through the PA system.  
• CCTV system connected to gatehouse, occupied 24/7 
• DTS compliant fire hose reels, plus fire extinguisher at each exit door 
• No smoke ventilation system. Natural smoke venting system comprising a 
permanently open 300mm wide clear ridge vent along full length of apex, and 
large number of readily openable roller doors to sides of building. 
• Non-compliant perimeter access, due to awning in the North West (existing) 
part of building. 
• DTS compliant fire hydrants, on main with booster, including ground balls 
subject to previous MFB report and consent. 
• New MFB report and consent required for ground ball serving new extension 
• Multiple Exits  
• Direct access to the outside due to the workers being clustered around the 
roller doors when loading and unloading the trucks 
• Occupants can sense fire themselves 
• Alarms can be raised by direct communication and by the occupant warning 
system/ PA system 
• Occupants can suppress the fire by the hose reels and extinguishers and/or 
they can have fire fighter intervention upon arrival by the brigade 
• Fire wardens will assist with evacuation in their area  
• Fire Hose Reels 
• Fire Extinguishers  
• Fire Hydrants  
• Emergency Vehicular access 
• Smoke exhaust system – two fans 15m3/s can be used to exhaust smoke 
 
 
Occupant Characterization  
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Use Floor Area (approx), m2 Number of persons 
accommodated 
Class 8, internal space 15,210 507 
Class 8, west awning 1,520 51 
Class 5 offices  2,000 200 
Total 18,730 758 
 
 
Special Constraints  
• No Packages are stored in the building overnight. Goods arrive by truck in the 
morning and to be unloaded and automatically sorted. Goods are unloaded 
from large trucks by forklift, to be de-palletized within the terminal building. 
Conveyors transport the cartons automatically to the dispatch side of the 
terminal where they are stacked on the floor ready for loading onto trucks.  
• The centre of the building accommodates the automatic conveyor system 
including high level platforms and conveyors. 
• Smaller trucks and vans enter the building to load and unload. The larger 
trucks reverse up to large roller doors which constitute the majority of the 
external walls of the building. 
• Ignoring the possibility of system failure 
 
Potential fire hazards 
• A truck or van fire within the building 
• A forklift truck fire 
• A fire in the equipment leading to a carton fire 
• A fire may occur in a group of pallets, or in a linear row of pallets or stacked 
cartons 
 
 
Assumptions 
 Any changes to the building design or use may mean that the 
assumptions are not valid, in which case the implications are to be reviewed 
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by a suitably qualified Fire Safety Engineer and /or Building Surveyor. The 
conclusions of this report may not be valid if the assumptions are incorrect. 
 
• All fire safety aspects of the development which are not addressed within this 
report comply with the DTS provisions of the BCA, unless otherwise noted. 
• The assessment and analysis are based on the assumptions that the 
development is complete and operational.  
• All fire safety systems and management strategies will be maintained in 
accordance with this report and the relevant Building Regulations and 
Australian Standards.  
• Any significant changes to the design drawings and/or specifications will be 
referred to the relevant Building Surveyor and/or Fire Safety Engineer for 
review prior to acceptance. 
• All the occupants are alert and awake 
• With the type of work that goes on in the facility, it is assumed that everyone 
that works in the building can move at a pace of 1.2m/s 
 
 
Deviations from DtS Conditions 
 
1. Building has no Sprinkler System 
2. Building has no compliant smoke-and-heat vent or full smoke exhaust 
system 
3. Providing External hydrant access 
4. To permit hydrant shortfall in the building 
5. To permit hose reel shortfall of coverage in the building 
6. To permit emergency vehicle access into the open space around the 
building. 
 
Visit Check List 
1. Check the egress paths to make sure they are clear from obstructions 
2. Check for painted lines in the fire hydrant areas to keep trucks from parking 
there 
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3. There isn’t any oil/gas spills from trucks or fork lifts that could cause ignition 
4. Check for Fire extinguishers and make sure they are in indicated areas that has 
a shortage of hose reel reach 
5. Check for hose reel coverage to office area 
6. Check for adequate fire alarms are placed near exits and around the building 
7. Check for any broken fire alarm operators 
8. Make sure no packages stay over night  
9. Check for any broken roller doors 
10. Check to see if they have a log for their essential safety measures 
11. Check to see if they conduct their emergency warning PA system (suppose to 
be check on the first Monday of every month at 7AM, 11:30AM, and 5 PM 
12. Are the Fire alarms clearly marked 
13. Are the Exits clearly marked 
 
 
Questions to ask Managers/Owners 
1. Do you store any packages overnight, or is there an overnight storage area 
2. Do your workers know how the fire wardens are in their areas 
3. Are the workers aware of the fire extinguishers (there where-abouts) 
4. Are there any handicap workers or anyone that may be physically deficient 
5. Are the workers aware that the hose reels may not reach certain areas of the 
building 
6. Are you using the building for anything other than a package distribution 
building  
7. Do you have security guards … How many 
8. Have you ever had a fire, big or small 
9. If so did you not call the fire brigade  
10. Did the employees put it out 
 
Site Visit Notes 
 
Visit Description: 
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The team, accompanied by two MFB inspectors, arrived at the front desk of 
the facility, where there were sign-in procedures with nametags for visitors and 
fluorescent vests.  The nametags also had emergency evacuation procedures on the 
back.  The team was lead by the Health and Safety Delegate, who is in charge of 
ensuring that all of the occupational health and safety procedures are followed.  His 
particular background was not in dealing with fires, but he had had experience with 
evacuations. He has been working on the job for 9 years.  
 
The visit concerned only the building with the fire engineering, a large, open 
distribution building with an extended canopy that caused the need for a fire 
engineering report.  The team was lead around the building while having the 
opportunity to ask questions of the Health and Safety Delegate leading us.  While 
walking around the facility itself, there were no major deficiencies in the visible fire 
safety systems, with all of the fire extinguishers and hose reels present and 
maintained.  Evacuation paths were clear, and there was an active effort to keep them 
clear during work hours with frequent housekeeping.  The team was told that there is 
no cargo present at night. However the team cannot verify this claim due to the time 
of day of the site visit.  Many of the doors along the outside of the building were 
open, as expected, but our guide said the policy is to keep them closed when not in 
use.   
 
The alarm system was the primary concern for this site visit, as it was one of 
the PBD alternative solutions from the fire engineering report.  There is no automatic 
alarm system using smoke or thermal detectors in this building, and there are no 
break-glass manual fire alarms.  Fire detection relies on humans, either people 
working in the building during the day or security guards watching the building via 
CCTV (this is not a fire safety system, but is a means of detection since the security 
gatehouse is suppose to have the cameras being fed to them), being able to call 
security, where security will send the signal for a full evacuation and call the brigade.  
There are trained fire wardens throughout the facility who can help facilitate both fire 
suppression and egress.   
 
The CCTV is helpful to detect a fire, but the CCTV was not a fire safety 
system. Having the Security Gatehouse manned at all times is a part of the fire safety 
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system because it is a vital link in the communication chain so that the gatehouse can 
notify the fire brigade there is a fire, which it was manned at all times. At the time of 
the site visit, there was no one watching the CCTV system, with only one screen 
showing one view from an external camera.  The security staff was not able to view 
feeds from any of the other cameras, at the time of the visit, which were in the 
building, as the management change was to allow management to have primary 
access to these cameras.  In this case, the CCTV could not detect a fire because those 
cameras were not feeding to the monitor. The building relied on someone spotting it. 
This did require everyone to know the emergency procedures which the team was 
notified that the staff was trained in this manner. But the other flaw with this system is 
that it is possible to not get full notification, as people near a fire may evacuate, and 
even call 000 for the brigade, but security won’t get notified unless someone calls 
security.   
 
A somewhat less complicated flaw concerned the fire control panel, which 
lacked sufficient labels and maps to determine where a fire is.   
 
The Health and Safety Delegate guiding the visit appeared to be quite aware of 
how systems should work, and the evacuation procedures had been tested on a few 
occasions.  The safety systems are checked every 6-12 months by outside contractors 
which then will report to the health and safety delegate to fix any problems. During a 
chemical spill emergency, there was a full evacuation of the facility, which showed 
that it was possible to evacuate without significant problems due to system problems.  
The largest problems noted were that some people could not be convinced to 
evacuate, in particular the truck drivers whose trucks may have been in the building, 
or external contractors who wanted to finish a task before leaving.  In a separate 
incident, there was a fire, which was contained to a metal bin.  In this case, there were 
only 6 people in the building, so evacuation was painless, but there was an attempt to 
fight the fire, which resulted in some burns as someone tried to climb the metal 
container the fire was in.   
 
The Health and Safety Delegate told the team that fire wardens had training, 
usually supplied by the MFB, in how to use various types of fire extinguishers, and all 
employees had a general induction where this information was discussed.  He was 
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aware of how the alarm system was supposed to function, but did not know about the 
issue with no one watching the CCTV system.  
 
 
 
Issues Noted: 
• Fire detection system 
o Automatic sensor system (smoke, thermal) deleted as a part of the PBD 
o Intended system relies on human spotters to call security, and security 
will call the brigade.   
o There are also CCTV systems so that security guards can watch for 
fires and report them from the security building.  Due to a recent 
change, there was only one camera feeding the monitor in the security 
gate house.  There was only one view available, and it was to an 
external camera. Though this was a means of detecting a fire, this was 
not a system dedicated to fire safety.  
o Flaw: Insufficient coordination for alarms, as it would be possible for 
an employee spotting a fire to call 000 to get the brigade, but the rest of 
the facility may not know about it. 
o Flaw: Some of the exit signs were not lit. 
 
 
• Fire Control Panel 
o Flaw: No labels on panel to indicate where the zones are, and no map 
easily visible near the panel.   
 
 
C.6 Building F 
 
Age: 2 Years 
 
Description: Multiple occupancy warehouse and office, with a large open warehouse 
area and an adjoining office section.  There is a ground-level carpark outside of the 
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building, and the canopy that extends from the building does not constitute a 10a 
carpark.  The warehouse section has a high ceiling, and is effectively two stories.   
 
Building Section BCA Class 
Main Warehouse (With upper and lower 
Mezzanine and non-mezzanine floors) 
7b Warehouse 
Front office area 5 Office 
Lower ground-floor carpark 7a Carpark 
 
Stories: Effectively 2 stories for warehouse, 1 story for office section.  Predominantly 
single story in the warehouse except for over the printing rooms.   
 
Usage: Occupied a company that will print and store textbooks on this site.  Printing 
processes occur in separated rooms, while storage is in racks in the open 
warehouse section.  The racks within the warehouse will include boxed board 
games, plush toys in boxes, books, bulk paper and plastic toys in cardboard 
boxes.   
 
Construction: Type A 
 
Fire Safety Systems: 
• Self-closing fire doors on side facing adjoining property 
• Hose reels near exits 
 
Occupant Constraints:  All occupants are assumed to be awake, alert, mobile and 
familiar with the building.  The occupants should be able to escape the room 
of origin of an open fire with no difficulty.  There is no dependence on trained 
staff for evacuation, and the number of occupants will be less than 100.   
 
Areas of deviation from DtS Requirements:  
The deviations listed in the Fire Engineering Report are: 
1. Permit extended travel distances to a single exit from upper warehouse floor of 
more than 20m. 
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2. Permit openings less than 1.5m from fire source features, such as the proposed 
northwest corner warehouse self-closing exit fire door 
3. To permit reduced FRL to external walls and roof parts required to be of Type 
A construction. 
4. To permit reduced FRL to internal elements of a building required to be of 
Type A construction. 
Issues listed outside the Fire Engineering Report: 
5. Permit fire hose reels short falls in the warehouse area, as required by the 
BCA 
6. Deletion of automatic sprinkler system, a concern highlighted by MFB 
 
 
Resolving Deviations from Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Extended Travel Distance: (BCA Clause D1.4c requires that no point be 
more than 20m from exit or from decision point between exits with 
total distance of 40m) Extended distance is 30m and the difference is 
rationalized by the average ceiling height from ground floor of 9m, and 
average ceiling height from upper floor of 5m, so the occupants will 
have more time to escape.  Meets performance requirements DP4 and 
EP2.2 conditionally assuming good management policies and 
practices.   
Openings less than 1.5m from fire source features: Exit doorway is within 
1.5m of adjoining property line.  This problem is solved using a -
/60/30 self-closing fire door.  Assumed to be closed unless used for the 
passage of people, and will not be exposed to severe fire conditions.   
Reduced FRLs in external walls and roof: The walls have a FRL of 
180/180/180 instead of 240/240/240, and the roof uses combustible 
skylights.  The report provides quantitative analysis and comparison to 
international codes (none cited) to support a reduced FRL in the walls 
when analyzed for the purpose of preventing fire-spread to adjoining 
properties.  The roof variation is rationalized with qualitative 
interpretation of BCA requirements in comparison with other building 
codes, so that the skylights will not result in fire spread to adjoining 
properties.   
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Reduced FRLs in internal components: Through entirely qualitative 
analysis, the engineer assumes that because structural supports are 
spread out over a large area unlikely to simultaneously be involved in a 
fire, the reduced FRLs are reasonable with respect to preventing 
structural failure and fire spread.   
Deletion of Sprinkler System: Due to size of the area, there are usage 
requirements to ensure that the rack storage section of the warehouse is 
not an excessive hazard (volume > 2000m3 and height > 4m).  Based 
on the plans and the limited size of the planned racks, the warehouse 
storage does not technically constitute an excessive hazard.  Based on 
floorplans, the maximum volume will be 1700m3. 
Fire hose reel shortfalls: Due to the large size of the floor, in order to get full 
hose reel coverage, hose reels would need to be placed away from 
exits, making retreat after attempting to fight a fire more difficult.  This 
allows for better life safety considerations.   
 
Policies 
• Management regulates fire prevention and response 
o Good housekeeping 
o Ignition control 
o Regular staff training in emergency response and evacuation 
procedures 
• Fire Safety Management 
o Establish procedures 
o Allocate responsibilities 
o Regular training 
o Maintain and adjust procedures as necessary 
• Fire Emergency: procedures should include all necessary areas to facilitate 
firefighting, evacuation, and calling of the brigade.   
• All fire safety training and drills should be documented in a logbook 
• Housekeeping 
o Combustible materials separate from ignition sources 
o Store flammable liquids in appropriate containers 
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o “Recognition of potential hazards” (no details) 
o Ensuring escape routes are clear 
o Ensuring fire doors are closed 
o “Waste control” (no details) 
o All checks logged.   
• Maintenance 
o All fire safety systems should be maintained on a regular basis in 
accordance with Australian standards 
o Competent persons should examine potential sources of ignition such 
as gas, oil and electrical installations 
o All tests and checks recorded in logbook. 
• MFB Required: Must check that racks are not an excessive fire hazard on a 
monthly basis, and this check is on the Essential service list.  
• Annual inspection to ensure that class and use of building remains the same 
 
Occupancy Permit Requirements 
• Essential services maintained as per schedule 
• Annual Essential services reports issued 
• Due to lack of sprinkler system, the occupancy must not be an excessive 
hazard (Storage volume > 2000m3 and height > 4m) 
• Warehouse roof lights may extend to within 3m of property boundary subject 
to roof lights being of polycarbonate or unplasticized PVC, or equivalent as 
per FER. 
• Development, implantation and maintenance of fire safety measures listed in 
FER (Reproduced in Policies section) 
 
Modeling assumptions 
• Combustibles randomly distributed in warehouse area 
• Fire doors near adjoining property closed unless people are moving through 
them 
• Means of egress are free and unobstructed, with no locked doors.   
• Exit doors intact, functioning hardware, swing in direction of egress where 
required.   
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 Areas to check during site visit: 
• Evacuation routes need to kept clear of combustibles 
• Fire doors must not be propped open 
• Door closer systems (including automatic door closers near the side facing the 
adjoining property) need to be functional 
• Hose reels should be in place, usually near exits.   
• Maintenance logs for all checks should be available 
o Checks for volume of stored material 
o Housekeeping checks 
o Essential safety systems 
• Rack storage cannot be increased beyond racks on plans – storage cannot be 
excessive hazard: Storage volume > 2000m3 and height > 4m 
• No obstructed egress doors (locks, fasteners, etc) 
• Combustible materials stored away from ignition sources 
• Flammable goods in marked containers 
• No excess waste in building 
• Must make sure that the area between the adjoining buildings is clear and 
there is no debris that would allow fire spread, or extensions to the roof.   
• Management policies 
o Regular drills and training (logged) 
 
Interview with Managers 
The particular areas targeted by this interview largely concern the storage area and its 
limitations – sprinklers will be required if the racks increase in size from the original 
plans.  Of general interest is the reliance on outside contractors to perform 
maintenance.   
 
1. Background 
a. What sort of Educational Background do you have? 
b. Can you describe your job and some of the responsibilities it entails?  
c. What sort of experience and training have you had related to the use of 
this building? 
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d. How long have you owned/managed this building/facility? 
2. Building-Specific Information:  
a. How is housekeeping performed?  What is recorded? Who performs 
the housekeeping? 
b. How much is stored in the warehouse area of the building?  Do you 
experience any changes in the amount of material stored? 
c. How are employees trained in emergency procedures? 
 
Site Visit Notes 
 
Site Visit Notes: 
The team visited the building with two MFB inspectors, and were 
accompanied by a manager in charge of maintenance for the building, among other 
tasks.  While the building included an office area and a carpark, the focus of the fire 
engineering report and the team’s visit was on the factory/warehouse area.   
 
Throughout the visit, hose reels and extinguishers were in place, maintained 
properly, and were labeled, with few small exceptions.   
 
The first area examined by the team was the printing room on the first floor 
(enclosed within the main warehouse).  This area had very heavy fuel loads due to the 
pallets of paper throughout the room.  This would present an egress path hazard due 
both to the increased difficulty of moving through the room with stacks of paper, but 
and additional hazard due to the fact that the obstructions are combustible.   
 
In the main warehouse area, the primary area of concern for the fire 
engineering6 was the volume and height of the material stored.  In order to avoid a 
sprinkler requirement, the volume must remain under 2000 m3 and the height must be 
less than 4m.  The floor plans showed 4 long shelves which were used to calculate 
fuel loads at a volume of 1700 m3.  The actual storage was much more extensive than 
                                                 
6 The fire engineering report actually had very little mention of the lack of sprinklers, however there 
was an MFB requirement placed on the essential services list (and occupancy permit) to ensure that the 
contents did not become an excessive hazard under the BCA.   
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indicated, with 5 long racks and pallets of goods stored to heights of 5.6m to 6m.  
There were also significant volumes of combustible material on the floor of the 
warehouse area, which add to the total fuel load of the area.  Also of note was one 
exit, which had empty pallets placed in front of the door, and egress would require 
stepping over or removing the pallets.  This particular issue is probably the easiest to 
fix, as it would only involve putting the pallets someplace else.   
 
Another of the issues the PBD dealt with was the close clearance to the 
boundary lines and the team checked the exit doors and egress routes outside the 
building.  The side of the building closed to a boundary line provided a narrow, but 
legal egress path to the front of the complex.  This should be within the requirements 
of the fire engineering.   
 
Issues: 
• Storage of combustible goods 
o DtS required no more than 2000 m3 or 4 m high storage of goods in 
warehouse area. 
o Floor plans showed 4 long racks, with an estimated volume of 1700 m3 
o Flaw: 5 long racks were present, as well as significant amounts of 
material on the floor on pallets. 
o Flaw: While the racks were just under 4 m high, there was storage of 
pallets of combustible goods on top of the racks, pushing the height to 
5.6 and 6 meters on the shelves mentioned. 
• Egress Pathways 
o Printing room had large volumes of boxes (filled with paper) 
o Flaw: Egress path not entirely blocked, but makes egress difficult. 
o Flaw: Egress path is obstructed by combustible materials 
o Flaw: Exit door from main warehouse area blocked by pallets – this 
can be fixed easily.   
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7C.7 Building G
 
Age: Still under construction at the time of the project.   
 
Description: The complex has multiple parts, all over a Class 7a carpark in a shared 
basement.   
 
Section Name Levels Classification Comments 
Aged Care Complex 2 9c (Aged Care) 4 wings of bed-sits 
on each of two 
levels, 100 units, 
large open common 
areas  
Mansion 2 2 (Apartment), 9b 
(Public) 
Refitted to 
apartments  
Apartment Towers 2 2 (Apartments)  
 
The primary area of concern in the Fire Engineering Brief (FEB) is the Aged Care 
building, which needs more extensive fire safety precautions due to the aged 
residents.  This building is the largest of the buildings in the complex, and 
incorporates more fire safety systems than the other buildings.   
 
Stories: 2 above ground, 1 level shared carpark in basement 
 
Usage: Aged Care Facility, occupants consisting of aged residents that may require 
significant help with evacuation, staff consisting of trained and alert people 
able to facilitate evacuation.   
 
Construction: Type C 
 
Fire Safety Systems: 
                                                 
7 No site visit was performed for this building as it was discovered to still be under construction at the 
time. 
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Automated Sprinkler System in aged care facility and mansion – includes 
concealed spaces and roof spaces.   
Smoke detection system – fully addressable system, battery backup to main 
panel.  Magnetic hold-open devices, with manual release switches, for 
smoke doors that are held open.  Activation of smoke detectors in 
common areas shuts down mechanical air handling systems.   
Occupant Warning System: Staff has pagers to find out about emergencies, 
used for coordinating response.  Public address system to inform 
occupants.   
Hydrants, Hose reels, fire extinguishers, fire blankets, emergency lighting and 
signage all available.   
Emergency lighting system.   
 
Occupant Constraints:   
Residents – Assumed to all need help evacuating with a one-to-one staff to 
resident ratio, but the necessary level of help varies. Those in common 
areas were modeled as not needing help to evacuate, as these residents 
would be awake and alert.  They need help both in evacuating and for 
notification of emergency.  Those that need the most help are those 
that are in the wings section of the aged care complex (bed-sit area).  
The residents in the common areas are assumed to be more aware and 
active, and will need less help to evacuate.  In this instance, it was also 
assumed that more able residents will be capable of helping the less 
able residents.  All residents are assumed to comply with evacuation 
instructions and act in best self interest. 
Staff – Assumed awake and alert with sufficient numbers and training to 
facilitate minor fire fighting tasks (not modeled), notification and 
evacuation.  Staff will have pagers to communicate during an 
emergency.  Design calls for at least 4 staff available at all times, but 
numbers may fluctuate depending on number of aged residents and 
level of disability.  This number may drop during some hours of the 
day.   
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Areas of deviation from DtS Requirements: (Numbers match list on page 16 of 
FEB, section 4, revision 01) 
The report lists 13 areas where the design deviates from DtS requirements, with 8 
concerning the general construction of the buildings relating to fire resistance, 
and the remaining 5 concerning access and egress.  There was an additional 
deviation in the first version of the FEB that deleted the fire rated protection 
for the steel support members in the carpark, and a fire scenario still tests this 
condition, but it is not listed in the most recent list of deviations.   
1. Allow first floor in 9c, used for separating smoke compartments, to be solid 
timber joists with 13mm plasterboard, in lieu of 60 min FRL 
2. Allow first floor and walls  in existing mansion to remain with half required 
FRL (1.5 hrs rather than 3 hrs) 
3. To allow smoke zones larger than 500 m^2 
4. To allow load bearing walls supporting first floor in 9c part to be lined with 13 
mm fire grade plasterboard rather than 60/60/60 FRL 
5. Allow new/existing party walls at top floor between apartments in mansion to 
finish at underside of ceiling instead of roof covering 
6. Delete fire rated top enclosure for stair shafts in 9c part 
7. Allow openings and walls of 9c part to be within 6m of apartment building, 
which lacks the required FRL or protection to Spec C3.4. 
8. Allow roof/ceiling space smoke walls to be lined with 13mm plasterboard on 
one side only 
9. Delete separation between rising and descending stairs in 9c area and in 
apartment stairs 
10. To allow the point of choice to two alternative exits to be more than 20m (28m 
in basement and 22m on the ground and first floors of the 9c part) and the 
distance to an exit in the basement to be 46m in lieu of 40m.   
11. Required exit is smoke isolated stair (5) rather than fire isolated, stair 
discharges internally rather than to outside, as required of fire isolated stairs. 
12. Travel from stair discharge in 9c part to pass within 6m of building without 
60/60/60 FRL or self-closing openings 
13. Allow smoke doors in 9c to swing against direction of egress 
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14. Allow unprotected steel beams in the carpark under the 9c area in lieu of 120 
minute FRL protection8 
 
Resolving Deviations from Deemed-to-Satisfy 
Oversized Smoke Zones (> 500m2) 
• First Level Resident Sleeping Area (540m2) 
o Due to staff facilitating an evacuation during a fire, this change 
does not affect life safety. 
• Ground Level Common Area (560m2) 
o Residents are likely to be alert and will be able to evacuate, 
with staff help, fast enough to preserve life safety. 
Reduced Fire Resistance Levels (1, 2, 4, 5, 8 from list) 
• Sprinkler systems that include concealed and ceiling spaces will help 
to suppress fires, and not result in increased hazard.   
• Staff will be able to evacuate before the sprinkler systems can be 
overwhelmed. 
• All occupants (residents, staff and visitors) will have affiliation to the 
building. 
• Staff will help to fight fires or notify the brigade in emergencies.  
• Low fire loads are expected (400 MJ/ m2), and hazardous materials are 
mostly unlikely (except for Oxygen cylinders or medical supplies).  
• Fully developed fires will not likely occur due to the sprinkler system. 
• Fully addressable smoke detectors system will alert staff prior to 
sprinkler activation, and staff will coordinate evacuation using pagers 
and public address system.   
Deletion of fire rated top enclosure of fire rated stair shafts in 9c part of 
building 
• Removal of this enclosure may allow fire to spread to stairs prior to 
brigade intervention, but this is unlikely given the trained staff and 
sprinkler system.   
                                                 
8 Inconsistently listed - in first revision, but not second, even though fire scenario designed to test this 
particular scenario still exists.  Not in either of the final lists of deviations, however.   
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• Other fire-rated stairs available in the building and each shaft is 
separated from each other, so spread is unlikely. 
• Occupants will be able to evacuate prior to fire spreading into the 
stairway.   
• Ignition is unlikely inside the stairwell itself. 
Allow openings and walls of the buildings to be too close (<6m and < 18m) 
to the apartments without the required FRL or protection. 
• Fire spread from stair 4 is unlikely, as the stair will be kept sterile. 
• Sprinklers will prevent the spread of most fires 
• Heat transfer will be insufficient (with sprinklers active) to cause 
ignition in adjacent buildings. 
• See rationale for reduced fire resistance levels 
Delete separate rising and descending stairs 
• All occupants will be familiar with the exits 
• Signage will be present to prevent mistaken egress to the basement 
rather than ground floor.   
• Occupants are expected to be awake and alert while using stairs and 
immediately comply with any fire cues. 
Allow extended travel distances to exit (basement) and to point of decision 
(ground and first floors of 9c area) 
• Travel times do not increase significantly enough to cause life safety 
concerns. 
• Occupants in the basement are likely to be of sound mind and body 
• Residents will have staff available to help the evacuation 
• Occupants population in the 9c part will be approximately 100 people, 
with awake and alert staff at all times. 
Exit stair (stair 5) discharges internally and is only smoke isolated 
• Located in small smoke compartment 
• It is only necessary to travel down one floor to egress, with an exit 8m 
from the internal discharge point 
• Alternate fire isolated stairs available 
• No beds in lower section accessed by stair 
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Allow travel from fire stairs to pass close (<6m) to apartment building not 
meeting 60/60/60 FRL or having automatic self-closing openings 
• Fires in the bedsit area are unlikely to be significant due to the 
sprinkler system 
• Staff would coordinate the evacuation to avoid going near any fires, 
and this stair would not be used if the route were not clear of fire 
Doors swing against direction of egress 
• Opening the doors causes a several second delay, but these delays are 
mitigated by staff response, and single-occupancy of the rooms.   
• Sprinklers will prevent significant life safety dangers 
• Due to the small number of people in a wing (18), a ‘crush’ of people 
against a door is unlikely to occur, especially given the staff.   
 
Evacuation Assumptions 
• Fire sprinklers not obstructed 
• Fire and smoke doors not held open in an emergency 
• Staff members trained as to what to do in an emergency – includes closing 
doors after evacuation.   
• Design dependent on working sprinklers. 
• Compensate for oversized smoke compartments by assuming active residents 
(no one is sleeping) in the common areas and sleeping residents in bed-sit area 
can be helped by the staff.  
• Tactical fire plans provided in all public areas, laminated and well labeled 
with relevant fire system details (egress path, hydrants, hose reels, exits, 
evacuation assembly points, etc) 
• Management policies 
o All employees and contractors have fire safety information and fire 
safety procedures (specific to building) – staff has training and practice 
handling evacuation procedures.   
o Numbers of staff need to be maintained relative to the number and 
needs of the residents. 
o Remove combustibles from escape paths 
o Regular maintenance of equipment. 
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o If building changes, the Tactical fire plans need to be updated.   
o Annual audits of procedures.  
 
Evacuation Notes 
• Sprinkler system assumed to contain fire to room of origin, and other 
precautions deal with a fire that continues to spread.   
• Strategy is not to evacuate to the outside, but to get occupants to “safe areas” 
that could be in the building.  Also described as getting to another smoke 
compartment.   
• Occupants may need to move through visibility-limiting smoke to escape  
 
Modeled assumptions: 
• One fire at a time 
• “Safe haven” defined as a “compartment containing a fire rated stair outside 
the smoke compartment of fire origin.”  
• Occupants do not engage in fire fighting in models.   
• All essential services functional 
 
Areas to check during site visit: 
• Sprinklers unobstructed 
• Sprinkler maintenance – Should meet standards, look for logs of tests 
performed 
• Smoke doors (automatic closing) work properly and are not impeded 
• Doors have 3mm gaps at sides and 5mm at top and bottom 
• No doors propped while unattended (models required doors closed) 
• Clear escape paths 
• Signage to indicate exits (particularly in stairs) 
• Tactical evacuation plans available 
• “Suitable” number of staff available – should look for logs or similar 
• Residents in public areas require less help by staff (or are attended by staff), 
and the most able will be able to help the less able in an evacuation.   
• All staff have pagers to coordinate emergencies 
• Emergency plans available 
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• Wall penetrations smoke sealed – won’t be able to judge materials, but can see 
if there are any gaps.  Should also look for penetrations made after initial 
construction.   
• Availability of fire extinguishers, hose reels, fire blankets 
• Fire stairs are sterile, especially stair 5, near the middle in the 9c area, and stair 
4, near the apartments.   
 
 
Interview with Managers 
Note: We will need to avoid asking direct questions of the staff to get them to 
volunteer information without leading them into an answer.  The 
questions are intentionally vague under the expectation that the staff will 
happily give details if they think they are doing things correctly.  
Targeted information will be in parenthesis and will give the follow-up 
questions for each area.   
1. Background 
a. How many residents are there? (where staffing levels might be) 
b. When did the new facility open? (this might be very recent) 
2. Staffing 
a. Are there people here all the time?  Even at night? (minimum 
staffing information) 
b. What sort of experience and training does the staff have?  What 
do you need to do/know to work here? (emergency training, 
fire appliance use, regularity of training) 
c. Is there some sort of housekeeping in the hallways? (Clearing 
escape routes of fuel – should try to comment on current state, 
such as “It’s very clean in here…”) 
3. Emergency response 
a. What happens in the case of a fire? (evacuation plans – 
specifically where they are taken, coordination – pagers and 
public address) 
b. What do you expect in the case of a fire?  (sprinklers, alarms, 
evacuating through smoke)
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Appendix D: Interview Notes 
Because anonymity was a condition of many of the interviews, the interview notes are 
only identified by subject numbers for the purposes of this paper.   
D.1 Subject 1 
Fire Safety Engineer in Victoria 
 
• Manages group of FSEs working for fire engineering firm. 
• Works with a variety of projects such as residential, commercial and industrial 
buildings as well as infrastructure. 
• Generally get involved fairly early on in design process, at a point when the 
building design is complete enough to see if it will require an alternative 
solution. 
• Clients are typically well educated. 
• Knowledge of the benefits of PBD in Australia is pretty good. 
• Most projects involved an FSE. 
• Often not involved in actual construction because there is no requirement to 
have an FSE after the building permit is obtained. 
• In NSW an FSE is required to sign off on the building after it is finished. 
• In Queensland it is fire brigade policy for an FSE to sign off on a building 
after it is finished. 
• Usage determined by the drawings themselves, i.e. drawing will say label an 
area as retail or residential. 
• No accounting for change in use.  It is stated on report that if the usage 
changes, the design needs to be reassessed. 
• Ideally, when a building use is changed such that it needs a new permit the 
FSE will get involved early in the process. 
• Often, the building surveyor will forget and not get the FSE involved until the 
end of the process. 
• Occasionally, the building surveyor will forget entirely about the FSE. 
• Common for buildings to change from retail to office. 
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• Also a gray line between Class 2 buildings (apartments) and Class 3 buildings 
(hotels). 
• Warehouses often change what is stored, which affects the fuel load but does 
not change the use as far as the regulations are concerned. 
• Good building owners/managers are aware of requirements of fire engineering 
report and what they can and can’t do. 
• Change in ownership can often result in a loss of information. 
• Good tenants will have the building checked when they buy it.  Only about 20-
30% does this. 
• Developers and contractors want to build as cheap as they can. 
• Sometimes you can delete a fire safety system and the building will still be 
safe. 
• It’s up to the owner sometimes to decide how much risk they are willing to 
take. 
• Most insurers have little impact on the design.  Some get involved and impose 
their own requirements on the developer. 
• No effort has been made to educate insurers. 
• Common deviations from DtS are smoke control systems and extended travel 
distances. 
• Easier to incorporate alternative solutions earlier in the process. 
• Building permit is most common method of communicating.  Often written in 
very general terms. 
• ICC requires “bounding conditions” to be displayed.  These are the important 
aspects of fire safety design.  Easier to check and more detailed than permit. 
• Permit level of detail often depends on who writes it. 
• Bounding conditions pick up not only the systems, but other parts as well (fuel 
load, compartmentalization, etc.) 
• Singapore uses operating manual.  Produced by FSE and written specifically 
for non-technical people to inform them of most important areas of report. 
• Building managers would probably use this info if provided in a way they 
understood. 
• Often will ask in his reports that something, like extra maintenance, be added 
to the essential safety measures. 
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• Quality of building surveyors ranges.  Some will sign off on things even if 
they don’t really understand them and haven’t thoroughly checked them. 
• This is often because the building surveyor is employed by the developer and 
wants to keep the customer happy. 
• No real policing of building surveyors in Victoria. 
• Inspections by fire brigades and municipal building surveyor are primary 
enforcement methods.  Not enough manpower. 
 
 
D.2 Subject 2 
Fire Safety Engineer with New South Wales Fire Brigade  
• Fire brigade makes comments on designs incorporating certain fire safety 
features. 
• Comments are optional, but if they are incorporated then the brigade makes 
sure the requirements are met. 
• Problems with buildings are fairly common; chances are you will find them in 
any building you look at. 
o Sprinklers turned off in one building. 
o FRLs not implemented in an apartment building (people could smell 
neighbor cooking) 
• Example:  warehouse with goods piled too high, exit signs are obstructed. 
• Yearly inspections are supposed to be performed on the essential safety 
measures.  This isn’t always done. 
• If it isn’t done, the brigade can order non-structural work be done to fix it. 
• Can tell people to stop using a building for certain things, can’t completely 
shut it down.  This is done very rarely. 
• Fire brigade has to pay for any add-ons it orders to be put on a building. 
• No requirement that FSE has to provide information to building 
owner/manager in an understandable manner.  Some do, some don’t. 
• Most of the time, brigade comments are taken into account because of an 
example made of a few people who didn’t. 
• Brigade doesn’t have enough manpower. 
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• Common alternative solutions: reduced egress width and extended length, 
smoke control, reduced FRLs. 
• Building surveying and fire engineering have two different focuses: building 
surveying focuses on the regulations and fire engineering focuses on finding 
the best way to do things. 
 
D.3 Subject 3 
Fire Safety Engineer in Tasmania 
 
• Designs fire safety systems based on the fire engineering reports. 
• Hasn’t seen much in the way of major usage change in Tasmania (referring to 
classification change). 
• Most common change in reduction in number of fire stairs. 
• Example:  Narrow, 20 story building that the designers wanted to only have 
one stair.  This is a problem when trying to get fire fighters up the stairs and 
evacuees down.  Ended up not being built because the fire brigade wouldn’t 
approve. 
• Often the one he deals with is the developer, not necessarily the end user. 
• Owners/managers don’t always pass on information regarding what needs to 
be done to maintain the safety in the building.  This is often due to fire safety 
being a low priority for them. 
• PBD is often used to achieve the most efficient and practical design. 
• Cost not as important. 
• In Tasmania, the FSE becomes involved either by the architect realizing that 
he’s going to need fire engineering as he progresses, or the developer deciding 
the building will be fire engineered no matter what. 
• FSE needs to be involved as early as possible.  Had a building that was built 
without proper approvals beforehand and needed an FSE to come in 
afterwards and sort everything out. 
• The occupancy permit should require the signature of an FSE. 
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• Queensland has a good idea where there is a sign near the FIP which says that 
the building is a fire engineered building.  Trying to get that implemented in 
Tasmania. 
• Building owners who are involved in design are more aware of the needs of 
the fire safety solution and more willing to meet those needs than an owner 
who buys the building later on. 
• Building owners are required by law to make themselves aware of these needs. 
• PBD is too new in Tasmania to get a good sense of how well it is working 
right now. 
• Local insurance companies are going to be more aware of the requirements 
and what’s going on in a building than companies in other states or countries. 
• Fire services in Tasmania can inspect but ultimate decision making power 
belongs to the local council.  The fire services have some power to prosecute 
but don’t like to use it. 
• Fire service doesn’t have enough manpower. 
 
 
D.4 Subject 4 
9Municipal Building Surveyor and Deputy Building Surveyor
 
• Occupancy Permit should contain all the information regarding how the 
building is to be used and how the fire safety systems need to be maintained. 
• The communication of these requirements depends on the building company 
and is generally not very good. 
• Issue arises when the developer hands the building over to the owner.  The 
owner might not understand everything that is given to him. 
• Information can be lost when the building is transferred from owner to owner 
too. 
• It is required for the essential safety systems to be maintained and the owner 
has to sign off on this every year. 
                                                 
9 This interview was done as a combined interview with both present. 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 156 
May 1, 2007 
• Sometimes difficult to find the necessary information for a building when 
performing an audit. 
• Building surveyors who sign off on PBDs have a pretty good understanding of 
it from the course they are required to have taken, if not they have to give it to 
either an FSE or a qualified building surveyor. 
• Owners/managers don’t always know enough to do their job properly.  Trying 
to set up information session to educate them. 
• Large buildings often owned by corporations and can be very complex to 
manage.  Even more difficult when there are multiple owners (in a subdivided 
building for example, where each apartment, condo, etc, is owned by different 
people) and it is unclear who is responsible for common areas, corridors, etc. 
• Some managers are just ignorant of their responsibilities, others are aware but 
too busy to do anything, and others know and are trying to sneak under the 
radar. 
• The Municipal Building Surveyor has the ability to prosecute offenders but 
prefers negotiation. 
• The city focuses on high risk buildings, such as nightclubs, hotels, etc, where 
there are a large number of people with a high potential for casualties. 
• Regulations currently don’t account for small issues that don’t change building 
classification. 
• Example:  Apartment building with two penthouses on the top floor and only 
one exit stair.  Penthouse doors had button that could be pressed to 
automatically open the door in case of an emergency.  New tenants moved in 
and were worried about security so they padlocked it. 
• Nothing in legislation governing passage of information from seller to buyer 
regarding safety issues. 
• Not enough building inspectors to inspect every building every year. 
• Trying to get the message across that if the building isn’t maintained properly, 
the insurance policy may be void.  Hoping the insurance companies will 
support this. 
• Lot of developers use fire engineering as a way to lower costs. 
• Issues with apartment buildings being used as short term accommodations. 
 
 Colschen, Cunningham and DiOrio 157 
May 1, 2007 
D.5 Subject 5 
Building Surveyor in New South Wales 
 
• Focus is on how the process is supposed to work, very little on the practical 
details. 
• Position is to review reports, with understanding of the FSE end of the work, 
and determine if the reports are sufficient.   
o Liability for signing off on bad designs 
• Inspections occur after building construction 
• PBD areas 
o Deleting sprinklers – replace with smoke exhaust systems 
• Influences on design 
o Insurance – insurers are becoming aware of how PBD works, and are 
paying attention to some of the details.   
o Money – many clients want to find cheaper solutions, and will pay 
FSEs to find the easy solution, rather than the safe one.  
• PBD Flaws 
o Paperwork not sent to council – process isn’t followed, not effective 
policing.   
o Responsibility is on the owner – but many aren’t sending in the 
documentation and there are unsafe buildings.   
o Badly written reports are a problem, 10 out of 150 
• Communication 
o If there are bad reports, the surveyor will tell the client that they have 
chosen a bad FSE based on low cost.   
o If the changes go by him, then he reviews the report and 
documentation before informing the client to go back to the FSE.   
o Clients don’t really understand it, unless they have engineering 
experience.  
o Architects sometimes understand the problem, sometimes not 
o Builders just beginning to understand it 
o If clients understood the report better, it would improve things 
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o Don’t understand the steps behind the report, or fire engineering.  Only 
told they will save a certain amount of money, but details left out.   
o It would be helpful if there were sections written into reports designed 
for non-technical managers.   
o Very confusing for new building managers, people more recently in 
the field have better ideas of how things work.   
• After construction 
o Legislation says every 12 months everything tested 
o Outside contractors provide the testing 
o Onus on the owner to evaluate building 
o Inspections consist of checking things off on a list, specifically 
focusing on fire safety systems (other elements not listed, such as fuel 
load/distribution, etc) 
o If the building does not pass inspection, the contractors won’t sign off 
on it. 
o Council can issue a warning, but this is not usually done, as there is no 
manpower after to police any of this.   
o Cannot get people, improvement unlikely.   
o FSE modifies report for changes 
? Needed if there is a major change such as adding offices to a 
warehouse 
? Report goes back to FSE for changes, reviewing process 
occurs, passed on to builder as part of the construction permit.   
? Certifier only has to go back to the FSE if there is a change to 
the fire engineering requirements 
? Only occurred about 3 times in his personal experience– 
Example: shopping center with extended travel distances 
 
D.6 Subject 6 
Fire Safety Engineer with CFA 
 
• Law in Victoria requires that owners maintain the systems in their buildings 
but many don’t do this because it’s not at the top of the priority list for them. 
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• Fire Engineering is a rapidly growing field; many more people want to use it 
for all types of buildings. 
• Example:  25 million dollar (AUD) warehouse fire.  Original use of warehouse 
was to store non-combustible metal car parts.  Designed without sprinklers and 
without an automatic fire detection and alert system.  Building changed hands 
and was bought by a transport company.  Then used to store 150,000 liters of 
motor oil as well as a range of other combustibles, which varied from day to 
day.  Building caught fire and by the time the fire brigade showed up, it was 
fully engulfed.  The motor oil was contained at all and caught fire and started 
flowing out of building.  It ignited the trucks outside and then flowed into 
drains before the fire brigade contained it.  Building was still a warehouse 
even though its contents had changed so its classification was the same and no 
new permit was required. 
• Legal mechanism for changing requirements on the occupancy permits when 
the use is changed but no real world understanding of it.  Owners are generally 
too busy with other issues. 
• A few insurance companies understand PBD and get involved and make their 
own requirements that must be met in order for the building to be insured. 
• Often difficult for developers to get past the initial cost of fire safety and see 
the long term savings and other benefits. 
• Example: Equestrian center, with large open middle and stadium seating 
around the edges.  Plan was to put sprinklers only around the edges.  The 
building was inspected and there were stables and feed in the middle.  CFA 
recommended that they put hydrants in instead of sprinklers. 
• First owner who was involved with design understands why things need to be 
maintained.  Later owners might not and won’t be as willing to do it. 
• Requirements listed in fire engineering report need to be communicated to 
managers and understood. 
• Engineers often rely on occupant intervention when doing their analysis. 
• Building occupants don’t always understand why they can’t do certain things 
(like opening fire doors). 
• PBD works great as long as everybody does what they’re supposed to do.  
Human nature however often leads to shortcuts being taken. 
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• Public perception is important.  Eventually, there will be a big fire with a PBD 
building and people might take the quick easy response and just get rid of 
PBD and revert back to prescriptive codes. 
• Reverse engineering: developers/builders do something, like put in a wall 
without the proper FRLs then go back to an FSE and get it justified. 
• Lot of pressure on developers to do things fast and cheap, fire engineering 
often seen as a get out of jail free card. 
• Common uses of PBD: reduced FRLs, extended travel distances. 
• CFA sometimes prefers the use of the Appeals Board, since they are legislated 
as being untouchable and are thus an independent body. 
• Not always an independent check when using PBD. 
• Buildings in the public eye (like MCG, Telstra Dome) are often better 
managed because of the attention and risk involved.  Nobody really cares 
about the factory that nobody sees. 
• Generally PBD is used to reduce cost.  Occasionally used because the DtS 
isn’t appropriate and doesn’t provide the right level of safety. 
• CFA has added difficulty of use of PBD for bushfires. 
• More education is required for everybody involved in the building process. 
 
D.7 Subject 7 
Building Manager for Building A  
 
• Been in industry for 25 years. 
• Body Corporate responsible for maintenance of all common areas. 
• Contractors are used to perform all of this maintenance.  The Body Corporate 
doesn’t employ any staff. 
• Initially, the contractors are the ones who installed the equipment. 
• Technical details left to contractor, there is no oversight.  Assumed that a 
reputable company will do good work. 
• Contractors often chosen by developer.  Price is the biggest factor although the 
choices are generally limited. 
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• Maintenance info provided by developer and builder.  Manuals produced to 
facilitate maintenance. 
• Occupancy Permit is overall guideline but not referenced in day to day use. 
• Maintenance companies are responsible for satisfying requirements on 
Occupancy Permit. 
• Believes that most buildings are managed in similar fashion.  Lots of 
competition, so a manager who isn’t performing is at risk to be replaced. 
• Wants to make sure regulations are complied with partially because of random 
checks performed by fire brigade. 
• Not many professional managers have much technical knowledge.  Dependent 
on the contractors for this. 
• Doesn’t use the fire engineering report, anything important in that would be on 
the Occupancy Permit. 
• Feels that if he doesn’t keep the building compliant, he could lose his job.  It’s 
also to protect his reputation. 
• Committee must be appointed by Body Corporate.  Some are more proactive 
than others.  The committee at Building A is very proactive. 
 
D.8 Subject 8 
Fire Safety Engineer in Victoria (Performed the Fire Analysis for Building C) 
 
• Usage of building determined through discussion with the other stakeholders. 
• Not much change in use, as far classification, that occurs with apartment 
buildings.  Only issue is changes from apartment to hotel which isn’t that 
significant since the buildings are pretty similar. 
• Issues can arise when owners or managers change and they aren’t aware of the 
requirements. 
• Example:  A building’s exit stair discharges into the lobby which must be free 
of combustible.  A new owner comes in and wants to put in a couch or 
something which changes the fuel load. 
• There isn’t enough control over the actions of managers and owners regarding 
fire engineering requirements. 
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• Only check is that the manager must sign off annually that things are being 
maintained.  But the problem is that the manager does not have the technical 
knowledge to do it. 
• BCA classifies warehouses as high hazard, medium hazard, or low hazard 
based on what is stored. 
• Little control, because it requires the end user to interpret the requirements of 
his occupancy permit. 
• Depending on the building, insurance may come out and do an audit.  Other 
times they just might ask questions about the use of the building. 
• For large valuable buildings with valuable things inside, they will negotiate 
with insurer and involve them from the beginning of the process. 
• Some insurance companies understand a lot about the process and the 
regulations. 
• At the other end of the spectrum, an insurance company wouldn’t accept a 
system that didn’t meet Australian standards even if it would have been better. 
• Majority of people in the property industry don’t know much about process. 
• Owners of large buildings and multiple buildings are becoming more aware of 
complexity of process and the benefits and limitations of PBD. 
• FSEs try to take human error out of design by not basing it on requirements 
like keeping exit corridors clear. 
• Regarding Building C, the building surveyor approached him about staged 
occupancy.  He said it was complicated and requires that all parties be 
involved and agree on a strategy. 
• Building surveyor has the responsibility to ensure that he only issues 
occupancy permits for buildings that are safe. 
• The builder is responsible for making sure the building complies. 
• Builder often won’t get paid until the occupancy permit is issued, which is one 
of the motivators for staged occupancy. 
• No regulations governing staged occupancy.  Up to the building surveyor to 
impose requirements on the process. 
• Legally, the building surveyor is qualified to make these decisions if he’s 
taken the building surveyors course. 
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• Most can understand the fire engineering report but often not the complexities 
of fire engineering. 
• Privatized building surveyors are just as good as or better than government 
employed building surveyors because it’s their reputation on the line.  For 
council employees they get paid no matter what so it doesn’t matter. 
• Builders are concerned with time and money, not with fire safety. 
 
D.9 Subject 9 
Building Manager for Building B 
 
• Managed the building since it was completed 
• Responsible for all the maintenance of the building 
• Manages 5 buildings total, Building B is the smallest 
• Been a building manager for about 20 years 
• Building is largely used for short term accommodation 
• Maintenance done by outside contractors 
• Relies on feedback from occupants and regulatory officials to determine if 
things are being maintained properly. 
• No technical background, not familiar with the alternative design associated 
with the building 
• Relies on the occupancy permit to determine how the fire safety systems need 
to be maintained. 
• Relies on the contractors to make sure they comply 
• Uses primarily two companies for fire safety system maintenance (including 
fire extinguishers, exit signs, and ensuring egress paths are clear) 
• These companies handle both inspections and repairs 
• Building built to price rather than for quality 
• People are provided with pamphlet detailing evacuation procedures and these 
are also on the door (only for apartments used for short term accommodation) 
• Occasionally have problems with people leaving trash out in the hallway; this 
is quickly noticed and rectified 
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D.10 Subject 10 
Building Manager for Building E (This person was interviewed on site during 
the site visit and also talked to over the phone) 
 
• He was the health and safety delegate for the distribution centre 
• The parcels were cleared out everyday before the end of the day 
• In some rare cases the distribution centre would have some packages that were 
left there overnight, but it was never an excessive amount 
• In the even rarer case that there was a strike, which has happened in the past, 
the packages either would never make it into the distribution centre and would 
be left in the trucks in the truck and trailer parking or the packages would be 
left in the distribution centre. He said the last time there was a strike, there was 
not a large amount of packages that were left in the distribution centre 
• The delegate knew that excessive storage of parcels in the distribution centre 
was a potential safety hazard 
• He knew that the sprinklers were deleted along with the smoke detection 
system 
• He also knew the reason why the smoke detection system was deleted  
• The delegate also knew that the building just went over the area that sprinklers 
were required 
•  He was under the impression that the CCTV was part of the fire safety system 
where the security gatehouse had the feed to all the cameras that were in the 
buildings. The security gate house at the time of the visit was only getting one 
camera view and it was of the gate that was on the other side of the street.  
• During the follow up interview, he informed the group that the CCTV system 
was fixed and fed all the cameras to the security gatehouse which, since the 
follow up phone call was only 5 days after the site visit, showed the timely 
manner in which he resolved problems 
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D.11 Subject 11 
10Private building surveyors
 
• No regulation governing small changes in building such as those that arise 
from change in tenants 
• These changes aren’t policed at all.  No way to know how often it happens 
• If there is a change of function within a use, the planning regulations might 
pick it up 
• Occupancy permit may have limits on fire load, occupancy, etc.  Recorded by 
council but not necessarily policed. 
• Local council is really the only regulatory body 
• Not all owners/managers actually take the time to read and understand the 
occupancy permit 
• Don’t always deal with the owner directly, sometimes deal with project 
manager or other representative of owner 
• Ideally, they will deal with all stakeholders at design time 
• Buildings often built with no owner in mind, building is built and then a buyer 
is found 
• FSEs often come up with same solution so that the ultimate effect is that the 
DtS provisions have been expanded to these new fire engineered values 
• PBD fairly young in Australia.  Designers often start trying to meet the DtS 
and only use PBD if the DtS becomes impractical 
• Very rare for buildings to be designed entirely using PBD 
• Broad spectrum of building managers.  Most are not aware of the intricacies of 
the needs of the building 
• Fire safety not a primary concern for building developer/owner.  More 
concerned with finding tenants 
• Building managers are rarely involved in the design, and is often ignorant of 
the requirements of the fire safety systems 
• Generally with factories, warehouses, offices, etc the final owner is not known 
at the time of design. 
                                                 
10 This interview was done as a combined interview with two building surveyors present. 
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• Usually, contractors give one year warranty with systems they install 
• Insurers have some impact on how much attention is paid to fire safety 
• Some organizations (government, hospitals, and some companies) have their 
own additional requirements.  For example, mandatory smoke detectors in 
schools 
• Most insurance companies have a good understanding of PBD 
• Their office doesn’t even consider single stair buildings.  Some FSEs won’t 
consider them either 
 
D.12 Subject 12 
 
A Private Building Surveyor, President/Owner of Surveying Firm 
 
• Has seen many of the problems we have seen 
• His business deals with audits and inspections of buildings and he sees all 
these normal “stuff-ups” all the time 
• Private surveying does almost 80% of the inspections  
• Checks the buildings in the area of the essential safety measures and all other 
aspects of the building that can impose safety risk and these checks happen 
once, twice, or four times a year for over 12,000 inspections 
• The company also put all these checks down into log books and has the log 
book for every building they have ever performed an audit or inspection for 
• Most people are driven by money 
• Most people are “slack” 
• Sometimes you will come across people that are very ethical and they tend to 
implement everything properly 
• People that are paying money want the cheapest, and everyone receiving the 
money need a profit, which causes a degrading service 
• These problems are happening all over Australia and has proof because he has 
companies in other states 
• There isn’t any legislation to enforce these regulations 
• The reality is education doesn’t work because the dollar is a stronger power 
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• Maintenance is a bottomless pit of money which is why a lot of owners and 
managers tend not to spend a lot of money on it because they would rather pay 
the fines due to the lesser amount of money that the fines are compared to cost 
of implementation or maintenance of systems 
• Example: There was a building, a client of his, had a building high rise with 
all the safety systems, such as sprinklers, smoke detection, stair pressurization, 
and automatic fire brigade calling, etc., and he tested it one day on a Sunday in 
the morning when no one was in the building, and 60-70% of the fire safety 
systems didn’t work. He set of some smoke bombs in the foyer and the lifts 
were supposed to go to the nearest floors to the ground with out smoke but 
instead it went to the ground floor where all the smoke was. The stair 
pressurization system didn’t work either. The fans that were supposed to start 
when the alarm was triggered didn’t turn on. The fire brigade was supposed to 
be called when the alarm was triggered and the fire brigade was never called. 
The egress system didn’t work. This was an owner that was doing something, 
but didn’t work.  
• There a problem with owners that know there is a problem and are doing 
something about it and nothing works and owners that are not doing anything 
about it 
• They inspect building and give the owners and managers a log book that has 
all the information they need to fix the systems and then they come back 6 
months later for another inspection and they didn’t fix anything. He would talk 
to them and ask the client why and they would respond because there are too 
many buildings I own and if I were to fix them all then it would cost me much 
more than a couple thousand dollars in fines. 
• The legislation has to change so that the fines are just as more costly to the 
owner then the implementation and maintenance 
• When the building surveyor issues an occupancy permit they give it to the 
owner and it is there job to inform who’s in charge of what to do to maintain 
the building. This step is being left out in a lot of buildings 
• Managers don’t read the permit and don’t understand why they have to 
maintain these aspects of the building where if they were to read it, they would 
understand this much better 
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• Example: In Sydney they have a client that had a high rise building and they 
picked on the doors and they wanted them to get rid of them because they 
were made out of asbestos. And they wrote in their log book that they had to 
make sure they abide by the public safety regulations. 6 months later they 
came back for another inspection and they took off all the doors on all 38 
floors and now there weren’t any fire doors into the stairs. They gave them a 
call of why this happened and the owner of the building said that they took off 
the doors but the new ones haven’t come in yet. The doors had been off for 
almost 2 weeks before the inspection.  
• Some of there clients left them and then came back years later because they 
provide great services even though they’re more expensive. There are too 
many owners that go to other surveyors that cost half the price of them that 
don’t even know occupancy permits exist 
• Too many surveyors that don’t necessarily take good care of there work 
• Bottom line of cost and education  
• The vast majority of senior building surveyors don’t believe FSE that is 
because in Australia they can put a design forward with outcomes that they do 
not have to be accountable for.  
• It is the building surveyor or the municipal building surveyor that is 
accountable because they are the ones signing off for it 
• Developers shop around for surveyors to get someone in their “comfort-zone” 
• If a developers come to there company without asking price and instead come 
in with a idea in their head like here is our building would you sign off on this 
and then delete something and then ask them if they would approve of that, 
they say get out of our office 
• FSE design a safe building but that is right on the limit and all the safety 
systems have to click in all at the exact same time and this doesn’t always 
happen all the time 
• Not enough building surveyors! 
• 400 building surveyors in Victoria, of which 1/3 of them actively don’t issue 
permits. There are only about 333 operating building surveyors a 1/3 of those 
are very qualified and don’t get the best buildings. You get the top end 
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building surveyors getting the best buildings, but now they are getting too 
many of them and then their work slacks. 
• 31% of building surveyors didn’t issue permits 
• 69% of registered building surveyor were active in the last year 
• 25% issued between 1 and 100 permits 
• 14% issued between 101 and 200 permits 
• 19% issued between 200 and 500 permits 
• 11% issued over 500 permits 
• Building surveyors don’t charge enough 
• The systems don’t protect the surveyor enough  
• A FSE should be accountable for his design and take liability for it 
• Other building surveyors are going for quantity not quality 
• A company that makes log books that are different from the ones people have 
been using and it is a scannable log book that way the building managers can 
scan it and send it back to the company and then give it to the appropriate 
people to keep record of it. This system catches if the companies are actually 
doing the repairs. Sometimes if the repair and maintenance companies know 
that a building is using the system, then they will bring more people and spend 
more time at that specific building. This will cause the other buildings that the 
maintenance company has to not get there maintenance and then they fall 
behind, so it is a lack of people that causes lack of maintenance. 
• The technicians make more money out of installation and less on maintenance, 
so they tend not to take time to do the maintenance 
• They should (the MFB or the Municipal building surveyor) pick out a high 
rise or an age care facility or a hospital and really dig into them. Make them 
pay for all there mistakes and make them fix all there building problems to 
make an example so that everyone else will want to fix there buildings before 
they get caught. Put some fear in them. 
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